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Abstract 
It is well known that in English law the indemnity insurers stand in a better 
position than the assureds and this is especially true when a claim is delayed: in 
that scenario, the insurer is neither liable for the damage caused by the late 
payment, nor for the compound interest. 
In Sprung v. Royal Insurance ([1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep IR 111) this unfair situation 
was justified by the Court of Appeal, naturally, it brought an opportunity for the 
Law Commission to reconsider the law. 
Recently, the new Insurance Act 2015 has been enacted and subsequently 
amended by the Enterprise Act 2016 in regards to the insurer’s obligation to 
make a timely payment; however, the legal effect of the new legislation is 
unknown due to the lack of binding precedents. 
In this work, the duty of the indemnity insurer shall be discussed in full and this 
work will try to make a contribution to the interpretation of the new legislation 
regarding to the obligation of the insurer and remedies for the assured. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The Insurance Bill and the intentional omission 
1.1.1 In July 2014, the English and Scottish Law Commissions, after over 7 
years research and consultation, finally completed a draft Bill for modern 
insurance legislation and it was intended to be named as the Insurance 
Contracts Act 2014.1 This draft Bill would make some significant amendments to 
the only statute which regulates indemnity insurance contracts in this country: 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA 1906), which is considered too obsolete to 
fit the modern insurance practice today. 
According to the Bill lots of issues have been changed significantly such as the 
duty of disclosure, the effect of a breach of a warranty, the effect of fraudulent 
claims and perhaps one of the most important changes among them is the 
insurer’s obligation to make timely payment after loss and its obligation if no 
such payment is reasonably made. 
1.1.2 However, it was surprising to find that in the final Bill, which was sent to the 
House of Lords for its readings, the section relating to late payment above was 
intentionally omitted. This meant that the only chance to add that section back to 
the legislation again would be in the amendment stage before the Royal Assent, 
or it could be done so in another legal reform in insurance law. 
As time went by, the Insurance Bill was named as the Insurance Act 2015 on 12th 
February, when the Bill received the Royal Assent. It is now an Act of Parliament 
                                         
1 Available on< http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc353_insurance-contract-law.pdf>, from p.351, 
accessed on 3
rd
 Dec 2014. 
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and it will come into force in August 2015, which means that there will be no 
statutory regulation of the insurer’s obligation on payment in that modern 
legislation on insurance, at least not in 2015 and 2016. However, the 
government said they would rethink on this point and this problem was finally 
resolved by the Enterprise Bill 2015 (now the Enterprise Act 2016); as a 
Government Bill rather than a Law Commission Bill it is able to contain 
controversial materials and the impact of the new Enterprise Bill will also be 
discussed in this work.  
1.2 Reasons for the omission  
1.2.1 For those who are not familiar with English insurance law, they may be 
curious about the importance of that section: because the insurer’s duty on 
payment stated in that section has been long recognized by the majority of 
common law countries such as Australia, Canada and some states of the USA; 
and civil law countries such as most of the countries in the EU and China. More 
importantly, this approach is also considered a European insurance principle;2 
however, that obligation has never been recognized by English law and more 
anomalously it is generally believed that English law regards the obligation of the 
insurer as one to “hold the assured harmless” by preventing the loss,3 rather 
than to pay the indemnity under the policy. It could be imagined that before 
sending the revised bill to the House of Lords, there must have been a heated 
debate on whether the original section, s.14, should be maintained, but 
                                         
2 See Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), Art 6:103.  
3
 For a detailed discussion see chapter 2 of this work. 
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regrettably it was decided by the Law Commission that a negative answer 
should be given. 
1.2.2 This omission caused series of responses from the market and even from 
those consulted in the House of Lords. In the Committee Stage the 
representative of the Law Commission was asked by the House to give 
reasons.4 
In its response, the Law Commissioner David Hertzell made several points to 
support the omission: 
Firstly, it was accepted by the Law Commission and the English government that 
this section would introduce a brand new cause of action in insurance law, and 
there was a lack of market consensus to do so.5 
Secondly, it was highly possible that this section could introduce uncertainty and 
unnecessary disputes, such as so-called “American fake litigations”, which 
would possibly ruin the reputation of the London market. 
Thirdly, it was noticed by the Law Commission that even though most national 
insurers accepted the original section on the insurer’s obligation, those who did 
international business, such as Lloyd’s, expressed strong opposition. 
To support the omission, Mr. Kees van der Klugt who represented Lloyd’s added 
a few points:6 
                                         
4
 Radio record available on <http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=16698>, accessed 
on 2nd Dec 2014. 
5 ibid, see also David Hertzell’s Memorandum, available on 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/HoL-Legislation-Office/Special-Public-Bill-Committees/Insurance-Bi
ll-%5bHL%5d/Evidence/Evidence%201-%20David%20Hertzell,%20Law%20Commissioner.pdf>, 
accessed on 2
nd
 Dec 2014, at para.15. 
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Firstly, Lloyd’s worried about speculative damage claims and these claims would 
inevitably prolong any litigation which could damage the efficiency of the 
international insurance business. 
Secondly, Lloyd’s believed that there were only a small number of disputes on 
the issue of an insurer’s obligation to make timely payment and claims for 
damage for late payment. This fact, as was believed by Lloyd’s, suggested that 
insurers were doing well with the current legislation unchanged, and therefore it 
was redundant to change the current law. 
1.3 Responses to the omission 
1.3.1 Before the Committee Stage there was a call for evidence and parties 
representing different interests in the insurance market were asked to express 
their opinion on the draft Bill.  
Surprisingly, most of them, both insurers and assureds, expressed their 
disappointment about that omission; and in the Committee Stage there were 
also supportive voices for reintroducing the original s.14, from parties of different 
interests and even from the judiciary. 
Response from written evidences 
1.3.2 Simon Hodgson, who speaks for Aon, expressed his concern that7  
                                                                                                                       
6 Radio record available on <http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=16699>, accessed 
on 3rd Dec 2014.  
7
 See Written Evidence from Simon Hodgson, all relevant written evidences and responses below are 
collected by Merkin and available on <http://vle.exeter.ac.uk/mod/folder/view.php?id=393771>, accessed 
on 20
th
 Dec 2014. 
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“…the provision that provided for damages for late payment was both 
a welcome and necessary development to redress an imbalance in 
the current law.” 
It was also a worry for Mr. Hodgson that it would be uncertain whether the new 
legislation would have the same effect which it was meant to have when the 
original s.14 was in, if the Bill passed the readings without the original s.14; and 
he further believed that such omission was a shame and a great opportunity was 
missed by it. Therefore Aon, even as an insurer, would wholeheartedly support 
the reintroduction of the original s.14 at a later stage.8 
Sue Lewis from the Financial Services Consumer Panel (FSCP)9 expressed a 
more direct “catcall”. It was pointed out by FSCP that the majority of the Bill was 
devoted to increasing the protection for the insurer, and the only reason for the 
insurance industry and the Law Commission to reach the consensus that the 
original s.14 should be omitted was because they were unwilling to resolve the 
problem in the interest of assureds, especially consumer assureds. Therefore, 
while expressing their strong disappointment, the FSCP wished the original s.14 
to be put back at a later stage. 
It may have a surprising effect to find that the RSA Insurance Group (RSA)10 not 
only expressed its disappointment for the omission of the original s.14 but also 
discussed the importance of that section in detail. It was believed by the RSA 
that the original s.14 reflected a reasonable legal point of view and it also 
                                         
8 See Aon UK Limited Response to The Special Public Bill Committee on The Insurance Bill. 
9
 See Evidence by the Financial Services Consumer Panel on the Insurance Bill. 
10 See The Insurance Bill – written submissions from RSA Insurance Group plc in response to the call for 
evidence issued by the Special Public Bill Committee of the House of Lords. 
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reflected good commercial practice in the modern insurance market; and 
therefore that section would not harm the interest of insurers, rather, it could 
protect them in the long term as it would encourage assureds doing business in 
this market rather than elsewhere in the world. It was also of concern to the RSA 
that, even it was technically possible to reintroduce such clause at a later date or 
in another legal reform, should the section fail to be added back during the 
Committee Stage it would be unrealistic to believe that it could be done in a short 
time.  
The same conclusion was also reached by brokers in the British Insurance 
Broker’s Association (BIBA), the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS), the 
legal practitioners: BLM Law Firm and the reinsurers: Reinsurance Group of 
America (RGA) 
Discussion in the Committee Stage 
1.3.3 In the Committee Stage, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
expressed the view that their members were strongly in favour that s.14 should 
be added again and this would bring incentives to insurers developing actions 
before a formal litigation, such as settlements, to the claim. 
Longmore LJ, an experienced judge of the Court of Appeal, also expressed the 
view that s.14 should have been maintained and His Lordship was unable to 
understand the reasons provided by the Law Commission on why s.14 was 
omitted. Longmore LJ clearly stated that the law should encourage assureds to 
16 
 
fight for their rights and that encouragement could not happen without s.1411 
and only after the statutory change could the court safeguard that right through 
the common law approach. 
However, Lord Mance, an honourable judge of the Supreme Court, believed the 
issue of an insurer’s obligation to make timely payment with damage for late 
payment should not be covered by legislation, but His Lordship recommended 
assureds, who intended to avoid damage for late payment, to put in place 
business interruption policies.12 However, this suggestion could not solve this 
problem completely, and in a landmark case Sprung v. Royal Insurance13 His 
Lordship, concluded that the English law on the obligation of the insurer was 
“notorious”.  
1.3.4 Along with these strong opposing views to the omission, there are some 
further points which would support legislative regulation on the insurer’s 
obligation for timely payment and damage for the late payment. 
Firstly, it was said by both Lloyd’s and the Law Commission that they worried 
about the uncertainty brought by the new cause of action and fake litigations, 
however, that worry itself is a lack of confidence in the judicial system and the 
professionalism of the English commercial courts. It has been mentioned and 
                                         
11
 The reason is that in English law the amount paid by the indemnity insurer is in the name of “damages” 
and there is no cause of action for “damage over damage”, for detailed discussions on this point see 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this work. 
12 In fact, business interruption policy could neither prevent nor solve this problem, see Pride Valley Foods 
Ltd v. Independent Insurance Co Ltd [1996] Lloyd’s Rep I.R.120, this case is further discussed in chapter 
2 of this work; see also Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands Ltd v. McHugh [1997] LRLR 94, 
which is discussed in chapter 3 of this work. 
13
 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep IR 111. 
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noticed by the House that most countries around the world have adopted that 
approach and among them Australia is a very good lesson.14 
Secondly, no one can deny the fact that the current English position on the 
insurer’s obligation is so isolated and anomalous; and even though, it was 
argued by Lloyd’s that this situation could maintain the “good reputation” and 
“international competitiveness” of London market, it is hard to believe that such a 
system could achieve that effect and it does not seem to comply with common 
sense. 
Thirdly, it was admitted by Lloyd’s that “clients are the heart of insurance 
business” but, compared with their strong opposition against the right approach 
to the insurer’s liability, that statement becomes ironic.15 It was also stated by 
Lloyd’s that their insurers would make timely payments in order to maintain their 
reputation, but this statement should be regarded as an incentive to maintain the 
original s.14 rather than against that. 
Fourthly, it was pointed out by Lloyd’s that there were fewer cases on the issue 
of late payment; but this situation is in fact a very dangerous signal: it is not 
because the insurers are doing well, but because the assureds have no way to 
seek for a remedy.16 
                                         
14
 Indeed, the Australian position is not free from problems, but at least it reflects a better understanding 
about insurance contracts, and more importantly, it is developing rather than remaining unchanged; for a 
useful comparison, Australian common law, statute and industrial self-regulation will be introduced and 
discussed in chapter 2, 3 and chapter 6 in this work. 
15 In fact, Lloyd’s statement on late payment was also doubted by the House of Lords during the hearing: 
<http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=16699>, accessed on 3
rd
 Dec 2014. 
16 There is a case line in which assureds lost each and every case on late payment, and this could deter the 
assured from seeking a remedy through the judicial system of this country. 
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1.3.5 Another point is to be read with the change in warranty: in the new 
legislation the obsolete rules on insurance warranty in English law have been 
replaced by modern ones with references from the general practice in most of 
the European countries. It was pointed out by Longmore LJ that it was correct to 
follow the European approach in this modern insurance legal reform because 
most of them were more reasonable. There is no doubt that this is a right 
understanding of how to keep the national market competitive and reputable. 
Accordingly, this approach should have been extended to an insurer’s obligation 
on payment and it makes the omission more unacceptable. 
1.4 Introduction to this work 
1.4.1 According to the brief introduction about the background of the English 
legal position on the insurer’s obligation of payment, several important questions 
have to be asked: 
What is the nature of indemnity insurance in this country? 
Why is the insurer’s obligation in this country to prevent the loss? 
Why could the assured not seek a remedy when the insurer’s non-payment or 
late payment causes damage and is that in balance? 
How could the law (common law and statute) in this country have developed in 
this way? 
Has there been any misunderstanding during the development of the law 
(common law and statute) in this country which leads to the problem? 
What is the available remedy for the assured? 
19 
 
What is the right approach? 
This work is intended to answer those questions provided above by firstly, 
analysing the backgrounds of the leading cases about the obligation of the 
insurers and what have really been decided in those leading cases which lead 
English law to the current situation; secondly, academic opinions elaborated in 
journal articles and books would also be critically analysed because those 
opinions are of great importance as well as the opinions from Law Commission 
Reports when the current law is to be reformed; thirdly, it should be noted that 
both Australia and New Zealand used to share the same statute on insurance 
law with the UK, however, the modern insurance law in those country deviates 
from their origin and therefore a comparative law study would be focus on the 
development of Australian law and the law in New Zealand; additionally, the 
questions provided above could also find answers in non-legal solutions such as 
the UK’s Financial Ombudsman Service and Australian General Insurance’s 
Code of Practice. In addition to the answers to the questions provided above, 
this work will try to make contribution to the development of the law in insurance, 
especially for the justification of the original s.14 of the Bill and hopefully it could 
also make a contribution to the future legal reform on the insurer’s obligation. 
It is a piece of surprising news that before this work was submitted the 
government published the new Enterprise Bill17, where the original s.14 is 
reintroduced as s.28; additionally in s.29 of the Bill it further regulates the rule for 
contracting out of the implied term of late payment. No wonder it is an inspiring 
                                         
17 The Enterprise Bill has become the Enterprise Act 2016 on 4th May 2016 and it will come into force on 4th 
May 2017. 
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message for assureds but it has to be remembered that a brand new cause of 
action would inevitably cause difficulties in practice and this work intends to 
make discussions and comments on the application of that section. 
1.4.2 As to the structure of this work, it will, firstly, according to the general 
principle in contract law, introduce the insurer’s primary and secondary 
obligation: this part is the foundation of the whole work because without a clear 
definition and description about the obligation of the insurer it is impossible to 
discuss the remedy of the assured, and by making a clear distinction between 
the primary and secondary of the insurer a powerful support shall be provided to 
the reform of the current law; accordingly, chapter 2 of this work will focus on the 
primary obligation of the insurer and chapter 3 will focus on the secondary 
obligation of the insurer. 
After the discussion of the primary and secondary obligation of the insurer, it 
would be safe to conclude that damages should have been regarded as an 
appropriate remedy for the insurer and it will be an appropriate remedy for the 
insurer in the future. However, currently the only available remedy provided by 
law for the insurer is interest and the law on the issues about the interest is far 
from clear; therefore, chapter 4 of this work would discuss the general issues 
about the nature of interest while chapter 5 would discuss awarding interest in 
insurance claims. 
In chapter 6 of this work, non-legal based remedies shall be introduced because 
they provide efficient remedies for the assured even when the law is silent. 
These remedies have different natures: they could be ADR (Alternative Disputes 
Resolutions) which is not bound by law or insurance industry’s self-regulatory 
21 
 
code of conducts. Therefore, in chapter 6 the most important non-legal based 
ADR in the UK: FOS shall be discussed as well as the well-developed Australian 
industry’s code: General Insurance Code of Practice.   
Lastly, the new Enterprise Act 2016 will have the force of the law shortly and the 
effect of the new Act would be discussed throughout this work; however, the 
application that Act may cause future uncertainty in reinsurance area and 
therefore, the new impact will be discussed in chapter 7 and followed by a 
conclusion of the whole work.  
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Chapter 2 The Insurer’s Primary Obligation 
2.1 The current law: the “hold harmless” doctrine 
2.1.1 It is common sense that the insurance contract, except the contingency 
insurance, is a contract of indemnity; this nature is codified in the only statutory 
document on insurance law: the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA). Section 1 
states that 
“A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the assured…”18 
However, the detailed requirement of the obligation of the insurer is still unclear 
and cannot be found in the MIA. Therefore, in this chapter the primary duty of the 
insurer under English law will be introduced in accordance with general contract 
law principles and followed by a detailed discussion about its problem. 
Additionally, leading cases which caused the problem will be read and analysed. 
Lastly, a reform proposal will be provided supporter by academic articles, case 
analyses and comparative law. 
2.1.2 It needs to be noted that, unlike legislation in some other countries,19 there 
is no statutory definition about the primary duty of the insurer and therefore, the 
primary duty of the insurer has to be found in case law. 
2.1.3 In The Fanti and The Padre Island20 (The Fanti) the duty was described by 
Lord Goff as one 
                                         
18
 MIA 1906 s.1, notably the application of this Act extends to other types of indemnity insurance. 
19 For example, see Art.10 of Chinese Insurance Law. 
20
 [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191. 
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“…to hold the indemnified person harmless against a specified loss or 
expense…”21 
Although the policy in The Fanti was against liability, it was subsequently held by 
Hirst J in The Italia Express (No.2)22 that the doctrine of “hold harmless” given 
by Lord Goff would apply equally in both property and liability insurance.  
After The Fanti the “Pandora’s Box” was open: it was legally certain after that 
case that the obligation of the insurer was regarded as one to hold the assured 
harmless by preventing the loss in indemnity insurance contracts; this makes the 
English position anomalous from the rest of the world. 
2.1.4 In The Italia Express (No.2) a policy was issued by the insurer against war 
risks and the vessel, The Italia Express, was sunk by explosives. The insurers 
rejected the claim “fairly but persistently” for more than three years, because the 
insurer noticed that some tape recordings indicated that the assured might in 
fact have sunk the vessel himself. After these surreptitious tape recordings 
finally turned out to be inadmissible the insurers withdrew the defence and paid 
the claim according to the policy. However, the assured raised additional claims 
caused by the delay, according to an argument that the insurer’s primary duty 
was to make good the loss. This argument was rejected by Hirst J and the 
learned judge, relying on The Fanti, said that 
“…once the loss is suffered or the expense incurred, the indemnifier is 
in breach of contract for having failed to hold the indemnified person 
harmless against the relevant loss or expense; this phraseology is 
                                         
21 The Fanti [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191, at p.202. 
22
 [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 281. 
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entirely appropriate to cover both the loss against which the insured is 
indemnified under property insurance, and the expense against 
which he is indemnified under liability insurance.”23  
2.2 The problem 
2.2.1 According to the authorities above, the insurer’s primary duty, under 
indemnity insurance, is now being described as to “hold the assured harmless” 
rather than to pay a valid claim; and the “hold harmless” doctrine is treated the 
same way as the duty of preventing the loss.  
Even though the words “hold harmless” have been widely used in defining the 
nature of the insurer’s obligation in English law, it has to be remembered that 
without a further explanation in detail these words could make assureds, and 
sometimes even insurers, to wonder the exact meaning other than the duty of 
preventing the loss. Accordingly, it has to be admitted that these words are 
unhelpful for defining or performing insurance contracts. 
Additionally, it is fair to say that once the risk insured against occurs and the 
damage is suffered, the insurer would be automatically in the position of breach 
of the insurance contract. In Transthene Packaging Co Ltd v. Royal Insurance 
(UK) Ltd24 the position of insurers was described by HHJ Michael Kershaw QC 
that 
                                         
23 The Italia Express (No.2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 281 at p.292, emphasis added. 
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 [1996] LRLR 32. 
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“…they are, collectively, in breach of contract hundreds or thousands 
of times every day, whenever a fire, a flood, a road accident or other 
such event occurs”25 
2.2.2 In addition to these surprising findings, another issue which is more serious 
would appear: namely there would be no remedy for the damage suffered by the 
assured which is caused by the insurer’s late payment. This problem, although 
first raised in The Italia Express (No.2), was subsequently found in the leading 
case for the issue of late payment, Sprung v. Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd.26 
Introduction to Sprung v. Royal Insurance 
2.2.3 In Sprung the assured, Mr. Sprung, a small businessman who owned a 
factory, bought two policies to protect his business against theft and his plant 
and machinery from “sudden and unforeseen damage that necessitates 
immediate repair of the plant before it can resume normal working”. 
Unfortunately, in April 1986 vandals broke into Mr. Sprung’s premises and 
destroyed both the insured’s plant and factory. During the year of 1986 the 
business conditions for Mr. Sprung were hard and therefore a timely payment 
made by the insurer was of fundamental importance. However, the insurer did 
not make the payment and six months after the accident Mr. Sprung was out of 
business because, without the indemnity paid by the insurer, he was unable to 
raise a loan.  
2.2.4 In his claim against the insurer in 1990, Mr. Sprung was supported by the 
trial judge for the payment under the policy and it was also pointed out in the first 
                                         
25 Transthene Packaging Co Ltd v. Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1996] LRLR 32, at p.40. 
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 [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 111. 
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trial that such payment of the policy should have been made some four years 
ago. In addition, the trial judge found that, calculated by reference to the value of 
the lost opportunity to sell his business, Mr. Sprung also suffered a further loss of 
£75,000. However, it was then held that this uninsured amount of the further 
damage caused by the late payment could not be awarded due to the lack of a 
legal basis, although the loss of plant and machinery plus simple interest was 
allowed. Being unsatisfied with this judgment, Mr. Sprung went on to the Court of 
Appeal to claim damage for late payment; however, his claim failed. 
2.2.5 The Court of Appeal held that they were bound by authorities which 
defined the primary duty of insurers, which was to hold the assured harmless 
and therefore no other damage than the insured amount could be granted. 
However, Beldam LJ said the law should be reformed: 
“There will be many who share Mr. Sprung’s view that…such an 
award is inadequate…as a result of insurer’s failure to pay, and the 
early consideration should be given to reform of the law in similar 
cases.”27 
2.2.6 It could be inferred from Sprung and cases introduced above that once the 
insured risk happens and the damage is suffered the assured has to pray for a 
timely payment and there would be no remedy for him if the payment is delayed, 
reasonably or not: because the law does not recognize that paying a valid claim 
is a duty of the insurer. After Sprung, an increasing number of doubts and 
criticisms about the “hold harmless” doctrine appeared due to the unjust 
outcome of that case. 
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 Sprung v. Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 111, at p.80. 
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Doubts about Sprung 
2.2.7 It has to be noted in the first place, that in order to allow the damage for 
late payment two issues have to be lifted together, namely the primary obligation 
of the insurer and the rule for damage. In this chapter the focus is to be put on 
the issue of the primary obligation of the insurer, because the primary obligation 
of the insurer shall be understood as the precondition of the rule for damages. 
Moreover, it is also pointed out that without a careful review on the primary duty 
of the insurer cases such as Sprung seemed to be “unimpeachable”.28 
2.2.8 Historically, it was pointed out by Hasson that  
“English rules of insurance are more oppressive to the insured than 
are the ordinary rules of contracts.”29 
Although the favouring of the insurer could have been justified by historical 
reasons,30 it is  
“…surprising therefore that dramatic changes in the practice of 
insurance, particularly in relation to the domestic market, have not led 
to changes in the legal principles…”31 
                                         
28 John R. Birds, ‘No damages remedy when insurers unjustifiably repudiate liability’, J.B.L (1997) 368, at 
p.371. 
29 Hasson, R. ‘The special nature of the insurance contract’, M.L.R (1984), Vol.47, No.505, at p.507. 
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 For example, the asymmetry of information. In old time it was very difficult for the insurer to know the 
exact condition about the insured vessel, therefore, for the development of navigation industry the law 
was in favour of the insurer at that time. 
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 Lisa Martine Bowyer, ‘Insurance contract law and regulation and competition in the UK insurance industry: 
The missing link’, (2000) JFRC 8(2), 140-148, at p.140; as to the change of market practice, see 
International Hull Clause 2003 Cl.46.7, which requires the insurer to make a decision within 28 days. 
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Therefore, nowadays the “hold harmless” doctrine, as a doctrine dramatically in 
favour of the insurer, has to be understood as a historical product and requires 
careful scrutiny. However, it is more anomalous to find that the “hold harmless” 
doctrine itself has no historical basis, especially on the ground of property 
insurance. 
2.2.9 It could be concluded from Sprung that the meaning and the function of the 
“hold harmless” doctrine is that the once an indemnity insurance is entered into, 
the insurer promises that the event insured against would not occur, nor cause 
loss or damage to the assured; once the loss does occur, the insurer is 
immediately and automatically in breach, and the payment afterwards to the 
assured is the damage and therefore no further damage is allowed. However, 
this conclusion is at least open to serious doubt.  
2.2.10 It is hard to imagine that, when an insurance contract is signed, the 
insurer has any intention to prevent the insured risk or is willing to take any effort 
to prevent it; it is because the policy itself is more like a promise made by the 
insurer: once the loss occurs the duty to indemnify will arise and that payment of 
indemnity, which comes from the promise, is the very subject matter of the 
contract rather than damage.32 In practice, once an assured is asked what is the 
promise provided by the insurer, the probable answer would be “pay me money, 
or repair my property, if I suffer a loss”33 rather than “to prevent the loss which I 
insured”. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the “hold harmless” doctrine in light 
of common sense and commercial sense.  
                                         
32
 See also Colin Ying, ‘Damages for late payment of insurance claims’, L.Q.R (Law Quarterly Review) 2006, 
122(Apr), 205-210 at p.208. 
33
 Neil Campbell, ‘The nature of an insurer’s obligation’, [2000] L.M.C.L.Q. 42 at p.42. 
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In addition, should the doctrine be correct an absurd situation would arise, 
namely no insurance contract could be performed in full if an insured peril occurs 
because at that time the contract has already been breached by the insurer, 
even without fault or intention. In other words, it is common ground that the main 
function of the insurance contract is to indemnify the assured once the insured 
loss was suffered;34 according to the “hold harmless” doctrine, there will be no 
obligation to perform the contract, but only to pay the damage for breach and no 
wonder this conclusion makes English insurance law anomalous and bizarre. 
It has also been pointed out by Marion Egan that despite the fact that the claims 
for damage in Sprung failed, the judgment, which was given ex tempore, was not 
“quite as clear as they might be”;35 therefore, it might be fairly inferred that the 
primary obligation of the insurer has not been decided in that case.  
This uncertainty was also found by the court itself in Pride Valley Foods Ltd v. 
Independent Insurance Co Ltd.36 In that case the assured raised a claim against 
the insurer for damages caused by the insurer’s failure to perform the primary 
obligation, namely to indemnify for the business interruption, while the insurer, 
based on the “hold harmless” doctrine and the case line before Sprung, applied 
to strike out the claim. The trial judge Parker J upheld the Master’s decision that 
the assured’s claim should be struck out. The Court of Appeal, expressing the 
view that the law had been criticized as moving in the wrong direction, granted 
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 MIA 1906 s.1. 
35 Marion Egan, ‘Insurer’s duty to pay’, Int. I.L.R. 1998, 6(5), 166-169 at p.168. 
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 [1996] Lloyd’s Rep I.R.120. 
30 
 
leave to appeal. However, due to the non-disclosure in that case,37 the assured 
failed and the debate on the insurer’s primary obligation was still left open.  
The academic debate 
2.2.11 It is worth stressing here again that the main discussion in this work is 
about the indemnity insurance and therefore, the meaning of “indemnity” itself 
should be discussed first.  
In English the legal definitions of the word “indemnity” related to insurance could 
be noted as follows: 
1. To keep the promise “harmless against loss”, an independent 
obligation undertaken by the indemnifier, which does not depend 
upon the existence of any other obligation of any other obligor.38 
2. A contract of liability insurance in which the insurer undertakes to 
indemnify the assured against legal liabilities incurred by him within a 
specified range.39 
3. A promise to compensate the insured in the event that loss does 
occur.40 
Therefore, it is not difficult to find that the “hold harmless” doctrine falls within the 
first definition. However, it has to be noted that the first definition is found in 
general contract law while it is accepted by courts now that the feature of 
                                         
37 Unreported, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), April 22, 1999. 
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 This is the definition in general contract law, see Halsbury’s Laws of England (2001), Vol 20 para 109. 
39 British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 (CA). 
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 Oxford English Dictionary, (2
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insurance is unique41 and the general rule of contract would not apply to 
indemnity insurance contracts, therefore it might be improper, literally, to define 
indemnity insurance in terms of the first definition; in addition, it is pointed out 
that 
“The recent English cases…have gone astray by focusing on the first 
meaning of indemnify, when they should have been focusing on the 
third.”42 
It is clear that in the second definition, no sign of “hold harmless” appears, 
although the definition came from a case of liability insurance;43 while it is also 
pointed out that the third definition “most accurately reflects both the parties’ 
intentions and precedent”44 in property insurance even though no one could 
read into the “hold harmless” doctrine out of that definition. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that the “hold harmless” doctrine has no literal origin from the legal 
definition of the word “indemnity”.  
It is also appropriate to introduce the different views of academics in textbooks in 
order to clarify the legal definition of indemnity insurance. 
In Arnould,45 the object of marine insurance is described as being  
                                         
41 This topic will be discussed in full in the next chapter of this work. 
42
 Neil Campbell, ‘The nature of an insurer’s obligation’, [2000] L.M.C.L.Q. 42 at p.48. 
43 However, it seems that the primary duty of a liability insurer could be treated as one to “hold the assured 
harmless” from legal liabilities in limited circumstances. 
44
 ibid. 
45 Jonathan Gilman, QC; Professor Robert M Merkin; Claire Blanchard, QC; Mark Templeman, QC, Arnould 
Law of Marine Insurance and Average (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013). 
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“…to prevent the assured from suffering loss by means of any of the 
perils against, and its whole spirit would be violated if he could make 
the occurrence of any such casualties a means of gain…”46 
In view of those who support the “hold harmless” doctrine, the definition provided 
above is a good resource. However, it is also stated in that distinguished book 
that 
“…its sole and exclusive object is to procure for the assured 
indemnity… for any losses he may sustain through… those perils 
[insured against]…”47 
Therefore a better understanding of the statement in Arnould is to treat the duty 
of the insurer as to stop and/or prevent the “suffering” rather than the “loss”: what 
an insurer could do is not to prevent the peril which is insured against, but to 
provide compensation in order to stop the assured “suffering” from the loss; and 
accordingly that definition is, in fact, not a supportive one for the “hold harmless” 
doctrine. 
Another clear opponent of the “hold harmless” doctrine can be found in Chitty,48 
in which the duty of the insurer of indemnity insurance is defined as being 
“…to compensate the assured for the loss that the latter may sustain 
through the happening of the event upon which the insurer’s liability 
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 ibid, at para 1-06. 
47 ibid. 
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 Professor Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts , (31
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may arise… the insurer’s obligation does not arise unless and until 
the assured has sustained a loss…”49 
The same position is also reached by Professor F.D. Rose,50 who suggests that 
“A contract of marine insurance is a contract of indemnity. Its purpose 
is that, when the assured suffers a loss as the result of a peril against 
which he is insured under the policy, the insurer will… pay him a sum 
of money [and the purpose]…can be achieved by that payment.”51 
In addition, the learned professor stresses that 
“To be indemnified… the assured must have suffered a loss…”52 
It is found by Neil53 that a similar position is also reached by Colinvaux,54 
Ivamy,55 and MacGillivray.56  
Accordingly, what constitute the most significant characteristics of indemnity 
insurance are loss and payment, rather than loss and the duty to prevent the 
loss; and should the words “hold the assured harmless” be used they have to be 
interpreted further by the duty of compensation. Therefore, it is a preferable 
argument that the primary duty of an indemnity insurer arises with the loss 
rather than be breached by the loss.57 
                                         
49 ibid, at para 41-003, emphasis added. 
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 F. D. Rose, Marine Insurance: Law and Practice, (2
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 edn, Informa, 2012). 
51 ibid, at para 1.26, emphasis added. 
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 ibid, at para 1.27, emphasis added. 
53 Neil Campbell, ‘The nature of an insurer’s obligation’, [2000] L.M.C.L.Q. 42 at p.61. 
54 Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, (7th edn ,London, 1997), at pp.5-6. 
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2.2.12 Without different contractual terms, a marine insurer’s obligation is 
subject to the MIA 1906 and according to the structure of the legislation the title 
of the relevant chapter is “Measure of Indemnity” rather than “Measure of 
Damage”, that is to say, the relevant sections within that chapter should be read 
as the contents of the insurer’s primary obligation,58 rather than a restriction to 
the remedy which the assured is entitled to when a so-called breach of the 
insurance contract occurs. It is supported by Neil that 
“…the relevant sections of the Act measure the insured’s primary right 
to an indemnity, and the insurer’s primary obligation to indemnify.”59 
In addition, no case which had held that the assured’s remedy in a policy was in 
terms of damage caused by the breach of the “hold harmless” doctrine could be 
found in the Digest of the Law Relating to Marine Insurance,60 from which book 
the statute was made. 
Therefore, the avoidance of the use of “damage” and “prevent” in MIA 1906 
seems to be intentional whilst the duty to indemnify, in other words, to pay a valid 
claim, should be regarded as the primary obligation of the insurer.  
Furthermore, once the primary obligation is fulfilled the insurer is then entitled to 
the right of subrogation. In s.79 of MIA 1906 the words which describe the 
precondition are “in so far as the assured has been indemnified…”61 Therefore, 
it could be concluded fairly that according to the statute, the primary obligation of 
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 It is also pointed out by Lord Mance that ss.67 to 69 do not rule out the availability of damage on late 
payment, see Lord Mance, ‘‘The 1906 Act, Common Law and Contract Claims All in Harmony?’ [2011] 
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the insurer should be the duty to indemnity rather than to “hold the assured 
harmless”. 
2.2.13 Apart from the terminology within the statute, the common law before 
Sprung, or more accurately, before The Italia Express (No.2), also seems to be 
against the “hold harmless” doctrine. 
In Simpson v. Thomson62 and Burnand v. Rodocanachi63 Lord Blackburn held 
that the meaning of the word “indemnity” was a payment made by the insurer in 
relation to the loss suffered by the assured, and therefore it was in fact a duty of 
recovery rather than a failure to prevent damage. In Castellain v. Preston64 Brett 
LJ stated that 
“The contract of insurance … is a contract of indemnity, and of 
indemnity only, and . . . this contract means that the assured, in case 
of a loss against which the policy has been made, shall be fully 
indemnified….That is the fundamental principle of insurance.”65 
In the same case, Cotton LJ described the insurance contract as 
“…a contract to indemnify the person insured for the loss which he 
has sustained in consequence of the peril insured against which has 
happened, and from that it follows, of course, that as it is only a 
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contract of indemnity, it is only to pay that loss which the assured may 
have sustained by reason of the fire which has occurred.”66 
Should the primary duty of the insurer be a duty of prevention, the obligation 
must arise at the time when the policy is issued. However, it is rightly pointed out 
that the tense used by Cotton LJ indicates that the obligation of the insurer 
arises no later than the occurrence of the insured loss,67 and the same inference 
could be made from Brett LJ as well.  
In Dane v. Mortgage Insurance Co. Ltd68 the role played by the insurer was 
described as 
“…a person who undertakes to pay money in a certain event…”69 
It was also held that 
“The policy…is a positive contract that, if the bank does not pay a 
certain amount on a fixed day, the insurance company will pay that 
amount.”70 
According to the judgment two issues were clarified afterwards. Firstly, the 
primary obligation of the insurer is to make the payment “in a certain event”. 
Secondly, the insurer has no obligation to prevent the event: for example, if a 
bank does not pay a certain amount to the depositor assured, what the insurer is 
obliged by law to do is simply pay that amount to the depositor rather than to 
prevent the bank from avoiding or not paying that debt. 
                                         
66 Castellain v. Preston (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 380 at p.393, emphasis added. 
67 Neil Campbell, ‘The nature of an insurer’s obligation’, [2000] L.M.C.L.Q. 42 at p.59. 
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In Prudential Insurance Co v. Inland Revenue Commissioners71 Channell J 
defined the insurance contract as 
“…a contract for the payment of a sum of money, or for some 
corresponding benefit such as the rebuilding of a house or the 
repairing of a ship, to become due on the happening of an 
event…”72 
It is clear that the judge rightly accepted the payment as the primary duty of an 
insurance contract. However, as to the duty of “hold harmless” the learned judge 
said that  
“Where you insure a ship or a house you cannot insure that the ship 
shall not be lost or the house burnt, but what you do insure is that a 
sum of money shall be paid upon the happening of a certain event. 
That, I think, is the first requirement in a contract of insurance.”73 
According to this judgment there is limited room for the duty of “hold harmless” in 
the indemnity insurance contract while the primary obligation of the insurer 
should be the timely payment. 
Subsequently, in Jabbour v. Custodian74 the traditional legal position introduced 
above was accepted by Pearson J, who refused to interpret the duty of the 
insurer as a kind of damage for failure to “hold the assured harmless”. It was 
held that 
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“…the word ‘damages’ is puzzling and seems to be used in a rather 
unusual sense, because the right to indemnity arises, not by reason of 
any wrongful act or omission on the part of the insurer (who did not 
promise that the loss would not happen or that he would prevent it) 
but only under his promise to indemnify the insured in the event of a 
loss.”75 
The same conclusion could also be reached from the Chandris case.76 In that 
case the assured ship-owners claimed for damage suffered from general 
average losses which happened some six years before. The argument provided 
by their insurer was that the claim was time barred and it was accepted by 
Megaw J (as he then was) by holding that the duty of the insurer would arise 
after the happening of the loss and the claim was indeed time barred. 
In summary, it is fair to conclude that historical authorities do not recognize the 
“hold harmless” doctrine, nor impose any duty of preventing loss upon the 
insurer. Those cases proved that the most important feature of indemnity 
insurance is the promise made by the insurer to pay a valid claim when the loss 
occurs and damage is suffered by the assured. Therefore, the modern cases in 
which the “hold harmless” doctrine is developed such as The Fanti, The Italia 
Express (No.2) and Sprung have to be reviewed carefully.77 
2.2.14 As mentioned above, an insurer could not prevent the loss from 
happening. It is also correct to argue that to prevent a loss might not be the 
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intention of the insurer and this is especially true in property insurance cases 
where most practical problems could be found. 
The mutual care and the cross claim 
2.2.15 It is common that the assured is required either by the policy78 or by law79 
to take reasonable care of the subject matter insured to hold himself harmless, 
therefore it has to be admitted that should the “hold harmless” doctrine apply to 
both parties in the policy both parties are obliged to prevent a loss and that is an 
odd position. 80  Moreover, once the loss is suffered, due to insufficient 
reasonable care, both parties are also in breach automatically: the insurer is in 
breach of preventing loss while the assured is in breach of a duty of care; should 
that be the case a cross-claim should would be raised frequently, which is in fact 
never seen in practice.  
Alternatively, should the insurer’s duty be one of prevention there has to be an 
implied term that the insurer should prevent the loss with reasonable care, as 
“…where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed 
that something shall be done, which cannot effectively be done unless 
both concur in doing it, the construction of the contract is that each 
agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the 
carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to 
that effect.”81 
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In addition to the implied term, once the primary duty of the insurer is regarded 
as one of preventing the loss, such a duty seems within the scope of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, which requires the service provider to carry out the 
service with reasonable care and skill. 82  Therefore, an insurer’s primary 
obligation is not only to prevent the loss, but also to prevent the loss with 
reasonable care and skill. In The Simona83 it was held that 
“…when one party wrongfully refuses to perform the obligations, this 
will not automatically bring the contract to an end. The innocent party 
has an option. He may either accept the wrongful repudiation as 
determining the contract or sue for damages or he may ignore or 
reject the attempt to determine the contract and affirm its continued 
existence.”84 
Therefore, as there is no such intention of the insurer,85 the assured may have 
an option to accept the repudiation by the insurer at the very beginning of the 
insurance contract rather than once the loss is suffered. However, this theory 
seems absurd and not aligning with commercial sense. Accordingly, to regard 
the primary obligation of the insurer as one of preventing loss is problematic.  
Alternatively, the explanation would become more practical if the primary duty of 
the insurer is regarded as one of compensation and this duty will not arise until 
the actual loss is suffered by the assured who has complied with the condition 
from policy or law.  
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The claim notification clause  
2.2.16 It is not uncommon now for a policy to impose a duty of notification on the 
assured86 which may become a condition precedent for the insurance claim. 
Should the duty of preventing the loss be the primary obligation, the explanation 
is irrational: the duty of preventing loss arises with the policy and it is breached 
when the loss occurs; then the innocent party shall have a right to sue. However, 
due to the claim notification clause, this breach cannot be sued for until a notice 
is given; this is illogical and complicated.  
Alternatively, the better understanding is that there is no breach at all before the 
undue delay of the payment; the contract was valid at that time, even though the 
loss has occurred; subsequently the primary obligation of providing 
compensation should be performed, but only after the proper notice is given to 
the insurer by the assured. If the notice is given late, the insurer could then claim 
damages for loss of opportunity to investigate and defend.87  
The non-intention of the insurer and the threat of gambling 
2.2.17 It needs also to be pointed out that, should the “hold harmless” doctrine 
become the leading principle, it would inevitably lead to the fact that in English 
law, insurers never indemnify assureds when the latter suffer insured losses, 
which should have been regarded as the fundamental purpose of the indemnity 
insurance because each and every payment made by the insurer is a payment 
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for damage. It would ruin the reputation of the insurance market and make the 
insurance relationship “surprising and odd”.88  
Generally speaking, the insurer should stand behind the assured, not before 
him.89 In addition, to impose the duty of “hold harmless”, which could not be 
performed on an insurer would also make an insurance policy sound like a form 
of gambling. Disregarding the issue of insurable interest on the side of the 
assured, this doctrine could push the insurer to be a gambler: although the 
insurer may have an interest in preventing the loss, it is rarely seen in practice 
that an insurer would really take care of the subject matter insured; what an 
insurer actually does is to receive the premium and do nothing but pray that the 
loss will not occur. Although this statement seems to lead nowhere, it 
nevertheless draws attention to the current understanding of the primary duty of 
the insurer. 
The problem with the election of reinstatement 
2.2.18 A more difficult problem can be found in the way of reinstatement in 
property insurance if the primary duty of the insurer is regarded as to “hold the 
assured harmless”. In Sprung it was held by Beldam LJ that the fact that 
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“…the insurers have the option themselves to reinstate or to pay for 
the reinstatement of the property…does not alter the essential nature 
of their liability, which is to pay the sum of money as damages.”90 
From all the discussions provided above, it might be argued, with respect, that 
the learned judge erred by defining both payment and reinstatement by way of 
damage. Further problems could be caused by that statement both in practice 
and law when the insurer decides to reinstate the damaged property rather than 
to pay the money: firstly, in English law, damage is described as 
“…the pecuniary compensation which the law awards to a person for 
the injury he has sustained by reason of the act or default of another, 
whether such act or default is a breach of contract or a tort; or, put 
more shortly, damages are the recompense given by process of law to 
a person for the wrong that another has done him.”91 
It has to be admitted that the obligation of reinstatement is not “a pecuniary 
compensation” nor has the insurer done anything wrong with the assured. Whilst 
upholding the legal position that the primary duty of the insurer is not damage 
Pearson J stated that 
“…the right to indemnity arises, not by reason of any wrongful act or 
omission on the part of the insurer (who did not promise that the loss 
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would not happen or that he would prevent it) but only under his 
promise to indemnify the insured in the event of a loss.”92 
Secondly, the duty of reinstatement is more like a method of performing a 
contractual duty rather than a method of compensation, because it could be 
rarely seen in practice that a so called wrong-doer (the insurer) rather than a 
victim (the assured) could be given a choice of how to compensate the breach. 
Thirdly, according to a general principle, there is “no damage over damage”,93 
and once the damage is made good the liability for the breach will be 
discharged;94 it means that if the insurer elects to pay rather than reinstate, any 
further defects are not the liability of the insurer. However, this is not the case in 
reinstatement. The insurer must bear the further obligation if the reinstatement 
causes further damage to the assured: 
“If the insurer replaces the damaged item with something inferior, the 
insured is entitled either to reject it or accept it and claim damages for 
the difference between the two values.”95 
Accordingly, it is the reason why many insurers, who have under the policy the 
option to pay or to reinstate, would rather choose to pay in order to cast the risk 
of the defective repair upon the assured. 
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In Davidson v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance96 the insured car was 
broken and the insurer opted to repair it rather than to pay the damage; however, 
the repair was not fast enough and caused the car to be off the road for about 40 
weeks and the assured claimed further damage. In the policy clear wording 
against loss of use was provided, but the court finally upheld the assured’s claim 
for the loss of use. The rationale behind this judgment is simple: once the insurer 
elects to reinstate rather than to pay, the reinstatement becomes the primary 
contractual obligation of the insurer and the failure of the performance would 
lead to damage. Prima facie this case and the academic statement could not be 
reconciled with the damage rule and the “hold harmless” doctrine, and the only 
way of reconciling them under current legal position is to say that the 
reinstatement is changed from “damage” into primary obligation. However, it is 
clear from Sprung that the nature of the reinstatement could not be changed and 
the primary obligation is to prevent the loss; the duty of reinstatement will be put 
in a predicament.  
In Brown v. Royal Insurance Co 97  the insurer elected to reinstate the 
fire-damaged building belonging to the assured. However, they did not do the 
reinstatement with care and as a result of which the remains were removed by 
the government. The court stated that even though the performance of the 
insurer’s contractual duty was now impossible, the insurer would nevertheless 
be liable in damages for the non-performance. It was held by Lord Campbell that 
if the insurer elected to reinstate the property rather than to pay the 
compensation, he 
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“…is in the same position as if he had originally contracted to do the 
act which he has elected to do.”98 
It should be noted that Lord Campbell stressed again that the duty of 
reinstatement was a primary contractual duty while the duty of preventing the 
loss was not. Therefore, a better view is to treat the reinstatement as a method 
of providing compensation, namely the fulfilment of the insurer’s primary 
obligation, the failure of which would lead to the secondary obligation, namely, 
damage.  
It is also pointed out that 
“Nor, apart from interest, can the insured recover consequential 
losses arising simply from the insurers’ failure to pay, but he may be 
able to recover if he can show that insurers committed some other 
and separate breach of the insurance contract which caused his loss. 
Furthermore, specific heads of consequential loss arising from the 
occurrence of an insured peril can be and often are insured by 
express words in the policy.”99 
Although it is academically arguable whether an assured is entitled to 
consequential losses by late payment100 it is obvious, from the statement above, 
that if there is a separate breach of the insurance contract, which causes 
consequential loss to the assured, damage could be awarded.101 Accordingly, 
                                         
98 ibid, at pp.858-859. 
99 Lord Mance, Iain Goldrein QC, FRSA and Professor Robert Merkin, Insurance Disputes, (3rd edn, Informa, 
2011), at para 7.7. 
100 While it is legally certain that damages for late payment is inadmissible before 5th May 2017. 
101
 See Davidson v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 406.  
47 
 
the duty of reinstatement has to be regarded as a contractual duty and 
consequential loss will follow should the duty be breached.  
One step further, the duty of reinstatement and the duty to indemnify stand in the 
same legal position: firstly, the condition precedent of these duties is the loss 
insured against; secondly, both of them are the result of an election made by the 
insurer and once the election is made, another approach would be blocked; 
therefore, there should not be any reason why damage is not permitted for 
failure to perform the duty of payment while it is permitted once the duty of 
reinstatement is breached. 
A different story in Australia 
The contractual duty to make timely payment 
2.2.19 In Moss v. Sun Alliance Australia Ltd102 the facts were similar to those in 
Sprung: the assured insured a store against fire and the store was destroyed by 
the insured risk. After a prompt report the insurer refused to admit the liability 
until 11 months had passed, based on an unwarranted suspicion that the 
assured had set fire to it himself. The delay of the payment of insurance money 
meant the assured was unable to repay the commercial loan and a further 
obligation to pay the higher interest.  
It is appropriate to add here that in Australia an insurance contract is also a 
contract of utmost good faith but the duty is described as a contractual duty and 
                                         
102
 93 ALR 592. 
48 
 
breach of such duty will not, at least in non-marine insurance,103 lead to 
avoidance but to contractual resolutions.  
Therefore, it was found by the court that the insurer in fact breached the 
contractual obligation to make timely payment and that he was also in breach of 
the duty of good faith104 because the good faith in indemnity insurance contracts 
meant that the insurer must not delay for an unreasonably long time in admitting 
liability and withholding payment and it was held that the insurer was liable to 
pay damages. 
It should be noted that, compared with the English position, the Australian 
understanding about the nature of indemnity insurance is more reasonable. 
Additionally, the Australian legal position is also well ahead in case of 
reinstatement, but it is true that recently there have been very few cases on this 
issue which have actually been to court and therefore the English common law 
has no chance of developing. 
The obligation to “reinstate”  
2.2.20 In Smith v The Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd105 there was a fire 
policy which stated that the insurer might elect to reinstate the insured property 
rather than to indemnify the assured. After a fire at the insured property the 
insurer elected to reinstate the damaged premises and some money was spent 
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on such action; however, before the premises were fully reinstated a second fire 
occurred and destroyed the premises. The second fire was also covered by the 
policy106 and unsurprisingly there was a total loss, but the insurer argued that 
the money spent in the reinstatement should be deducted from the total loss 
because it reflected the insurer’s previous effort. The argument failed and for so 
many years nobody has doubted the correctness of this old authority: the 
insurer's obligation in respect of the second fire was to reinstate, and the fact 
that it had spent some money partially reinstating the premises after the first fire 
was simply irrelevant to the proper measurement of its obligation in respect of 
the second fire. It is summarised that 
“During the progress of reinstatement they are their own insurers; and 
the happening of the subsequent fire does not concern the assured, 
who remains entitled to insist on the due performance by the insurers 
of their obligation without crediting them with what they have already 
expended.”107 
Judicially, such expression is welcomed in Australia and in Government 
Insurance Office of NSW v. Atkinson-Leighton Joint Venture108 the obligation of 
reinstatement was further explained by Barwick CJ that during the reinstatement 
taken by the insurer the added cost could not be deducted because 
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“The true analysis is that the obligation to reinstate having attached 
during the currency of the policy, its performance is required whatever 
it costs and however the cost is increased by events which could not 
in themselves have given rise to a claim under the policy.”109 
It is not difficult to note that the Australian insurer’s general position in 
reinstatement is the same as in England, but differences can be found when the 
insurer is willing to reimburse the amount for reinstatement rather than to 
perform reinstatement on its own,110 and that situation happened in CIC 
Insurance Ltd v. Bankstown Football Club111. 
2.2.21 In that case the building was insured against fire; the first fire occurred 
within the policy period while the third happened when the policy lapsed. The 
only dispute which was referred to the High Court was that whether the insurer 
was liable for the increased cost of reinstatement caused by the third fire.112 
It was argued by the assured that since the first fire was covered by the policy, 
the insurer was liable to indemnify the assured based on the amount of 
reinstatement; due to the wrongful non-payment for the first fire the assured 
could not reinstate and the added amount of cost should be regarded as 
damage caused by late payment. 
That argument was rejected by the High Court; it was pointed out that since in 
that case the reinstatement was a measure of indemnity rather than an 
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obligation, therefore the authorities such as Smith were distinguished;113 and 
the court further held that the insurer was only liable, from the reinstatement 
aspect, for the cost of the first fire.114 
Accordingly, once the word “reinstatement” appears in the policy it is crucial to 
identify the meaning of this word. Once it means an obligation that the insurer 
has undertaken to reinstate, the added risk during the reinstatement is on the 
insurer; while if it is a measure of indemnity the insurer is only liable to pay for 
the original risk and the liability of the additional risk shall be determined by other 
provisions of the policy and once the reinstatement is a measure of indemnity, it 
becomes a contractual obligation in Australian law to make that payment within 
reasonable time otherwise the rule of damage for late payment could still be 
triggered.115  
Reinstatement with reasonable despatch 
2.2.22 In CIC v. Bankstown the wording of the policy was that the reinstatement 
by the assured must be commenced with “reasonable dispatch” otherwise the 
insurer shall not be liable for the increased amount after the happening of the 
damage; it was held by the High Court that even though the delay for the repair 
was caused by the lack of financial resources of the assured, the obligation of 
“reasonable dispatch” was breached and the insurer was not liable for increased 
costs.116 
Reinstatement and indemnity  
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2.2.23 The Australian High Court provided no opinion about the definition of the 
money “actually incurred” in the policy from the CIC case which the insurer 
agreed to reimburse, but in the New South Wales Supreme Court Kirby P 
provided an obiter that such provision did not require the assured to actually pay 
out the money and an agreement should be enough.117  
It should be noted that Kirby P expressed a reluctance to regard the “actually 
incurred” money paid from the assured as a pre-condition of the insurer’s liability. 
Additionally, should this opinion be admitted by law, it will have the effect that the 
assured will have a security against the payment to a third party repairer. No 
wonder this is a very important remedy when the assured is out of funds itself, 
such as was the position of the assured in the CIC case. This view should be 
encouraged and should be accepted by an English court to maximise the 
assured’s remedy.  
It could also be argued that if the insurer wishes only to indemnify what has been 
actually paid already by the assured (the out of pocket money), it has to be made 
very clearly and with the consent of the assured.  
The New Zealand development on reinstatement 
2.2.24 It is also appropriate to add New Zealand cases on reinstatement in this 
part.  
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In New Zealand there is a recent authority118 which suggests that where the 
property is damaged by fire and the insured wishes to leave it damaged rather 
than to reinstate it, recovery will be allowed on the basis of the cost of 
reinstatement. This is subject to the proviso that there is no further requirement 
in the policy that the cost of reinstatement must actually have been incurred 
before there arises the liability of the insurer to pay. 
Historically the legal position in reinstatement was unfriendly to assureds in New 
Zealand: in Wright, Stephenson, and Co Ltd v Holmes119 the insurer elected to 
repair the damaged vehicle rather than to ask for indemnity; before the repair 
took place the vehicle was destroyed by an earthquake. It was held by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal that, by electing to repair, the obligation of the insurer 
changed to reinstatement, but the effect of the earthquake frustrated such 
obligation and the insurer was then not liable. This judgment was not welcomed; 
it is argued by Sutton that 
“…the effect of frustration could surely not be to terminate the policy 
itself but only the repairing obligation, so the effect of the earthquake 
would be to revive the obligation to make payment [under the 
policy]…”120 
Accordingly, it seems that the frustration of the obligation to reinstate could turn 
back the obligation to actually reinstate to the obligation of indemnity. 
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In TJK v. Mitsui121 there were two provisions in the policy: MD020 provided that 
the insurer was liable to indemnify the assured in full while MD022 provided that 
should the insured property be damaged by earthquake the insurer would 
indemnify the assured based on the reinstatement (same condition, but not 
better) corset (restriction), and a special condition of MD022 also provided that  
“No payment of more than the indemnity value will be made under this 
extension: 
(a) If the work of reinstatement is not commenced and carried out with 
reasonable despatch; 
(b) Until the cost of reinstatement has been actually incurred; or 
(c) If the property is damaged, but not destroyed, and the repair of the 
damage is not permissible by reason of any regulations or by any 
reason of the condition of the undamaged proportion of the property.” 
Once there is a conflict between those two provisions MD022 prevails.  
The effect of these clauses is clear: once the insured property suffers from any 
loss other than earthquake the insurer is liable for an indemnity amount based 
on MD020; while the loss is caused by the earthquake and the assured elects to 
repair, the insurer will be liable even if the amount exceeds the indemnity value, 
according to MD022, but if the assured refuses to repair or delays the repair the 
insurer is only liable for the indemnity value according to the condition of MD022. 
However, what is not clear from the wording is the time of the payment when the 
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property is damaged by an earthquake, but the assured does not take out the 
reinstatement with “reasonable dispatch”. 
The insured property was damaged by an earthquake and the assured asked for 
immediate payment, but this was refused by the insurer who insisted that no 
payment should be made unless and until the actual cost by the assured had 
been incurred according to the condition of MD022. The dispute was referred to 
the High Court of New Zealand. 
It was found by Miller J that a distinction should be made between “indemnity 
value” and “reinstatement cost” and the right to indemnity accrued immediately 
after the earthquake, but the inusrer was not liable to pay the reinstatement cost 
until it was actually incurred.122 Miller J also pointed out that support could be 
found in CIC v. Bankstown because in that case even though the assured failed 
to act with reasonable despatch, the insurer was still liable for the indemnity 
value and the indemnity value only. 
Accordingly, it should be noted that it is firmly accepted in both Australia and 
New Zealand that, compared with “reinstatement cost”, the duty to indemnify 
under the policy has the primary contractual effect. Additionally, the indemnity 
value could be the minimum amount for which the insurer is liable when the 
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policy term on reinstatement is not fulfilled123 or where reinstatement of the 
original property is impossible.124  
This conclusion also applies where it is impossible to reinstate, or according to 
the order from the local authority the damaged property could only be rebuilt 
rather than be reinstated.125 
2.2.25 It should be pointed out that the statement above is about the primary 
obligation of the insurer to indemnify the assured, and such a scheme may not, 
in general, affect the insurer’s secondary obligation to pay damages when the 
primary obligation is breached. It is rightly summarized that 
“…the insurer cannot rely on the failure of the assured to satisfy a 
condition such as carrying out reinstatement with reasonable 
despatch or actually incurring the costs thereof, to prevent 
damages…”126 
According to the comparative law discussion, it can be seen that the Australian 
and New Zealand’s understanding about the nature of indemnity insurance is 
much clearer than that in England and accordingly the development of the 
remedies for the assured in those countries are also more advanced. Therefore, 
it is more crucial to review recent cases to find out the reason why the English 
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understanding of the insurer’s obligation has gone astray while the Scottish 
position remains the same with New Zealand and Australia. 
2.3 The re-examination of recent cases 
2.3.1 From the arguments above, it is now clear that the “hold harmless” doctrine 
is in fact incorrect if it is to be regarded as the primary duty of the indemnity 
insurer. It needs to be mentioned that the doctrine never appears in historical 
authorities nor been accepted by any other common law country. Therefore, 
modern cases, in which the doctrine of “hold harmless” is held to be the primary 
obligation of the insurer, need to be carefully re-examined. The following 
cases,127 as mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, will now be 
scrutinized. 
The Fanti 
2.3.2 In that case the ship-owner of the vessel, The Fanti, entered into the 
Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (also known as the P&I club). 
After a leakage of water appeared in some tanks of the vessel, both the vessel 
and the cargo on board were damaged and abandoned to the salvers. 
Subsequently a judgment was obtained by the cargo owner against the 
ship-owner, whose liability insurer was the named club. However the ship-owner 
became insolvent and the cargo owner, according to the Third Parties (Rights 
against Insurers) Act 1930, claimed damages directly against the club.  
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The main issue of the case was whether the famous “pay to be paid” clause 
altered the rights of parties and what right an assured had before the actual 
payment was made. The clause in dispute reads as 
“…the Member shall be protected and indemnified against all or any 
of the following claims and expenses which he shall have become 
liable to pay and shall in fact have paid…”128 
The case finally reached the House of Lords and it was held that firstly, such a 
clause constituted a condition precedent so that unless and until the liability of 
the assured was discharged the club was not liable.129 Secondly, the argument 
that such a clause had no effect on the ground that it purported to alter the rights 
of the parties was rejected; in Lord Brandon’s view that clause 
“…applied throughout the lives of the contracts…imposing a condition 
necessary to be fulfilled before any liability of the clubs to indemnify 
the members could arise. …[U]pon any member being ordered to be 
wound up… that member would be likely to be prevented from 
discharging any liability to a third party which…results rather from the 
member’s inability… to exercise those rights.”130 
2.3.3 It is obvious that the main issue of The Fanti is not on the point of the 
primary obligation of an indemnity insurer. However, the issue of the primary 
duty of the insurer was raised by the counsel for the assured, which was as 
follows: 
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“(a) At common law, a contract of indemnity gave rise to an action of 
assumpsit for unliquidated damages for failing to prevent the 
indemnified person from suffering damning by paying the third party. A 
condition of prior payment was implicit in the nature of the contract. 
(b) Equity, though recognizing the existence of the condition, would 
not allow reliance on it when the effect would be to defeat the 
indemnity altogether rather than to achieve the object… ”131 
It could be found that the first point contained the duty of preventing the loss, 
which would be treated as the “hold harmless” doctrine, although it was not 
known according to which authority this argument arose. Counsel for the 
assured wished to persuade the court to accept the equity approach rather than 
that of common law, and this argument was rejected by Lord Goff. However, the 
Law Lord accepted the first submission on the common law approach by holding 
that 
“… at common law, a contract of indemnity gives rise to an action for 
unliquidated damages, arising from the failure of the indemnifier to 
prevent the indemnified person from suffering damage, for example, 
by having to pay a third party.”132 
His Lordship continued by stating that 
“…a promise of indemnity is simply a promise to hold the indemnified 
person harmless against a specified loss or expense…once the loss 
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is suffered or the expense incurred, the indemnifier is in breach of 
contract for having failed to hold the indemnified person harmless 
against the relevant loss or expense”133 
Accordingly, once the indemnifier, which could be an insurer, failed to pay a 
claim to a third party, first, a claim of damage would arise; secondly, it is the 
contractual duty of the indemnifier to hold the indemnified person harmless. 
It is common ground that an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity, and 
therefore the duty of the insurer, according to the judgment, is to hold the 
assured harmless and what is paid to the assured sounds like the unliquidated 
damage.134 However, this judgment has to be read with caution. 
2.3.4 The first issue which needs to be noted is that what Lord Goff stated in that 
case should only be regarded as an obiter rather than a ratio: it is because what 
needs to be decided in that case before their Lordships was whether the “pay to 
be paid” clause violated the statutory regulation.135  
The judgment quoted above by Lord Goff rejected the intervention of equity136 
and therefore some special consideration of equity may have troubled the 
learned Law Lord, and such a judgment would only be treated as correct in very 
special circumstances. 
Alternatively, should the judgment be regarded as a ratio, the special facts of 
The Fanti have to be considered and in addition, it is necessary to discuss the 
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point of “hold harmless” and “damage” separately. Additionally, the 
understanding about the nature of indemnity insurance has been doubted both 
in English law and in Australia.137 
2.3.5 Firstly, it was held in The Fanti that a P&I club, as a liability insurer of the 
assured ship-owner, should take the responsibility to hold the assured harmless. 
Should there be no “pay to be paid” clause, it would be certain that the club had 
to make payment directly to the third party, as Lord Goff noticed that 
“…clubs do on many occasions make payment direct to third 
parties… its payment to the third party …discharge the member’s 
liability to the third party.”138 
Therefore, once statements made by Lord Goff are read together, it becomes 
clear that, without the “pay to be paid” clause, liability insurers such as the P&I 
club in The Fanti would assume the liability of its member and then make 
payment directly to the third party in order to discharge the legal liability of that 
member; namely, the primary duty of a liability insurer could be treated as one to 
hold the assured harmless.139  
However, it needs to be noted that although the liability insurer could in some 
circumstances prevent the loss by the payment to the third party, they cannot 
prevent the legal liability from occurring. For example, a motor insurer could not 
prevent the negligent driving of his assured driver, but what he could do is to 
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prevent the assured suffering the loss caused by the negligence. However, once 
the “pay to be paid” clause is inserted, the primary duty of the liability insurer 
would change; it is not a duty to hold the assured harmless, but to compensate 
the out of pocket money paid by the assured to the third party.  
A similar conclusion was reached by Lord Brandon in the same case after a 
succinct historical review: 
“… before the passing of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873 
and 1875, there was a difference between the remedies available to 
enforce an ordinary contract of indemnity (by which I mean a contract 
of indemnity not containing any express “pay to be paid” provision) at 
law on the one hand and in equity on the other. At law the party to be 
indemnified had to discharge the liability himself first and then sue the 
indemnifier for damages for breach of contract. In equity an 
ordinary contract of indemnity could be directed to be specifically 
performed by ordering that the indemnifier should pay the amount 
concerned directly to the third party to whom the liability was owed or 
in some cases to the party to be indemnified. There is no further doubt 
that since the passing of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873 
and 1875 the equitable remedy has prevailed over the remedy at 
law.”140 
Therefore, it could be said that the duty to hold the assured harmless is originally 
an equitable remedy, and that remedy could not prevail if a clear express term is 
inserted within the contract. It was held in The Fanti that subject to a clear “pay 
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to be paid” clause a prior payment made by the assured was regarded as a 
condition precedent of the duty of the insurer to indemnify.141 
2.3.6 A conclusion could be reached that the issue of the “hold harmless” only 
exists in indemnity contracts where there is no clear and express contractual 
term which would constitute condition precedents of the liability of insurers. 
According to Lord Brandon, they are called “ordinary contract(s) of indemnity”.  
Once a condition precedent is inserted, it would be argued that such a duty 
would be changed into a duty to provide indemnity for the out-of-pocket money 
by payment. In the latter scenario, the insurer’s primary obligation will not arise 
until the payment (the loss or harm) is made (suffered) by the assured, and since 
the assured has been “harmed” already, it is meaningless to argue that in such a 
situation, the primary obligation of the insurer is still to hold the assured 
harmless. 
2.3.7 From the discussion about the judgment of The Fanti, it seems that the 
issue of damage will only arise if the contract is an “ordinary indemnity contract”. 
However, it is not decisive. The problem was found in another decision of the 
House of Lords: Caledonia North Sea Ltd v. British Telecommunications Plc,142 
a case which relates to the “Piper Alpha Disaster”.  
In that case, an indemnity clause was provided by the Contractor for liability 
incurred by the claimant Operator and notably the “pay to be paid” clause did not 
appear in the contract. Therefore, the indemnity clause would be regarded as an 
ordinary one and once the Operator makes a payment for its legal obligation the 
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Contractor is in breach and damage is available. However, it was refused by 
Lord Hoffmann, by holding that 
“…this is not a claim for breach of contract. It is a claim to an 
indemnity for a liability incurred by the operator outside the 
contract.”143 
It might be argued that the contract in that case was not one of indemnity but 
only a clause which provided the duty of indemnity and therefore Caledonia is 
not good law for indemnity insurance. Although it seems to be a sound argument, 
according to Lord Hoffmann, the duty to indemnify could be a contractual 
obligation to perform by the indemnifier. 
Therefore, even where there is an ordinary indemnity contract, whether the duty 
to provide indemnity is damage or merely a performance of contract, has not 
been decided yet. 
2.3.8 Notably, the application of the decision made in The Fanti is of fundamental 
importance. Even though it was held in Caledonia that the duty of indemnity 
could be regarded as a contractual duty rather than damage it is still in dispute 
whether a judgment made on the basis of an “indemnity clause” could apply to a 
“contract of indemnity”. The problem becomes severe when property insurance 
is in dispute as it is seldom seen, in a property policy, that the assured would be 
liable to the third party.  
However, once there is a condition precedent of the insurer’s liability after the 
loss, the same conclusion with liability insurance would be reached:   
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Firstly, as mentioned above, The Fanti itself is a case of liability insurance and 
accordingly it is arguable if it was their Lordships’ intention to apply the case in 
both liability and property insurance; should it be the case, clear words would 
have appeared as there are so many differences between property insurance 
and liability insurance.  
Secondly, within the judgment several precedents were referred to in order to 
reach a proper decision; however, none of them was property insurance, they 
were non-insurance liability indemnity contracts.144  
Thirdly, in order to clarify the judgment, the example used by Lord Goff was an 
example in which an indemnifier paid directly to the third party; this could only be 
found in liability insurance contracts. 
Accordingly, it is at least open to serious doubt that the statement made by Lord 
Goff in The Fanti would apply to another type of indemnity insurance, namely 
property insurance; moreover, it is also doubtful whether the statement could 
apply to non-ordinary liability insurance. 
The Italia Express (No.2) 
2.3.9 The key fact and the outcome of The Italia Express (No.2) have been 
introduced above; and what needs to be done in this part is to analyse the 
judgment made by Hirst J in the aspect of applying The Fanti in that case and 
the reason why the learned judge held that the duty to prevent the loss from 
occurring was the primary duty of property insurers. 
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According to the re-examination of The Fanti, it is appropriate to argue that The 
Fanti could not apply to property insurance without qualification. This was firstly 
pointed out by Mr. Tomlinson (counsel for the assured) in The Italia Express 
(No.2). 
“It would… be absurd in property cases to treat the obligation to 
prevent the occurrence of actual loss itself, since that would 
amount…to a promise…that the ship would not sink… Holding 
harmless thus meant different things in different contexts.”145 
Apparently this is a very strong and elaborate argument because it reflects the 
threat of misplacing the rule in The Fanti in property insurance and the real 
understanding of “hold harmless”. However, this argument was rejected by Hirst 
J. 
Although the judgment was cited at the beginning of this chapter, it is worth 
repeating here after the discussion about the scope of The Fanti and the 
introduction about the assured’s submission in The Italia Express (No.2).  
It was believed by Hirst J that   
“…it would be extraordinary if different principles applied to the two 
classes of insurance…as Lord Goff stated that…once the loss is 
suffered or the expense incurred, the indemnifier is in breach of 
contract for having failed to hold the indemnified person harmless 
against the relevant loss or expense; this phraseology is entirely 
appropriate to cover both the loss against which the insured is 
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indemnified under property insurance, and the expense against 
which he is indemnified under liability insurance.”146  
Should the judgment be correct, it has to be admitted firstly that there is no 
fundamental difference between property insurance and liability insurance in 
nature; it must also be right to argue that, subject to the condition precedent of 
the insurer’s liability after loss, equity would intervene in the property insurance 
and the court would grant specific performance, ordering property insurers to 
pay the assured before the loss occurs, in order to prevent the loss and suffering. 
Regrettably, it never happens and it is nearly axiomatic to say no such order 
would be given by courts in property insurance cases. Indeed, liability insurance 
and property insurance are not entirely different, but when it comes to practice 
they are not the same: liability insurance rests upon the establishment and 
quantification of the assured’s liability, whereas property insurance rests upon 
the occurrence of the peril. 
Secondly, the learned judge believed that different words used in Lord Goff’s 
speech147 must indicate that His Lordship’s judgment should apply generally. 
However, in the same paragraph and in front of the quoted sentence, the word 
“damage” was also used by Lord Goff,148 and therefore it might be true that 
“expense”, “loss” and “damage” used by Lord Goff shared a same meaning of 
the consequence of the legal liability assumed by the liability assured. In addition, 
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should it be the intention of Lord Goff it might be a slur, as it is indeed obvious 
that such obligation in property insurance is  
“…at odds with other precedents, with the likely intentions of the 
parties, and with common contractual provisions.”149   
Accordingly, as to the part of property insurer’s primary obligation, it has to 
be pointed out, with respect, that the learned judge erred in The Italia 
Express (No.2) by misunderstanding the intention of Lord Goff in The Fanti 
and misplacing the duty of the liability insurer in an ordinary contract into a 
property insurance contract. 
Sprung v. Royal Insurance 
2.3.10 Before the re-examination, it has to be stressed that what makes Sprung 
famous is not the legal rationale of that case, because the general legal principle 
had been decided upon in both The Fanti and The Italia Express (No.2) already, 
but the notorious and improper outcome imposed upon a small businessman, Mr. 
Sprung.  
2.3.11 Once the judgment of Sprung is read in full it is not difficult to discover that 
the main issue which defeated the claim for the £75,000 damage was the 
causation of such loss. It was held by Evans LJ that 
“…if, unfortunately, through his own financial circumstances he is 
unable to do so without assistance from the defendants, he cannot 
allege that the defendants were in breach of contract…”150 
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As to the matter of damage for late payment Evans LJ continued: 
“…I would hold that the law was correctly stated…even if the claim 
was reformulated in some such way [as a claim for damage for the 
late payment by the insurer] as I have stated, there would be no 
measurable prospects of success…”151 
Although it was mentioned by Evans and Beldam LJJs that the damage for late 
payment might not be possible in that case, the better understanding would be 
one to regard such understanding as an obiter.  
Therefore, it would be arguably right to infer that The Italia Express (No.2), as a 
High Court judgment, is the first legal authority which confirms that the payment 
made by a property insurer is a payment of damage; however, such a judgment 
made by Hirst J has not been finally confirmed by any higher court yet. 
2.3.12 Although the issue of a property insurer’s primary obligation was not 
clearly decided in Sprung, within the judgment some clues could be found by 
closer examination.  
2.3.13 In Sprung, the policy was defined as 
“In return for the premium the Company contracts to indemnify the 
Insured against the cost of making good [the insured damage]…”152 
It was clearly stated in the policy that the primary duty of the insurer was to make 
a payment in order to make good the loss, and failing to act would lead to a 
secondary obligation of damage. Accordingly, the duty to prevent the loss was 
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not mentioned and, due to that fact, the only way to import such a “primary duty” 
would be one of implication, which will be discussed below.  
Firstly, the most powerful implication, the implication by law, is understood as 
that  
“[t]he court is… laying down a general rule of law that in all contracts 
of a defined type… certain terms will be implied, unless the 
implication of such a term would be contrary to the express 
words of the agreement. Such implications do not depend on the 
intentions of the parties, actual or presumed, but on more general 
considerations.”153 
It was then confirmed by Lord Diplock in Photo Productions Ltd. v. Securicor 
Transport Ltd154 that the parties' express intention could replace the implication 
by law, because 
“…parties to a contract are free to determine for themselves what 
primary obligations they will accept. They may state these in express 
words in the contract itself and, where they do, the statement is 
determinative…”155 
Accordingly, once there is a clear and an express clause about the primary 
obligation, such as the quoted clause in Sprung, there is no room for terms 
implied by law. 
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Alternatively, the insurer may then argue that such a primary duty is implied as 
an “ad hoc gap filler”, namely an implication by the fact or the nature of the 
property insurance contract; however, that argument could hardly succeed. It is 
well settled by law that such an implication would be tested by an “officious 
bystander”.156 Subject to this test, once a layman is asked “do you believe the 
insurer will prevent the loss with reasonable care and skill?” the answer would 
probably be in the negative. However, should the answer be one of “do you 
believe the insurer, by entering into this policy and receiving the premium, is 
bound by to making payment for a valid claim?” the answer would be different. 
Therefore, it was clearly stated in Sprung that the primary obligation of the 
insurer was to make a payment for the loss; there would be no reason for the 
defendant insurer to argue their primary obligation was one to prevent the loss. 
It was, in fact, admitted by the counsel for the insurer by stating that 
“…the defendant owed no obligation to the plaintiff other than to pay 
the indemnity in question…”157 
The admission above is correct; no obligation other than the obligation to provide 
the contractual compensation shall be regarded as the primary obligation 
imposed on the insurer. While there is no cause of action for damage for failing 
to prevent the loss, there should be a cause of action for damage for 
non-performance of the contractual obligation to pay indemnity. What the 
defendant in Sprung did by admitting the obligation was to provide indemnity, but 
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he defended Mr. Sprung’s claim on the basis of preventing the loss. Therefore, 
Evans LJ commented on the insurer’s defence, other than the part of the 
admission of its liability, that  
“I do not find the defendants’ submissions at all attractive, either from 
a commercial or from a moral point of view.”158 
2.3.14 According to commercial sense, Beldam LJ expressed the view that 
“The commercial object of such a policy is clearly to ensure that as 
soon as possible after the damage the assured will be able to restart 
production with his repaired plant.”159 
It is a right approach to understanding property insurance. In most cases, the 
assured requires nothing but the compensation from the insurer in order to make 
good the loss. It should also be correct to argue that even if there is no express 
clause in the contract which requires the insurer to make compensation within a 
reasonable time, subject to the officious bystander test, the court would imply it 
as an ad hoc gap filler.  
However, the learned judge still treated such payment as “damage”160 and it 
would lead to the wrong conclusion that it is with commercial sense that there is 
only a primary duty which is to pay as damage but no secondary duty of damage 
once the primary obligation of contractual performance is breached. 
The position of Evans LJ was, with respect, itself a contradiction: the learned 
judge held that there was no need for the assured to take out another policy 
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such as a business interruption policy against the possibility that the insurer 
“would not perform the present property policy”.161 Should it be the case, 
namely the payment made by the insurer is to be regarded as the performance 
of the contract, the court should have allowed the appeal by awarding damages 
rather than to stress the rule that there is to be no damage over damage. 
Even though Sprung is regarded as the leading case on the issue of the insurer’s 
late payment, it must be treated with caution, especially after the findings 
provided above. 
Conclusion 
2.3.15 According to the re-examination of all the cases above the current 
position of English law on the primary duty of the insurer, although illogical, can 
be concluded as follows: 
Firstly, it has been settled in The Fanti that once there is an ordinary contract of 
indemnity the primary obligation of the insurer is one to prevent the assured from 
loss and suffering; such a duty could be performed by making payment to the 
third party directly, but that is not the only way in which that duty could be 
performed.  
Secondly, once the contract of indemnity is modified with clear clauses, it 
becomes a matter of construction and it has not been settled by law. For 
example, the primary obligation of the club in The Fanti, after the modification by 
a “pay to be paid” clause, was to compensate the out-of-pocket money paid by 
the assured. 
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Thirdly, where the contract of indemnity is a property insurance contract, which 
needs to be treated with special care, the primary obligation of the insurer has 
not been settled by law either, even though it has been widely accepted that the 
“hold harmless” doctrine should apply. However, the primary obligation should 
be one of providing contractual compensation rather than of preventing the loss 
from happening. 
Recently, The Fanti was firmly rejected by Carillion Construction Ltd v AIG 
Australia Ltd162 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. In that case a “Tie 
Road Damage” occurred in 1999 and the claimant assured Carillion 
Construction Ltd (Carillion) made a claim against the insurer AIG Australia 
Limited (AIG) 9 on 26th March 2010. The claim was denied by AIG and 
according to the findings from the court, the date of the formal denial was 3 
August 2011.163 
It was argued by AIG that the cause of action in respect of the “Tie Road 
Damage” arose at the time when the damage occurred and it was therefore 
time-barred; while it was contended by Carillion that the cause of action only 
arose once AIG had a reasonable time to consider the claim, and then declined 
its obligation or failed to indemnify.  
After reviewing conflicting opinions164 the learned judge, Stevenson J, made a 
conclusion that 
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“…a distinction is to be drawn between the time when an insured’s 
entitlement to indemnity arises and the time when its entitlement to 
sue for damages for breach of contract arises... It may well be that an 
insured under an indemnity policy would be entitled, immediately on 
the occurrence of the peril, to seek a declaration of its entitlement to 
indemnity. But its entitlement to sue for damages for breach of the 
promise of indemnity only arises only when the insurer has not done 
‘what was required of it’ under the policy.”165 
Apparently, this judgment deviated from what was held in The Fanti and it was 
made under the assumption that the primary obligation of the insurer was to 
indemnify the assured and damages was of a secondary nature when the 
primary obligation was breached. 
Additionally, the judge commented that  
“It may be that the duty of an insurer to decide within a reasonable 
time whether or not to indemnify an insured carries with it a right to 
take reasonable time to make the decision. That duty and right may 
be two sides of the one coin... That is, the insurer can, within the 
reasonable time available to it and before that time has passed, 
decide what to do. In that event, as well as not being in breach of its 
obligation to act in a timely manner, it has waived its right to take 
longer. If its decision is to refuse indemnity, and that decision is not 
justified, it is there and then in breach of its obligations.”166 
                                         
165 ibid, at [156]. 
166
 ibid, at [177]. 
76 
 
Therefore it could be found out that there is a clear distinction between the 
primary obligation and the secondary obligation in Australian law and it this 
understanding is more acceptable in modern insurance development. 
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Chapter 3 The Insurer’s Secondary Obligation 
3.1 The general rule of damage  
3.1.1 The primary obligation of an indemnity insurer has been discussed in full in 
chapter 2 and it should be remembered that the nature of that duty is not a 
clear-cut one in law, even though it should either be one to prevent the certain 
loss insured against in ordinary indemnity contracts or one to make contractual 
payments against certain events in other types of insurance contracts. However, 
it is clear that regardless of the type of indemnity insurance, the insurer’s 
obligation to pay damages could only arise after the insured peril or liability. 
Therefore, in this chapter focus will be put on the scenario where the loss does 
occur and the secondary obligation, namely, the damage that would arise. 
Firstly, the general rule of damage will be introduced followed by the current 
position of the law. Secondly, the application of the rules of indemnity insurance 
will be considered, followed by a discussion about the contractual duty of utmost 
good faith167 during the claim handling stage. 
Hadley v. Baxendale168 
3.1.2 It is commonly accepted that Hadley is the leading judgment on the 
principle of damage. In that case, Mr Hadley partly owned a mill and he wanted 
the broken crankshaft repaired in another place. Subsequently, a contract of 
carriage was concluded between Mr Hadley and a common carrier. However, 
that contract was breached by the carrier as the transportation was delayed; 
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without the crankshaft it was impossible for the mill to finish the daily work. Mr 
Hadley claimed for the loss of profit resulting from the carrier’s breach. 
The court firstly set the principle for the recoverable loss; in other words, in order 
to be recovered, the losses had to be 
“(1) those which may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising 
naturally that is according to the usual course of things (the first limb); 
(2) those arising from any special circumstances which were 
communicated at the time the contract was made (the second 
limb). ”169 
Applying the principle to Mr. Hadley’s claim, it was found by the court that the 
loss of profit did not arise naturally from the delay and due to the lack of 
communication there was no ground for the carrier to know that the mill could not 
work without the crankshaft. Therefore, Mr Hadley’s claim failed. It was then 
settled by law that losses were recoverable if they were reasonably supposed to 
be contemplated by both parties. 
The Achilleas170 and commercial sense 
3.1.3 The general principle of Hadley was considered recently by the House of 
Lords in a charterparty case: The Achilleas. In this case the ship-owner was 
unable to meet the laycan (layday and cancellation day) of a subsequent time 
charter due to the late redelivery of the vessel by the current charterer. At the 
time when the subsequent charter was concluded the market price was 
                                         
169 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341, at p. 354. 
170
 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 275. 
79 
 
increasing (more than doubled); however, due to the late redelivery by the first 
charterer the owner had to replace the original charterparty by another time 
charter when the market price fell sharply. The ship-owner, then, claimed 
damages on the basis of the severe price difference between the original rate 
and the reduced rate of the whole period of the subsequent charter, while the 
charterer argued that it was only liable for the loss during the overrun. 
It was proved by the charterer that it was the general practice of the shipping 
market that once the redelivery of the vessel was delayed the owner was entitled 
to damage, but the amount should be restricted to the difference between the 
market rate and the charter rate for the overrun. The House of Lords upheld the 
commercial practice and rejected the owner’s claim. It was held by Lord 
Hoffmann that although the damage was foreseeable, it was a matter of law to 
decide whether the damage was assumed by the parties according to 
commercial sense and contractual terms.171 Furthermore, it was pointed out by 
Lord Hope that although it was within the parties’ contemplation that late delivery 
may occur,172 it was not, according to commercial practice, known to the 
charterer that  
“…there was a subsequent fixture; the owners would deal with any 
new charterers. This was something over which they had no control 
and, at the time of entering into the contract, was completely 
unpredictable.”173 
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3.1.4 Therefore, it should also be remembered that the application of Hadley is 
also subject to the commercial context of the nature of a specialised contract. As 
for indemnity insurance, a succinct summarization is provided by the Law 
Commission that 
“…there may be substantial differences between policies. A consumer 
may buy a travel policy for ‘peace of mind’. A small business may buy 
property insurance because it could not otherwise afford to replace 
property vital to its profits. Alternatively, a large business policy may 
wish to allocate a precisely defined element of risk at the lowest 
possible premium. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale may lead to 
different results in different contexts.”174 
Applying the rule in debt: Sempra Metals v. Inland Revenue175 
3.1.5 Historically, it was held by the court that the rule of Hadley did not apply to 
cases in which there was a failure or delay to make the payment owed by the 
debtor.176 Moreover, it was once held that 
“…interest is not due on money secured by a written instrument, 
unless it appears on the face of the instrument that interest was 
intended to be paid, or unless it be implied from the usage of trade, as 
in the case of mercantile instruments.”177 
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Obviously, that historical position is no longer suitable for the needs of 
commercial development and therefore various kinds of solutions have been 
provided by the court. Finally, in Sempra the House of Lords found an 
opportunity to clarify the law. 
In Sempra a tax payer asked for the restitution of the over-paid tax plus 
compound interest. Along with an affirmative answer, Lord Nicholls held that 
once the damage caused by the late payment of debt was proved, the loss 
would be recoverable, provided that other rules in Hadley such as remoteness, 
failure to mitigate and so forth do not apply.178 
Applying the rule in tort 
3.1.6 In Lagden v. O’Connor179 the victim, Mr Lagden, had his car damaged by 
Mrs. O’Connor.  He was so poor that it was impossible for him to hire another 
car when the damaged one was under repair. Later on Mr Lagden had to use the 
service from a credit hire business service rather than an ordinary market hire 
one. The difference between the two services was that the credit service 
companies charged more and needed no advance payment from their 
customers. Alternatively, once they were satisfied that there would be a third 
party tortfeasor and an outstanding claim they would charge from that claim. The 
precedent was not favourable for Mr Lagden, because in Dimond v Lovell180 it 
was held by the House of Lords that only ordinary market hire was recoverable 
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in cases of a tort, while the additional amount charged by services such as credit 
hire was not. 
However, the House of Lords carefully distinguished Dimond. In Dimond, 
although it was held that the victim acted reasonably to avail herself of the credit 
service; it did not mean that the full amount of the service would be recovered 
because once the full amount of the credit service hire was paid by the tortfeasor 
it would lead to a benefit for the victim. However, the situation was different in 
Lagden as it was impossible for Mr Lagden to hire another car unless the credit 
service was used. Therefore, it was held by Lord Nicholls that the law would be 
“seriously defective”181 if a victim like Mr Lagden could not recover the full 
amount. His Lordship continued: 
“Common fairness requires that if an innocent plaintiff cannot afford to 
pay car hire charges, so that left to himself he would be unable to 
obtain a replacement car to meet the need created by the negligent 
driver, then the damages payable under this head of loss should 
include the reasonable costs of a credit hire company.”182 
It needs to be noted that in order to reach such a conclusion, both fairness and 
commercial context were considered by the House of Lords, although this 
judgment was delivered earlier than The Achilleas. This decision is also 
important to indemnity insurance as it might provide a “back door” for the 
assured to claim damages for late payment.183 More importantly, this case 
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overruled The Liesbosch,184 in which case it was held that there were no 
damages in tort for a claimant whose loss was caused by the fact that he had no 
money to replace the damaged property.  
Applying the rule in contracts of indemnity 
3.1.7 The application of the rule in contracts of indemnity was considered by the 
Court of Appeal in The Eurus;185 although the contract in the case was not 
wholly an indemnity case, the clause in dispute was a widely known “indemnity 
clause” in the  shipping  market. It provided that 
“Owners shall be responsible for any time, costs, delays or loss 
suffered by charterers due to failure to comply fully with charterers’ 
voyage instructions provided such instructions are in accordance with 
the charterparty and custom of trade.” 
In that case the price of crude oil was based on the market price when the bill of 
lading was issued. In order to ensure a cheaper rate the bills of lading should 
have been issued in February rather than January and therefore the ship-owner 
was notified that notice of readiness should not to be tendered before 1100 on 
31st January. However, due to the misunderstanding by the master, no notice of 
readiness was tendered and the vessel began loading straightaway. Although on 
the instruction of the charterer who requested a slow loading, the job was 
finished at 0130 on 1 February, no February bills of lading could be issued: it was 
because, unbeknown to both parties of the contract, in Nigeria the loading 
completed before 0800 on the first day of any month should be treated as if it 
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had been finished on the last day of the preceding month (the 8 o’clock rule). As 
a result, the charterer had to bear the cost of the price difference of 0.6 million 
dollars. 
Two heads of claims were raised by the charterer against the ship-owner: one 
was based on the breach of contract and another was based on a claim for 
indemnity. 
It was held by arbitrators that the first claim failed as it was not contemplated or 
foreseeable by the parties when the contract was entered into, while the second 
claim succeeded. The issue finally reached the Court of Appeal. It was firstly 
confirmed by the court that the clause provided above was one of indemnity; 
however, it was further held that the rule of damage was applicable and 
therefore the charterers’ claim failed. It was held by Staughton LJ that 
“…I cannot see why the parties would have wished to provide ... that 
the charterers’ loss would be recoverable whether or not it was within 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties, while for all other 
breaches the ordinary rule as to damages in a contract case would 
apply.”186  
What is of importance from The Eurus is that a contract of indemnity would be 
interpreted with commercial sense and the reasonableness of the parties has to 
be considered when the rule for damage applies. 
It would be correct to argue that the rule of Hadley has a pervasive application in 
different kinds of contracts, however, there is an important exception to the rule, 
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which is often referred by the court to rebut a claim for damage for late payment 
by the insurer: there would be no damage over damage. Even though it is at 
least open to serious doubt whether it is correct to regard the payment by the 
insurer as damage; however, it has been settled in Australian law that the 
obligation to make payment under the policy is not an obligation relating to 
damage and therefore the Australian position is of great importance for 
reference purposes, especially when the Enterprise Act 2016 comes into force 
which enables the assured to claim for damage caused by the late payment of 
the insurer.   
The Australian position 
3.1.8 Unlike the English position, indemnity insurance contracts are treated as 
ordinary contracts in Australia and it is common knowledge in contract law that 
once a repudiatory breach is made by one party, the innocent party has two 
possible remedies: one is to terminate the contract and claim for damage while 
the other is to affirm the contract and claim for damage.  
In the interest of the assured, affirming the contract and then claiming damage 
would be the better choice, especially after the insured risk occurs, because the 
contractual obligation for the insurer to make the payment has to be fulfilled 
together with consequential damage.187 It is pointed out by the Law Commission 
that in Australia, even though it has been well settled that it is the insurer’s 
contractual obligation to make payment and unreasonable late payment could 
amount to a repudiatory breach, the assured could not claim consequential 
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damage along with the policy indemnity.188 This position is summarized by 
Professor Sutton that 
“If the assured [accepts the repudiation], he or she is not bound by the 
terms of the policy and her or his measure of damages including 
consequential loss, will be governed by the rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale as to remoteness of damage.  
If the assured [affirms the contract], the terms of the policy continue to 
apply, the insurer’s indemnity is in respect of loss of or damage to the 
property insured, together with any additional benefits provided for 
in the policy, and any consequential loss outside those benefits will 
not be recoverable.”189 
However, this conclusion has been challenged both academically and judicially.  
It should be noted that Professor Sutton’s conclusion, concerning the scenario 
where the insurance contract is affirmed, is similar to the English position in The 
Italia Express (No.2) which held that the policy limit is “conclusive” even for 
consequential loss; as to this point, it has been argued in this work that damage 
caused by the late payment should be regarded as a separate claim and 
therefore it should not be limited by the policy.  
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In order to further clarify this point it is necessary to pause here to go back to the 
argument in The Italia Express (No.2). It has been repeated many times in this 
work that in English law the insurer’s contractual obligation is to hold the assured 
harmless and once the damage occurs the contract is breached, and the reason 
why the assured’s claim should be limited by the policy is that the amount of 
damage has already been written within the contract when it is made; but what 
if the assured, as the innocent party, elects to repudiate the contract? Will he or 
she still be bound by the contractual limit? In order to analyse this problem, it has 
to be assumed that it is correct to say that the insurer’s obligation is to hold the 
assured harmless and it is a contractual term in the policy; and in order to decide 
the effect of breach, this term has to be classified as a breach of condition, 
warranty190 or innominate term.  
It is common ground that in a policy it is always clearly stated that the breach of 
the duty to “hold harmless” will lead to damage and prima facie it shall be 
regarded as a “warranty in general contract”, which means that the innocent 
party could not repudiate the contract but only claim for damage. However, in 
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd191 it was held by 
the Court of Appeal that if the breach of a term deprived the innocent party 
substantially of the intended benefit under the contract, the court will treat that 
term as a condition and allow the innocent party to repudiate the contract and 
claim for damages. Even though it could be argued that once the effect of the 
breach is clearly stated in the contract there is no need to analyse other issues, it 
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has to be noted that the essential benefit of the assured is the safety of the 
insured property, and therefore the destruction of the property will certainly 
deprive the assured of all the benefits of the contract; consequently the insurer, 
on the destruction of the insured property, commits such a repudiatory breach. 
However, as an innocent party the assured could not repudiate the contract as 
he or she is entitled to claim damages only and the amount is usually limited by 
the policy; it has to be pointed out that this fact makes insurance contracts even 
more anomalous. 
Additionally, according to the Australian legal principle, where there is an 
affirmation after an “anticipatory breach”192 the innocent party loses all rights 
against the repudiation; on the other hand, where the repudiation is not regarded 
as an anticipatory breach, affirmation does not cause the innocent party to lose 
the right to recover damages for that breach. In order to support his conclusion, 
Professor Sutton relied on Russell Young Abalone Pty Ltd v Traders Prudent 
Insurance Co Ltd193 where it was held that the wrongful denial of the insurance 
claim was a repudiatory breach but since the assured affirmed the contract the 
policy limit applied and therefore consequential loss was prohibited. However, 
the judgment in Russell Young Abalone is not welcomed nor followed. It was 
criticized by Neil Campbell on the basis that the case is “shaky” and stands no 
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legal ground194 and in Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd v. Territory 
Insurance Office195 it was clearly held that 
“…if the insurer fails to pay within a reasonable time, the insurer is in 
breach and the insured may sue for the indemnity under the policy, 
and for damages for breach of contract. In order to sue for damages, 
it is not essential that the insurer has repudiated the contract.”196 
Therefore, despite some academic debates on the issue of damage for late 
payment, it could be regarded as settled in Australia that the insurer’s obligation 
is regarded as one to pay the claim, and any wrongful claim handling such as 
unreasonable late payment or denial of the policy liability could be regarded as a 
breach of a condition of the contract. Once the assured affirms the contract he or 
she is entitled to both the policy amount within the policy limit and further 
damage caused by the insurer.197  
Compared with the Australian legal position, the English rule on damage for late 
payment becomes more unreasonable and the following discussion is based on 
the current legal position that the payment made by an English indemnity insurer 
is a payment of damage. 
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3.2 Damage for late payment of damage 
No damage over damage 
3.2.1 The rule named as “no damage over damage” was firstly decided by the 
House of Lords in The Lips.198 In that case the charterer was obliged to pay 
demurrage, which was regarded as a kind of liquidated damage caused by delay 
in loading or discharging in a contract of carriage in British external sterling but 
accrued at a fixed rate of $6,000 per day. The vessel was detained for some 28 
days, but the charterer only admitted the liability and paid the amount for 24 days. 
It was held by the umpire that the period of demurrage was some 28 days and 
therefore there were some 4 days still to be paid. It was not in dispute that the 
amount should be paid was $24,250. However, the problem appeared when that 
amount was to be converted into British sterling. 
At the date when the demurrage should have been paid the rate of exchange 
was $2.37 to £1 sterling; while at the date of the award the rate of exchange fell 
sharply to $1.54 to £1 sterling. It was held by the umpire that the owner was 
entitled to the damage of late payment of demurrage, and in order to award such 
damage, the umpire calculated the amount by the latter rate of exchange and 
awarded the owner £10,232 (the demurrage) and £5,514 (the damage for late 
payment caused by the fluctuation) plus interest. It was also held that such 
damage was within the second limb of Hadley v. Baxendale, namely it was held 
by the umpire that the damage was caused by special circumstances which was 
communicated at the time the contract was entered into.  
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The charterer then appealed and the very question in this case was whether the 
owners were entitled to recover the damage of currency fluctuation caused by 
the late payment of demurrage (the liquidated damage).  
3.2.2 The dispute finally reached the House of Lords and the charterer’s appeal 
was allowed. The first issue which was considered by the House of Lords was 
the nature of demurrage; it was held by Lord Brandon that demurrage was not 
“…money payable by a charterer as the consideration for the exercise 
by him of a right to detain a chartered ship beyond the stipulated lay 
days.”199 
His Lordship continued: 
“It is a liability in damages to which a charterer becomes subject 
because, by detaining the chartered ship beyond the stipulated lay 
days, he is in breach of his contract… The effect of such a claim is to 
liquidate the damages payable: it does not alter the nature of the 
charterer’s liability, which is and remains a liability for damages, albeit 
liquidated damages. ”200 
Therefore, it was well settled in law that demurrage was liquidated damage and 
such damage accrued as soon as the duty of the charterer was breached. It 
could also be inferred that what was decided in The Lips should be extended to 
unliquidated damage equally. 
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Subsequently, Lord Brandon delivered the famous judgment on the rule of “no 
damage over damage”: 
“There is no such thing as a cause of action in damages for late 
payment of damages. The only remedy which the law affords for delay 
in paying damages is the discretionary award of interest pursuant to 
statute. ”201 
Therefore, it was held by the House of Lords that there was no breach by the 
charterer and no damage based remedy was available to the owner while the 
only remedy was statutory interest.  
No implied term to pay damages within a reasonable time 
3.2.3 It was held by the umpire that the charterer should make the payment 
within two months after the completion of discharge; although it was not 
expressly stated in the contract, the umpire was ready to imply such a term into 
the contract. However, such approach was found by Lord Brandon to be wrong 
in law. It was then held that although it was a commercial practice that 
reasonable time would be required for calculating the amount and settling the 
dispute,  
“[t]his circumstance, however, does not afford a basis for implying a 
term that the charterer’s liability to pay demurrage does not accrue 
until such a reasonable time has elapsed.”202 
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However, the reasonable time of two months was not completely meaningless; it 
was subsequently held by Lord Brandon that after the expiry of that period the 
interest was payable, which meant that Lord Brandon refused to regard the 
implied period as a period within which the payment shall be made, but a period 
of grace; this understanding itself is a paradox. 
In addition, the refusal to accept an implied term by Lord Brandon was not 
conclusive. A Privy Council case203 was subsequently cited by Lord Mackay to 
prove that there would be some possibility for a term for the date of the payment 
to be implied in the contract, although His Lordship preferred the express 
approach.204 
The risk allocation 
3.2.4 In addition to the findings above, another issue should be noticed, namely 
the allocation of the risk. In The Lips it was clearly stated in the contract that the 
exchange rate on a bill of lading would also apply to demurrage. Such a 
statement, based on commercial sense, would be regarded as a statement 
made by the parties that the risk of currency fluctuations was specially allocated 
and should be borne by the owner because by agreeing that clause it could be 
predicted by the ship-owner that there might be a risk of fluctuation. Although it 
was not clearly ruled by the House of Lords, it was noted by Lord Brandon by 
stating that  
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“The real issue in the appeal is the true construction of the provisions 
relating to demurrage…”205 
Therefore, it could also be argued that the judgment of The Lips was also based 
on special commercial grounds and that this case should not have been applied 
universally. 
3.2.5 To conclude, what was settled by The Lips was, in fact, that generally there 
would be no “damage based” remedy for late payment of damage should there 
be no other contractual or commercial arrangement. However, once the 
reasonable time to pay the damage was implied in the contract or agreed by the 
parties as an express term, the late payment would be regarded as a breach of 
contract and therefore there would be no reason to rebut the claim raised by the 
innocent party. 
Therefore, it would also be correct to note the fact that in order to introduce the 
rules in Hadley, the nature of the claim and the rules in The Lips have to be 
viewed with care and with commercial sense and it is of fundamental importance 
in indemnity insurance, especially in property insurance, as it has been stated in 
the prior chapter, that the nature of a claim in such insurance had not been 
settled yet. 
This point of view could also be supported once the assured places the policy 
through an insurance broker but the latter fails to do so, the payment which 
should have been claimed from the insurer is to be paid by that broker by way of 
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damage. Additionally, any loss caused by not having the money could also be 
recovered by way of damage. 
In Arbory Group Ltd v. West Craven Insurance Service206 the assured TGL 
wished to purchase a business interruption cover for £1m through the insurance 
broker WCIS but due to the negligence of WCIS the actual amount was only 
£0.25m. After the destruction of the business by fire the assured claimed two 
types of losses: the first was the shortfall of the cover amounting to £0.3m and 
the second head was the loss of profit due to the underinsurance for another 
£0.3m. WCIS admitted the liability for the first type of loss, but denied the liability 
for the second because, according to The Lips and to Sprung, there would be 
“damage over damage”. 
The case was referred to HHJ Grenfell and it was held that both losses could be 
recovered. As to the second type of loss, the judge clearly pointed out that the 
aim of purchasing a business interruption policy was to 
“…ensure that sufﬁcient business interruption cover was in place to 
enable the company to recover and to resume its pre-incident level of 
profitability at the earliest date.” 207 
Additionally, the judge also pointed out that once the broker was negligent in 
obtaining enough cover, the further loss was reasonably foreseeable208 and 
therefore WCIS would be liable for that further loss. 
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As to the issue of “damage over damage”, the judge carefully distinguished The 
Lips and Sprung by stating that 
“…had there been no underinsurance… a full payment would have 
been made at around the same time as payment was in fact received. 
I can see no good reason in this case to restrict the claim against the 
broker to the amount which would have been the liability of the insurer 
to pay had that been so.”209 
3.3 Damage for late payment in indemnity insurance 
3.3.1 It is common ground that in order to clarify the secondary obligation, the 
primary obligation has to be considered very carefully in the first place. 
Therefore, the following discussion will be divided into two approaches based on 
two different understandings about the indemnity insurer’s primary obligation. In 
this part, the discussion is based on current law, namely the primary obligation is 
to be regarded as one to prevent the loss and the payment made by the 
indemnity insurer is regarded as damage. 
Current Law 
3.3.2 Currently, damage for late payment in indemnity insurance is not available 
for the assured. The main reason is that, as previously mentioned in chapter 2 of 
this work, the primary obligation of the insurer is treated by law as one to prevent 
the loss from occurring and what is paid by the insurer is damages. However, 
according to the discussion about the indemnity insurer’s primary obligation, 
some doubts have to be cast on this conclusion. In order to find out the correct 
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answer the damage rules have to be read in a commercial sense in the 
insurance market and a re-examination of the common law is also required. 
The Italia Express (No.2) 
3.3.3 The first case which dealt directly with the issue of damage for late 
payment was The Italia Express (No.2), and in which case the damage for late 
payment was firmly rejected by Hirst J. Although this case has been discussed 
from the aspect of the primary obligation, the focus should be put on the 
secondary obligation in this part. 
As to the issue about damage for late payment by the insurer the claimant in The 
Italia Express (No.2) provided two cases210 in which damage was available to 
support the argument. The English case is Grant v. Cooperative Insurance 
Society.211 
In that case the block insurance policy dealt with the loss of rent within specified 
limits. After the damage (by fire) occurred, the house was left vacant and the 
insurer rejected the claim. Two special claims of damage were raised by the 
claimant, namely cost for extra accommodation, which was above the specified 
limit of the policy, and damage for the cost of protection when the house was 
vacant. Hodgson J in that case awarded both heads.  
It was firstly held that those two heads of damage were special damage and 
secondly, it was held, according to commercial awareness, that each head ought 
to have been contemplated if the insurers wrongfully refused to pay the amount 
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due under the policy, thirdly, it was also held that those claims were not under 
the policy but were separate claims for damages which could breach the limit of 
the policy. 
However, Grant was distinguished by Hirst J. The learned judge held that 
“Neither the Grant case in England, nor the Stuart case in New 
Zealand were marine insurance cases, so they are clearly 
distinguishable on this ground alone; but in any event I very much 
doubt whether they can stand in the light of The Fanti…”212 
In the light of the discussion in chapter 2, it is doubtful whether The Fanti should 
be extended to property insurance. However, it is even more doubtful that Hirst J 
decided not to follow Grant for the reason that Grant was a non-marine case. It is 
correct to clarify that there are many important differences between marine and 
non-marine insurance,213 however, no such difference could be found in Grant 
and The Italia Express (No.2). Additionally, this uncertainty turned out to be more 
illogical as The Italia Express (No.2), as a marine case, was applied in Sprung 
without any difficulty. 
Another reason, according to which Hirst J rejected the claim by the assured, 
was his understanding about relevant sections of the MIA 1906. The relevant 
parts of these sections are cited below: 
“67. (1) The sum which the assured can recover in respect of a loss 
on a policy by which he is insured, in the case of an unvalued policy to 
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the full extent of the insurable value, or, in the case of a valued policy 
to the full extent of the value fixed by the policy, is called the measure 
of indemnity. 
68. Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any express provision 
in the policy, where there is a total loss of the subject-matter insured— 
(1) If the policy be a valued policy, the measure of indemnity is the 
sum fixed by the policy;” 
It was understood by both the counsel for the insurer and Hirst J that these 
sections were to be treated as the limitation of the insurer’s liability. It was held 
by Hirst J that 
“I consider that the starting point in this marine insurance case is s. 67 
of the Act. In my judgment, this section, together with s. 68 in total loss 
cases, is conclusively definitive of the extent of the liability of the 
insurer for loss of the vessel under a valued policy.”214 
It has been argued in chapter 2 that these sections are dealing with the measure 
of indemnity rather than with damage; therefore, it could be argued that these 
sections, indeed, set a limitation on the liability of the insurer but that limitation is 
for the primary obligation rather than the secondary one, even though the 
primary obligation, under current law, has to be read as one to prevent the loss.  
Therefore, ss.67-68 should not be treated as a protection to limit the secondary 
obligation of the insurer within the policy limit, as was held in Grant. 
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ICCI v. McHugh215 
3.3.4 In ICCI v. McHugh, the assured entered into a business interruption policy 
for a hotel which suffered huge losses caused by three arson attacks. Among 
other issues the assured claimed that the insurers were in breach of an implied 
term which obliged them to conduct negotiations after the occurrence of each 
insured event and/or to assess the amount of the loss and/or to pay the sum due 
under the claim for material damage and/or the business interruption policy with 
reasonable diligence and due expedition. It was further argued that the assured, 
due to the breach, was unable to recommence business and suffered the loss 
due to the late payment and response by the insurers. 
This claim was firmly rejected by Mance J (as he then was); it was not accepted 
by the learned judge that such a term could be implied into the policy in dispute: 
“The law will not however imply a term unless it is necessary to give 
the contract business efficacy or represents the obvious, although 
unexpressed, intention of the parties. Mere reasonableness or 
convenience is not sufficient…”216 
It could be noticed that the same approach in The Lips was adopted by Mance J 
and generally it might be correct to hold that the indemnity insurer, without 
express terms in the policy, is under no obligation to indemnify the assured 
within a reasonable time. However, the above judgment might not be the reason 
why the assured’s claim was finally rejected because it was found in ICCI that 
                                         
215 Insurance Corporation of the Channel Islands Ltd v. McHugh (ICCI) [1997] LRLR 94. 
216
 ibid, at p.136. 
101 
 
the assured acted fraudulently by presenting forged materials in order to get 
profit from the loss (the fraudulent means and devices).  
That issue was subsequently discussed by Mance J by stating that 
“If any such term existed at all, it would, presumably, have to be 
mutual…there would be a duty on the insured to present and 
progress the claim with reasonable speed and efficiency. Just as 
insurers would be obliged not reasonably to refuse or delay 
indemnity, so, presumably, the insured would be under a duty not 
unreasonably to delay, misstate or overstate his case.”217 
Therefore, it is at least arguable that there could have been an implied obligation 
on the insurer to provide indemnity within a reasonable time if the assured also 
owed an obligation to co-operate with the insurer. However, in ICCI, the 
corresponding implied obligation on the assured, namely not unreasonably to 
delay, misstate or overstate his case, had been breached by the assured at the 
start by his using fraudulent means and devices; therefore, the insurer was 
released from such an implied obligation to handle the claim reasonably. 
Tonkin v. UK Insurance Ltd218 
3.3.5 In Tonkin the assured insured his house and its contents by a fire policy. 
After a serious fire both the insured house and its contents were damaged. The 
insurer paid in full in respect of the contents of the house, but a dispute arose as 
to the payment for the reinstatement of the house.  
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In the fire policy, a clause stated as 
     “Caring for You 
We will always try to be fair and reasonable whenever you have need 
of the protection of this Policy. We will also act quickly to provide that 
protection.”219 
Notwithstanding this clause, the house had not been rebuilt after a period of over 
three years and a half; the assured claimed that such a term within the contract 
constituted a separate contractual obligation and it was breached by the insurer, 
and therefore, the assured would be entitled to damage caused by late payment 
and the delay in negotiation. 
It was accepted by Peter Coulson QC, as a deputy judge, that such a clause was 
an 
“…express obligation on the part of the defendant to be fair and 
reasonable and to act ‘quickly’ when dealing with the claim.”220 
However, feeling himself bound by Sprung the learned judge rejected the claim: 
“The claimants’ main claim here is based on the defendant’s failure to 
pay their claims under the policy. Thus I consider their ‘delay’ claims 
to be claims for damages for failure to pay damages, which is just the 
sort of claim which the authorities noted above hold to be invalid. It is 
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difficult to conclude that there is here another or separate breach of 
contract arising out of the general obligation…”221 
However, in Sprung it was suggested that once a separate contractual obligation 
was breached, damage would be available for such a breach. Therefore, the 
learned judge seems to be wrong to reach the conclusion that even though there 
is a separate obligation, a breach would not lead to damage as well. 
Although the learned judge might be wrong in deciding that there would be no 
cause of action, it was rightly found by him that in Tonkin the delay of in 
negotiation was caused by the assured. It was pointed out that 
“…it seems to me that the critical delays in this story are referable to 
the claimants and their advisers. Whilst the defendant’s conduct is not 
free from criticism, for the reasons which I have stated, it is impossible 
to conclude that any critical delay or other identifiable loss was 
caused by those defaults.”222 
Accordingly, it will be more persuasive to argue that the assured was truly 
defeated by their own “critical mistakes”, and even though in any event there 
would be no damage payable to the assured in Tonkin, it needs to be noted that 
the true reason which precluded the claim for damage is better understood as 
the same as in Sprung, namely the issue of causation.  
3.3.6 Currently, to conclude the English legal position, it is open to the parties of 
the policy to use express terms to constitute a contractual obligation to pay a 
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claim within a reasonable time, and such a breach, if satisfying the rules of 
damage and causation, would lead to a claim for damage. However, where there 
is no express term, the answer is not a clear-cut one. It could be inferred from 
ICCI that even in the claim handling (post-contractual) stage there is a mutual 
obligation which regulates the parties’ post-contractual actions. According to the 
description in ICCI, such an obligation would fall within the scope of a 
post-contractual duty of good faith.  
The duty of good faith of insurers in claim handling stage 
3.3.7 It is well known that the contract of marine insurance is a contract based on 
utmost good faith of both parties. The duty of utmost good faith, because of the 
imperfect statutory wording, has been interpreted differently case by case; the 
most significant difference exists in the understanding of the duty between the 
pre-contractual and post-contractual stage.  
It is also widely accepted that the pre-contractual duty is one from statute; 
however, when it comes to the post-contractual duty, the situation is less clear. 
Therefore, in this part, the pre-contractual duty of good faith will be introduced 
firstly and there will be discussion on the reason why the remedy of the breach of 
such duty would not be suitable for the assured in the claim handling stage. 
Secondly, the duty of good faith in the post-contractual stage will be discussed in 
depth. 
3.3.8 It has been mentioned above that after 12th August 2016 the new 
Insurance Act 2015 will come into force and according to the new legislation 
there will be several important amendments on the duty of good faith; 
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accordingly, the historical development of the duty of good faith, especially the 
post-contractual duty of good faith will be discussed at the beginning while the 
significant amendments in the Insurance Act 2015 will be discussed 
subsequently. 
The duty of utmost good faith can be traced back to Carter v. Boehm223 and it 
was subsequently codified into the MIA 1906. In s.17 it originally stated that 
“A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost 
good faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either 
party, the contract may be avoided by the other party.” 
The application of this section was settled in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd224 that two tests have to be satisfied in order to 
entitle the insurer to avoid the policy. Firstly the objective test of materiality and 
secondly the subjective test of inducement.  
It has to be noted that the duty of utmost good faith in s.17 does not state 
whether such duty is limited in the pre-contractual stage only, but ss.18 and 20 
are explanations specifically dealing with the pre-contractual duty. Therefore, 
historically it is not appropriate to apply the statutory duty of utmost good faith in 
the claim handling stage, especially when the insurer unreasonably delays in 
making payment or in negotiation, as it has been settled in common law for a 
long time that the only remedy for breaching the statutory duty of utmost good 
faith is avoidance. 
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In La Banque Financiere v. Westgate225 (the gemstone case) the broker of the 
insurer failed to disclose material facts to the assured banks about the fraud and 
according to the policy wording (the fraud exception clause) the four banks in 
that case suffered a huge loss but could not be recovered from the insurer. 
Therefore, the assured claimed damages for breach of utmost good faith at the 
pre-contractual stage by the insurer. 
At the first trial, Styen J (as he then was) held that the assured would be entitled 
to damage, as 
“…avoidance of a policy and a claim for return of the premium will be 
a wholly ineffective remedy if the breach of the duty of the utmost 
good faith by the insurer caused the insured to be unprotected and 
exposed to great loss.”226 
The insurer appealed and at the Court of Appeal it was held that there was a 
mutual duty of pre-contractual disclosure that 
“In our judgment, however, there is no doubt that the obligation to 
disclose material fact is a mutual one imposing reciprocal duties on 
insurer and insured. In the case of marine insurance contracts, s. 17 
in effect so provides.”227 
However, the Court of Appeal rejected to treat damage as a remedy for breach 
of statutory duty of utmost good faith and reversed the trial judgment; it was held 
that 
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“In our judgment, however, the wording of s. 17, if anything, goes 
against, rather than supports, the banks’ submission, inasmuch as it 
explicitly confers on the other party, in a case where the utmost good 
faith has not been observed, the right to avoid the contract but makes 
no mention of damages…”228 
This judgment was subsequently confirmed by the House of Lords. Therefore, 
historically the remedy for a breach of statutory duty of utmost good faith would 
be summarized as “all or nothing”. This position is concluded and developed as  
“The remedy is all or nothing. The courts have no power to apply 
proportional recovery and to allow the assured to recover that 
proportion of his loss represented by the premium actually paid; 
neither may the assured make full recovery by preferring the balance 
of the premium that would have been charged had full disclosure 
been made…”229 
It has to be pointed out that the “all or nothing” remedy is by no means a 
sufficient remedy for the assured. In the case of the gemstone case, the only 
remedy for the assured was to avoid the contract and claim for the premium to 
be returned, when the amount of premium, compared with the loss suffered by 
the assured, was meaningless. Furthermore, when an insurer breaches his duty 
of utmost good faith, pre- or post-contractual, it would be absurd for the assured 
to ask for the remedy of avoidance; what is required by the assured is to keep 
the property or liability covered and to be indemnified reasonably.  
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Therefore, when the problem is a claim for damage under an insurance contract, 
the court has tried to find some solution to balance the unfair legal situation. 
In La Banque Financiere230 it was held that the post-contractual duty of utmost 
good faith existed in special circumstances: 
“It may be that on the particular facts of some cases (though by no 
means necessarily all) the duty of post-contractual disclosure can be 
said to arise under the terms of the preceding contract.”231 
Therefore, the following discussion will be mainly based on the implied and 
post-contractual obligation of utmost good faith. 
3.3.9 The earliest case which stated that the duty of utmost good faith existed 
throughout the contract could be traced back to Britton v. Royal Insurance Co232. 
It was held by Willes J that 
“The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith on both sides, 
and it is most important that such good faith be maintained.”233 
Although it is believed that it will be better to regard Britton as the case about the 
rule on fraudulent claims, the existence of a continuing duty of utmost good faith 
has “never seriously been doubted”. 234  Therefore, a conclusion could be 
reached that the duty of utmost good faith is not only mutual but also a 
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continuing one, 235  although there are differences between the pre- and 
post-contractual duty of good faith in their origins, definitions and the remedies 
for breach. 
3.3.10 Although it should be accepted that the duty of utmost good faith is a 
continuing one, difficulties will arise when the definition is to be given to the 
post-contractual duty of utmost good faith. 
The first modern case which concerns the post-contractual duty of good faith is 
The Litsion Pride.236 It was believed by Hirst J that there should be no difference 
both in the definition and the remedy for breach between the pre-contractual 
duty of good faith, which was stated in s.17 of the MIA 1906, and the 
post-contractual one, which had not been clearly defined. Therefore, he held that 
even if the contract of insurance had been concluded, the duty of utmost good 
faith retained its “full rigour”237, and a breach of such duty would entitle the 
innocent party to avoid the whole contract. 
However, the judgment delivered by Hirst J was not commonly accepted both by 
courts and academics.238  
Subsequently, the House of Lords had a chance to review the requirement of the 
post-contractual duty of utmost good faith and its remedy in The Star Sea.239 It 
was held by Lord Hobhouse that The Litsion Pride was no longer good law: 
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“The reasoning adopted by Mr Justice Hirst has been criticized both 
by academic writers and by other Judges in later cases. I consider 
that it should not any longer be treated as a sound statement of the 
law. In so far as it decouples the obligation of good faith both from s. 
17 and the remedy of avoidance and from the contractual principles 
which would apply to a breach of contract it is clearly unsound…”240 
Deciding not to give a precise legal definition for the post-contractual duty of 
good faith, Lord Hobhouse believed the problem would be solved by the 
implication of contractual terms and therefore a very famous judgment was then 
delivered that 
“A coherent scheme can be achieved by distinguishing a lack of good 
faith which is material to the making of the contract itself (or some 
variation of it) and a lack of good faith during the performance of the 
contract which may prejudice the other party or cause him loss or 
destroy the continuing contractual relationship. The former derives 
from requirements of the law which pre-exist the contract and are not 
created by it although they only become material because a contract 
has been entered into. The remedy is the right to elect to avoid the 
contract. The latter can derive from express or implied terms of 
the contract; it would be a contractual obligation arising from the 
contract and the remedies are the contractual remedies provided 
by the law of contract. This is no doubt why judges have on a 
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number of occasions been led to attribute the post-contract 
application of the principle of good faith to an implied term.”241 
In concurring with the view of Lord Hobhouse that the post-contractual duty of 
utmost good faith was a contractual one and the definition was flexible, Lord 
Clyde held that 
“…once it is recognized that in a contract of insurance, and indeed in 
certain other contracts, an element of good faith is to be observed, 
and that that element may impose certain duties particularly of 
disclosure between one party and the other, duties… may vary in 
their content and substance according to the 
circumstances…”242 
Therefore, the duty of good faith in the post-contractual stage would, at least, be 
treated as an implied duty and the content of such duty has to be decided 
according to the special circumstances of each case. 
3.3.11 It has been mentioned above that the rights and obligations of the parties 
of a contract have to be understood within a commercial context, and this rule 
would also apply to the understanding of the definition of the post-contractual 
duty of good faith subject to the judgment given by Lord Hobhouse and Lord 
Clyde in The Star Sea. 
However, there are some arguments about the legal basis of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith, and the judgment of Lord Hobhouse has 
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been interpreted as an understanding which denies the existence of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith mentioned above;243 with respect, those 
doubts misunderstand the nature and the definition of the post-contractual duty 
of good faith and therefore should be clarified. 
Firstly, in The Star Sea it could be clearly noted that Lord Clyde was in the same 
position as Lord Hobhouse. If the judgment of Lord Hobhouse is against the 
contractual origin of post-contractual good faith, the judgments delivered by Lord 
Hobhouse and Lord Clyde can hardly be reconciled, especially in light of the 
following speech of Lord Clyde, in which His Lordship clearly accepted the 
contractual origin of the duty: 
“In my view the idea of good faith in the context of insurance contracts 
reflects the degrees of openness required of the parties in the 
various stages of their relationship. It is not an absolute. The 
substance of the obligation which is entailed can vary according to 
the context in which the matter comes to be judged.”244 
Secondly, as is admitted, the contractual origin of the post-contractual duty of 
good faith has been widely accepted by subsequent cases,245 which will be 
introduced below. 
3.3.12 In The Mercandian Continent246 it was clearly accepted by Longmore LJ 
that some post-contractual acts were governed by the implied and contractual 
duty of good faith: 
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“(7) Other situations where good faith may be implied 
… Interests of the insured and the insurers may not be the same but 
they will be required to act in good faith towards each other. If for 
example the limit of indemnity includes sums awarded by way of 
damages, interest and costs, insurers may be tempted to run up costs 
and exceed the policy limit to the detriment of the insured. The 
insured’s protection lies in the duty which the law imposes on the 
insurer to exercise his power to conduct the defence in good faith.”247 
It could be clearly found that, in the judgment delivered by Longmore LJ, the 
insurer’s duty to make payment for a valid claim within a reasonable time would 
be governed by the post-contractual duty of good faith. As a matter of practice, 
once there is no express term such a duty would be implied, and the insurer 
should make the payment within a reasonable time, otherwise the 
post-contractual duty of good faith would be breached by the insurer. It is true 
that, according to the Enterprise Act 2016, the post-contractual duty of good faith 
could be understood as a duty implied by statute, but before the enactment of 
that Act the post-contractual duty of good faith in the claim handling stage could 
also be understood as a duty which is implied by common law. 
In Drake Insurance v. Provident Insurance248 the Court of Appeal had a chance 
to state the law of post-contractual duty of good faith specifically in the claim 
handling stage. In Drake the assured was required to disclose previous 
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speeding convictions and in the earlier policy the assured stated that there was 
one accident waiting for settlement and according to the term of the policy that 
accident was regarded as being one of contributory fault (50% of the assured 
and 50% of the third party). Subsequently, the assured had another speeding 
conviction and when the policy was to be renewed, the assured did not disclose 
the later speeding conviction to the insurer, however, at that time his liability in of 
the earlier accident was clarified and the assured turned out to be innocent.  
According to the policy provisions, the premium should have remained the same 
due to the assured’s innocence in the earlier accident, even if the later speed 
conviction had been disclosed and therefore the assured’s non-disclosure was 
immaterial. However, the insurer decided to avoid the policy on the ground that 
the assured made a material non-disclosure which breached the statutory duty 
of utmost good faith (pre-contractual duty).  
Prima facie, Drake did not deal with the post-contractual duty of good faith 
directly; however, based on the special facts of the case it was held by the court 
that the misuse of the right of avoidance by the insurer might become a breach 
of the contractual duty of good faith (post-contractual duty). 
In reaching this conclusion, Rix LJ referred back to a statement made by Lord 
Lloyd in Pan Atlantic v. Pine Top249 that 
“…there may be circumstances in which an insurer, by asserting a 
right to avoid for non-disclosure, would himself be guilty of want of 
good faith.”250 
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However, it was then found by Rix LJ that the avoidance was made by the 
insurer not knowing the assured was innocent in the earlier accident, and it was 
then accepted by Rix LJ that the avoidance was made in good faith. However, 
the learned judge left a warning that 
“If, however, the point were a live one, I would hazard the opinion that 
knowledge or shut-eye knowledge of the fact that the accident was a 
no fault accident would have made it a matter of bad faith to avoid the 
policy.”251 
A more harsh approach was taken by Pill LJ in the same case, he held that 
“…a failure to make any enquiry of the insured before taking the 
drastic step of avoiding the policy was in my judgment a breach by the 
insurer of the duty of good faith.”252 
Clearly there was a conflict between Rix and Pill LJJs about whether the 
avoidance could be justified and it was caused by different understandings on 
the facts of the case. However, it was not doubted that in the claim handling 
stage, the insurer owed a duty to act with good faith towards the assured.253 
Therefore, once the insurer rejects the claim without any sound ground, or 
delays a valid payment arbitrarily254 the contractual duty of good faith will be 
breached and the breach of a contractual duty of good faith should be deemed 
as a breach of a term in the contract, although the term is an implied one.  
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3.3.13 It has been argued earlier that the court is entitled to imply terms into the 
policy in accordance with commercial sense and good faith, it is now appropriate 
to introduce several examples about the successful implication of these terms. 
In Phoenix General Insurance v. Halvanon255 a facultative/obligatory policy was 
issued for a reinsurance contract and the facultative/obligatory policy required 
the reinsurer to accept whatever risk was provided by the reinsured. With this 
commercial background Hobhouse J (as he then was) was prepared to agree 
that there would be an implied obligation on the reinsured to provide the risk with 
reasonable care of the reinsurer and follow the rule of the market. He held that 
“The implication of this term or terms was not controversial before 
me…The facultative/obligatory nature of the transaction which 
imposes no restriction on the reassured’s right to choose whether to 
cede or not to cede, without giving the reinsurer any equivalent right, 
does necessitate that the reinsured should accept the obligation to 
conduct the business involved in the cession prudently, reasonably 
carefully and in accordance with the ordinary practice of the 
market.”256 
When it came to the origin of the implication, Hobhouse J believed that it was 
based on the contractual duty of good faith and subsequently held that 
“On this assumption, there is no ground for curtailing the obligation 
which would probably be imported anyway by the duty of good faith 
and which could also be enforced by way of discovery and inspection 
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in any subsequent litigation. The relevant obligations must be 
regarded as continuing ones, just as is the obligation of the utmost 
good faith.”257 
Another example could be found in Goshawk v. Tyser258 and the judgment of 
that case was made after the House of Lords decision in The Star Sea.  
In Goshawk some important materials such as placing documents, claim 
documents and premium accounting documents were held by the brokers of the 
assureds. In order to reassess the risk the insurer required the brokers to 
disclose them again even though at that time the risk had already attached. 
However, some of the brokers refused to do so as their principals, the assureds, 
objected to this post-contractual disclosure.  
The case reached the Court of Appeal and Rix LJ believed that it would be 
appropriate for commercial reasons to imply a term which required 
post-contractual disclosure; otherwise the insurer had to “work in the dark”.259 
Although Rix LJ felt that the implied term came from a duty of good faith,260 he 
still clarified that  
“…in the Lloyd’s market there has…been a term to be implied in the 
insurance contracts between underwriters and insureds to this effect: 
that placing and claims documents which have been previously 
shown to underwriters, and premium accounting documents which 
are necessary to the operation of the contract, where retained by the 
                                         
257 ibid, at p.614, emphasis added. 
258
 [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 566. 
259 See Goshawk v. Tyser [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 566, at [49]. 
260
 ibid, at [53]. 
118 
 
insureds’ Lloyd’s brokers, should be available to underwriters in case 
of reasonable necessity.”261 
Accordingly, in order to assist the performance of the contract of insurance, the 
contractual duty of good faith requires implication in the contract where there is 
no express one. 
It should be noted that in both Phoenix and Goshawk the implied obligations 
were imposed on the side of the assured or reinsured. As a matter of fact, it is 
indeed very difficult, if not impossible, to find any reported cases in which the 
insurer’s obligation in the claim handling stage has been implied. However, this 
fact does not in any way mean that there should be no implied duty on the 
insurer. The merit behind those duties which should have been implied, namely 
the reasonable care and effort to assist the performance in a fair and just manner, 
has to be noted. Therefore, a conclusion could be reached that the behaviour of 
the insurer is also regulated by the duty of good faith in the claim handling stage: 
it requires the insurer to investigate the loss properly, to hold the negotiation with 
the assured fairly and to make the payment against a valid claim reasonably. 
This argument finds support even from Arnould, in which the learned editors 
refused to accept the contractual origin of the post-contractual duty of good faith, 
however, it is admitted that the post-contractual duty of good faith 
“…may inform the manner in which the parties perform their express 
contractual obligations to each other and the manner in which express 
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contractual liberties are exercised, including by the implication of 
terms…”262 
It is argued by Professor Eggers263 that the damage for late payment by 
indemnity insurers could not be recovered and among all his powerful 
arguments an ingenious point was presented: 
“This can be tested by assuming that the day after the loss, the 
assured obtains a judgment against the insurer, thus merging the 
insurer’s contractual liability into the liability created by the judgment. 
If that judgment is not honoured by the insurer, the assured should not 
be entitled to recover consequential damages over and above the 
judgment sum (other than interest).”264 
Although it might be argued that an insurance claim made by an assured is 
different from a judgment because the latter is guaranteed by public authority, 
such an argument could not resolve the problem completely. However, once the 
contractual duty of good faith is imposed on the side of the insurer and requires 
him to act reasonably, the point raised by the learned professor could no longer 
be an obstacle. That is to say, once litigation begins there are two kinds of claims: 
one is the claim for indemnity according to the policy and the other is the claim 
caused by the breach of duty of good faith subject to the implied term of the 
policy. Although it has been decided many times that there is no damage over 
damage, it has not been decided yet about the remedy for a breach of 
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post-contractual duty of good faith, and once the remedy of the breach is 
crystallized a solution would be provided as well. 
This assumption will be supported by the Enterprise Act 2016 where the implied 
duty of post-contractual good faith is recognized by statute and the effect of the 
new legislation shall be discussed in chapter 7 of this work. 
3.3.14 It has been suggested that it is difficult to define the post-contractual duty 
of good faith; however, when it comes to the remedy for the breach it is more 
problematic as it is clearly stated originally in s.17 of the MIA 1906 that the only 
remedy for the breach is avoidance (an all-or-nothing remedy). 
Therefore, different approaches have been taken by courts to bypass the 
one-sided and harsh remedy of avoidance when the duty of good faith is 
breached in the post-contractual stage. 
In Phoenix v. Halvanon265 Hobhouse J held that the implied term from the 
post-contractual duty of good faith was innominate in nature and the 
consequences of breach would be subject to normal contract law: 
“The term or terms are all innominate and therefore the 
consequences of any breach for any particular cession or any 
individual claim or, indeed, for the contracts as a whole, must depend 
on the nature and gravity of the relevant breach or breaches.”266 
In The Star Sea it seemed that the same approach was taken by Lord Hobhouse 
as His Lordship did in Phoenix v. Halvanon where the Law Lord held that  
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“The Courts have consistently set their face against allowing the 
assured’s duty of good faith to be used by the insurer as an 
instrument for enabling the insurer himself to act in bad faith. An 
inevitable consequence in the post-contract situation is that the 
remedy of avoidance of the contract is in practical terms wholly 
one-sided.”267 
In addition, since the duty of the post-contractual good faith has a contractual 
nature, it could then be inferred that the remedy of the breach would be resolved 
by general contract law as well. 
3.3.15 However, this approach was not commonly accepted and the type of the 
remedy remained problematic. Therefore, in Goshawk even though it was held 
by Rix LJ that there was an implied term for disclosure based on a 
post-contractual duty of good faith, he refused to classify the post-contractual 
non-disclosure as a breach of the duty of good faith, it might be inferred that it 
was the view of the learned judge that avoidance ab initio remained as the only 
remedy.268 
In The Mercandian Continent it was held by Longmore LJ that once there was a 
fraudulent claim in the post-contractual stage, the insurer would be entitled, 
according to the post-contractual duty of good faith, to avoid the policy ab 
initio;269 while he left it open when there was no fraud involved. 
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The general position in Australia 
3.3.16 Unlike the uncertain English position before the Insurance Act 2015, the 
Australian courts and legislation clearly put more favour on the existence of the 
post-contractual duty of good faith currently and according to the requirement of 
the post-contractual duty the insurer has to act honestly and reasonably; the 
relevant part of section 13 of the Australian Insurance Contract Act 1984 (ICA 
1984) reads as 
“(1)  A contract of insurance is a contract based on the utmost good 
faith and there is implied in such a contract a provision requiring each 
party to it to act towards the other party, in respect of any matter 
arising under or in relation to it, with the utmost good faith.” 
Historically in Australia, it was argued that s.13 of ICA 1984 did not have the 
power to grant the innocent party damage for late payment, nor do legislators 
intend to do so. In Re Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd 270  Cheterman J 
commented that 
“If an insurer is liable to pay damages because it paid late, that is 
because there is a term or implied term of the contract that it should 
pay by a certain date. It is not because it was bad faith to be late…”271 
However, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) intends to regard this 
problem as settled, because it is clearly stated in the ALRC report that 
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“… it is quite clearly that, as utmost good faith is an implied term of 
contracts of insurance covered by [ICA 1984], damages are available 
for breach…”272  
3.3.17 In CGU Insurance Ltd v. AMP Financial Planning Ltd273 the assured AMP 
Financial Planning Ltd (AMP) purchased a claim policy from CGU Insurance Ltd 
(CGU). In 1999 AMP notified CGU that two of their capital holders were facing 
potential claims from investors and AMP also sent notice to Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) about potential claims. It was believed by 
ASIC that the late payment to investors might have a bad influence on AMP’s 
certificate and AMP provided settlement and sent it to CGU. CGU agreed the 
settlement in general, but “reserved indemnity under policy” because it was 
believed by CGU’s solicitors that AMP would not be liable. In 2001, without 
further notification, AMP settled the potential claim with investors for £3m and 
CGU denied the payment under the policy. 
In the lower court, it was held that the duty of utmost good faith was a reciprocal 
duty which both AMP and CGU had to follow. It was also held that the duty of 
utmost good faith meant something more than just acting with honesty and once 
the relevant material (the settlement protocol) was sent to CGU it was required 
by the duty of utmost good faith that CGU had to handle the claim properly and 
accordingly CGU failed. 
The case was then referred to the High Court and the judgment was reversed. 
However, the focus was not put on the reason why CGU was entitled to refuse 
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the claim, but the reason why AMP was not entitled to claim for indemnity and 
the High Court tacitly consented to the lower court about their opinion on the 
duty of utmost good faith. 
Accordingly, it would be safe to argue that should the assured be entitled to the 
indemnity the insurer’s refusal would be a violation of the duty of utmost good 
faith and according to Australian law that violation would lead to damage. 
Additionally, this case is a good example to illustrate that damage for late 
payment is the insurer’s secondary obligation in an indemnity insurance contract, 
that is to say, once the primary obligation, namely the payment under the policy, 
is not breached there will be no need to trigger an insurer’s liability for damage.  
It is, therefore, better to reconcile Cheterman J’s comment and the ALRC’s 
statement, and this aim could be achieved by stating that in some cases the 
implied obligation to make payment on time could be regarded as the 
requirement of good faith as well. Additionally, in some of the cases discussed 
there is a strong point of view from the Australian courts that the duty of utmost 
good faith is well implied, and a breach will certainly give rise to damage and a 
timely payment is a good reflection. Notably, this is also the legal position in New 
Zealand, where it is recognized by the courts that the obligation to pay on time is 
well implied and a breach will lead to damage.274 
                                         
274 See Harris v. New Zealand Insurance Company Ltd (1987) 4 ANZ Ins Cases 60-817; notably, in Canada 
a breach of duty of good faith could also bring damage, although on a different ground. 
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It is also believed by the ALRC that damage should be the only appropriate 
remedy and therefore it refuses to invoke the separate tort of bad faith as a 
remedy and such refusal shares the same approach taken by English law.275 
Awarding damages in Australia 
3.3.18 It needs, however, to be pointed out that some academics believe that 
even though there is an overlap between the common law approach and the 
statutory implication, in practice most cases are decided on a common law basis 
rather than by s.13 of the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (the ICA 1984); this is 
because the payment could be delayed even if the insurer acts in good faith276 
or if the policy is a marine policy which is beyond the jurisdiction of the ICA,277 or 
in the situation where s.13 is not argued;278 but this distinction will not influence 
the assured’s right to claim damage in any event.  
It needs also to be mentioned that in Australia, following the English authority 
Lagden v. O’Connor,279 the assured’s lack of financial resources (impecuniosity) 
is no longer a bar to a claim for damage. 
In Brescia v. QBE280 it should be noticed that in Australia the requirement of the 
insurer for a timely payment is stricter than it is in Canada and the U.S281 when 
the assured’s perception of the risk is raised as a defence by the insurer.282 
                                         
275
 See Law Commission Paper No. 201: Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and Other Issues 
(n.188), this issue is also discussed in chapter 6 of this work. 
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 See Sutton (4
th
 edition, Thomson Reuters Australia, 2014), at para 16.72. 
277 For example, see Tropicus Orchids Flowers v. Territory Insurance Office (1998) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-412 
where the ICA did not apply. 
278
 See Maxwell v. Highway Hauliers [2013] WASCA 115. 
279 [2004] AC 1067. 
280
 [2007] NSWSC 598. 
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In that case the assured insured the family business against loss caused by 
negligence and business interruption for a maximum period of 12 months. The 
business was severely destroyed by fire and the insurer refused to pay but 
raised several powerful arguments: firstly, the assured failed to obtain council 
consent for the use of the roof level for storage and for using the spray booth 
system, knowing that without significant modification such consents would never 
be given; secondly, the assured was aware that the booth system had no 
filtration and flammable materials were being emitted for over 16 years; thirdly 
knowing the defects in the building, the assured still used the angle grinder 
which caused the fire. Due to the delay in payment the assured’s business was 
interrupted for over 12 months and the assured lost a good opportunity to 
purchase a new building. 
Prima facie the insurer’s arguments were made with reasonable grounds, but 
the court tended more to favour the assured by using the a subjective test283 in 
perception of the risk by holding that in order to use perception of risk as a policy 
defence, the insurer had to prove that the assured not only perceived the risk, 
but they also deliberately took the action or inaction which caused the 
damage.284 Accordingly, the assured was awarded the policy cover for damage 
caused by fire and business interruption for 12 months. 
                                                                                                                       
281 In Canada and the U.S the assured’s perception of the risk is decided on the assured’s objective 
knowledge. 
282 In England the approach taken is the same as Australia, see The Talisman [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 535 and 
Fraser v BN Furman (Productions) Ltd [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 per Diplock LJ. 
283 It has to be pointed out that in Plasteel Windows Australia Pty Ltd v. Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd (1989) 5 
ANZ Ins Cas 60-918, Cole J expressed a view that the subjective non-perception of a risk could be 
rejected by a reasonable person’s position. 
284 See also Roger Walter and Melanie Cox, ‘Courting the risk and the refusal of indemnity’, Australian 
Insurance Law Bulletin Volume 23 Number 4 at p.66, available on  
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The insurer then contested liability for further loss claims by stating that even if 
the loss was caused by the insurer’s breach of contractual obligation, the insurer 
was not liable when the contract was not terminated and it was too remote as in 
Hadley v. Baxendale; the insurer further argued that the assured’s failure to 
purchase a new building and to get reinstatement was not caused by the insurer, 
as the assured had enough financial resources but had elected not to do so. 
After a long and detailed analysis of the authorities, Hammerschlag J firstly 
confirmed that the failure to make payment within a reasonable time was a 
breach of the insurance contract285 and then held that a breach of the insurance 
contract was the same as the other contracts286 and the same principle applied 
and pointed out that 
“Whether the contract is on foot or not plays no role in whether or not 
Hadley v Baxendale applies to a particular breach.”287 
The judge then held that there was no difficulty in applying Hadley v. Baxendale , 
because the causation was not too remote: 
“A premium was paid for consequential loss of profits insurance. 
It is accordingly, not difficult to suppose that at the time of the Policy 
the parties had in their contemplation that if the defendants 
unjustifiably delayed the acknowledgement of their liability to 
                                                                                                                       
<http://www.carternewell.com/icms_docs/184290_Construction_Liability_Insurance_-_Read_the_Policy
_Carefully.pdf>, accessed on 10th Nov 2014. 
285
 Brescia v. QBE [2007] NSWSC 598, at [88]. 
286 ibid, at [510]. 
287
 ibid, at [514]. 
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indemnify Brescia in respect of its losses it would inevitably suffer loss 
of trading profits as a consequence”288 
As to the purchase and reinstatement, the judge found that the assured was not 
unreasonable to do so, as the insurer contemplated the payment of indemnity 
value initially and then payment to the insured for reinstatement value. The judge 
then held that should the policy be honoured, it was not unreasonable for the 
assured to proceed with its own financial resources and held that the insurer was 
liable for the further loss. 
Accordingly, it should be noted that in Australia it is clearly recognized that an 
insurance contract is not as special as it is in England, and such understanding 
makes more commercial sense because historical reasons which made 
insurance law so special have no longer exist; secondly, the misconception of 
consequential loss has been abolished by the Australian courts by applying 
Hadley v. Baxendale to insurance contracts even if they are not terminated, 
while in England the long-standing authorities make it impossible for courts to 
award consequential damage without reforming the law; thirdly, in deciding the 
foreseeability the aim of the insurance policy has a great value, as the court in 
Brescia clearly stated that since the policy was against the risk of business 
interruption, the loss of profit and the loss of opportunity due to late payment was 
foreseeable.289 
                                         
288 Brescia v. QBE [2007] NSWSC 598, at [517], emphasis added. 
289
 See also Ferrcom Pty Ltd v. Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1993) 176 CLR 332, 
where it was held that the loss of profit due to the unrepaired crane was reasonably foreseeable by the 
insurer. 
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3.3.19 By contrast, in Motor Accident Mutual Insurance Pty Ltd v. Kelly,290 the 
assured told the insurer that he would not use the insured vehicle for business 
purposes but after the policy attached he did. The vehicle was stolen with 
business tools inside and the insurer refused to pay on the ground of 
misrepresentation. Judgment was given in favour of the assured plus a 2-year 
business loss; but at the appeal it was held that since the insurer could not have 
contemplated this further damage, they were not liable. 
It is also predictable that the assured could suffer a consequential loss, even if 
the insurance payment is duly made; in this scenario the key issue is the 
construction of the policy wording: for example, in Brescia it was held that a 
business interruption policy covered the loss of profit and other inevitable losses. 
It is well summarized in Sutton that 
“The general rule is that insurance covers physical damage resulting 
from an insured peril, and that consequential loss is not insured 
unless the policy expressly so provide.”291 
Accordingly, the damages for loss of profit could be recognized by Australian law 
in principle, but subject to ordinary principles of foreseeability and causation, and 
the existence of the foreseeability could be solved by the type of the policy and 
the facts and evidence in the different cases: in a business interruption policy, 
further damages for loss of profit and loss of chance292 are more likely to be 
awarded than in property insurance cases in Australia. In other words, it is 
required by the duty of good faith that the insurer should handle the claim 
                                         
290
 (1999) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 61-420. 
291 See Sutton (4th edition, Thomson Reuters Australia, 2014), at para 16.60. 
292
 See Maxwell v. Highway Haulier Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 115, at [87-99].  
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properly and if the insurer fails to do so, whether damage should be allowed 
shall be determined by the rule of damage; this conclusion is based on the 
understanding in Australia that the primary duty of an indemnity insurer is to 
perform the contractual duty of payment and arguably this will be the same 
approach taken by English law when the Enterprise Act 2015 comes into force. 
It is appropriate to add an English case here for comparison. In Normhurst Ltd v 
Dornoch Ltd293  the assured’s property was also insured against business 
interruption and fire; the property was destroyed by fire, the insurer refused to 
pay and consequential loss was incurred: everything but the outcome was 
exactly the same as in the case of Brescia v. QBE in Australia. The English High 
Court held that the policy, property or liability, was a contract of indemnity and 
HHJ Chambers QC felt himself bound by Sprung and The Lips and made 
judgment for the insurer. 
By making this comparison it can be seen in Normhurst that the English position 
lacks business sense: the insurer takes the premium and is well aware of the risk 
of business interruption and their inaction causing further loss but they are 
legally not liable. It has to be admitted that compared with Australia the English 
law exposes the assured to a very dangerous and unreasonable position and 
that is one of the reasons why the current English law should be reformed. 
Limiting the misuse of the duty of good faith in Australia 
3.3.20 In Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v. Ellis294 the contractual duty 
of utmost good faith went too far for the benefit of the assured295 and what 
                                         
293 [2005] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 27. 
294
 (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-957. 
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should be learned from that case is that the remedy for the assured also requires 
some limitation.  
In that case a condition was written into the policy which required that the 
assured should not modify the car without the insurer’s written consent. After the 
policy was entered into the assured, without the insurer’s consent, modified the 
car with “mag wheels”. The car was subsequently damaged, but the wheel 
played no part in the accident. Cox J in the Supreme Court South Australia found 
that the insurer breached the duty of utmost good faith because the assured was 
not clearly notified about the consequence of the breach. 
From this judgment, it might be inferred that there is a potential risk that the duty 
of utmost good faith on the insurer could be misused by the assured and such a 
threat grants the assured a very powerful weapon against their insurers even in 
the handling stage. Therefore, it is appropriate to add some limits to the duty of 
utmost good faith. 
In Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd and St Andrew’s War Memorial Hospital296 
Chesterman J criticised the judgment made by Cox J and expressed his own 
opinion about the contractual duty of utmost good faith; he stated that 
“This decision appears to me, with respect, wrong. A duty, the 
essence of which is to act honestly, is elevated to an obligation in an 
insurer to coddle its insured and to allow idiosyncratic judicial 
solicitude to replace principle.”297 
                                                                                                                       
295
 While by contrast, in England the duty goes too far towards the insurer. 
296 (1999) 10 ANZ Ins Cas 74,828. 
297
 ibid, at [81]. 
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The judge continued that 
“… there is an implied limitation in any term of a policy which confers 
rights or powers on the insurer that they be exercised with due regard 
for the interests of the insured where those interests conflict with the 
insurers.”298 
Even though the judgment was mainly focused on the pre-contractual duty of 
good faith, it nevertheless revealed the nature of the duty, namely the duty 
requires one party, in performing the contract in his or her part, to consider the 
interest of the other party and once there is a conflict between the interests of 
parties it is the obligation of each party to minimize the bad influence towards the 
other.299 
Therefore, the assured should not, after the risk occurs, leave all the matters to 
the insurer and wait for the indemnity; he has to provide suitable co-operation by, 
for example, providing proper materials and documents. This view can be 
supported by Ambrose J who believes that the insurer could only be guilty for 
bad claim handling after obtaining all relevant materials and a reasonable period 
of reasonable consideration.300 
It has been argued elsewhere in this work that a modified remedy for breach of 
the duty of good faith would be a resolution in English law about the assured’s 
remedy and according to the discussion above, it could be said that in Australia 
                                         
298 ibid. 
299
 See also Wiltrading (WA) Pty Ltd v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (2005) WASCA 106, at [67]. 
300 See Gutteridge v. Commonwealth of Australia (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, 25/6/93), at p. 
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such a resolution, after some debate, works well and is more suitable for the 
modern insurance industry.  
3.3.21 However, the justification of this approach is seriously doubted by Neil 
Campbell, who believes that the resort to good faith, not only in England, but 
also in Australia, is a sign of “insufficient understanding of the monetary 
remedies available to the insured under the general law of contract” and/or 
“desperation”301 and this doubt makes it fundamentally important to have a very 
clear understanding about the duty of good faith not only in Australia but also in 
England. In order to guard his opinion, the learned academic argues that  
“In my view the duty of good faith at the claims stage, if it means 
anything, means that obligations might be imposed on the insurer that 
are additional to the express and fundamental obligation to indemnify. 
On that view, a plea that the insurer has breached its duty of good 
faith is going to make a difference only when the insurer is not 
otherwise in breach of contract.”302 
As a result, he stresses that the pleading should only be brought where there is 
a difference between the breach of contractual obligation to indemnify and the 
duty of good faith; the difference appears, as he says, where the remedy for the 
breach of the duty of good faith is better or the claim is not covered by the policy. 
With respect, this argument is erring in constructing the duty of good faith too 
narrowly and making it isolated from the mutual contractual duty, therefore it 
                                         
301
 Under current English law, it has to be admitted that “desperation” has more weight. 
302 Neil Campbell, Monetary remedies for wrongful declinatures of insurance claims, [2004] 15 Insurance 
Law Journal 185, at para 2.4, emphasis as original. 
134 
 
could not find legal or academic support;303 a discussion on this point will be 
preceded with an explanation of the duty of good faith and its remedy in 
Australia.  
It has to be pointed out again very clearly that in Australia there are two sources 
for the duty of good faith: one is from common law, where it has been 
recognized for centuries that the insurance contract itself is a contract of good 
faith, and the other is a statutory duty of good faith clearly stated in s.13 of ICA 
1984: 
“A contract of insurance is a contract based on the utmost good faith 
and there is implied in such a contract a provision requiring each party 
to it to act towards the other party, in respect of any matter arising 
under or in relation to it, with the utmost good faith” 
Additionally, in the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 it is further 
clarified that 
“A failure by a party to a contract of insurance to comply with the 
provision implied in the contract by subsection (1) is a breach of the 
requirements of this Act.” 
As to the common law duty of good faith, the effect of breach may not lead to a 
monetary remedy directly, but it could be found in many decided cases that it 
could be used as a guide to interpret the insurance contract; this point is made 
by McMurdo J who says that 
                                         
303 Neil says he could find some support in Re Zurich at para 77, but in that case the policy was effected in 
1977 when the ICA 1984 was not enacted. 
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“…the common law duty of good faith was not in itself a duty which, if 
breached, would give rise to a right to damages. It was effectively a 
rule of construction of the express terms of the insurance contract.”304 
It might be true that should there be only a common law duty of good faith, the 
assured could not receive a monetary remedy directly from that duty, but the 
assured could nevertheless be awarded such remedy indirectly.305 However, 
since the ICA 1984 is in effect now, things have changed. 
It is well understood that the duty of good faith in s.13 of the ICA 1984 is codified 
from common law, with some further improvements added. Firstly, s.13 306 
makes it very clear that the duty of good faith is a mutual duty, unlike English law 
where avoidance is the only remedy and would easily makes it an 
insurer-favoured duty. Secondly, s.14 confirms that the duty of good faith is 
mandatory because it could not be excluded. Thirdly, s.13 (2) which states that 
the breach of the duty of good faith is a breach of law also grants justification for 
the intervention by the public authority, the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC)307, to vary, suspend or even cancel the insurer’s Australian 
Financial Services Licence; such intervention can be made at every stage of the 
insurance contract, especially the claim handling stage, to make sure the 
assured’s claim is fairly handled. 
                                         
304 See Justice Philip McMurdo, An Insurer’s Breach of the Duty of Good Faith:Exemplary Damages?  
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Accordingly, it can be seen that a breach of the duty of good faith will certainly 
give the assured monetary remedy according to the statute and it could also be 
argued that since most consequential damages for the assured are caused by 
poor claim handling by the insurer, the poor claim handling is a breach of the 
duty of good faith due to the lack of care for the assured.308 In this scenario, it 
could be argued that the duty of good faith and the duty to indemnify the assured 
could work together to give rise to a monetary remedy for the assured. 
Additionally, it could also be fair to say that the duty of good faith could not be 
breached alone, the breach must be represented by some behaviour: for 
example, in England such behaviour could be misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure; while in Australia such behaviour could be poor claim handling.  
3.3.22 It is the opinion of the Law Commission that once the insurer is asserting 
a defence which is unfounded309 it does not break the duty of good faith; some 
support for this conclusion can be found in Bankstown Football Club v CIC 
Insurance Ltd310 where the court was satisfied that the insurer’s rejection was in 
good faith, but the court also held that the insurer was liable for consequential 
loss. 
In summary, it can be found that in Australia, firstly a breach of the duty of good 
faith is a breach of a contractual term and now a breach of law; secondly, such a 
breach can only be triggered by some prohibited acts; thirdly, it is at least 
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 See also CGU v. AMP [2007] HCA 36. 
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arguable that the duty of good faith can be separated from the primary 
contractual duty to indemnify. 
3.3.23 To conclude, according to the analysis and the comparative law 
discussed above, it is clear that the insurer should have an obligation arising 
from the post-contractual duty of good faith in the claim handling stage and such 
duty is a contractual one. It is further argued by Malcolm Clarke that indemnity 
insurance should be the same with general contracts,311 that is to say, the 
payment should be regarded as a kind of contractual debt rather than damages, 
because otherwise the rule of English insurance law would be “bizarre”. 
It should also be noticed that the old law on the duty of good faith has several 
disadvantages: 
Firstly, the statutory requirement on the duty in s. 17 of the MIA 1906 has been 
judicially interpreted as a pre-contractual duty and “the all-or-nothing” remedy is 
especially unfair to the assured. 
Secondly, there is no conclusive definition of the post-contractual duty of good 
faith, even though it has been mentioned, obiter, that there has to be such a duty 
in insurance contracts. 
Thirdly, when it comes to the question of damage for late payment there is 
neither a statutory remedy nor a unified guide for a common law remedy.  
Even though it could be argued that once the late payment is made due to the 
lack of care towards the assured, the duty will be breached and the breach is to 
be deemed as a separate one so that it could exceed the limit of the policy: it is 
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certain that the court would be reluctant to allow avoidance as the remedy, it is 
understandable because once the duty of good faith is breached by the insurer, 
avoidance of the contract sounds like a punishment instead of a remedy; 
however, there are no reported cases in England in which the damage is clearly 
stated as an available remedy for the breach312 and the law on that issue 
remains uncertain. Therefore, it is even possible that the assured might claim 
damages for late payment for breach of the post-contractual duty of good faith; it 
is not the best option until the law on this issue is reformed. As suggested by the 
Law Commission and according to the amended Insurance Act 2015 this aim 
has been achieved. 
The effect of the Insurance Act 2015 
3.3.24 It was stated at the beginning of this part that the Insurance Act 2015 has 
made significant amendments and some of the problems have been solved. 
Firstly, the new legislation abolishes the “all-or-nothing” remedy in s.17 and 
omits ss. 18-20 in the MIA 1906; accordingly, there is now a continuing duty of 
good faith which would cover the post-contractual stage; it is a statutory 
recognition of the common law approaches.313 
Secondly, the new obligation of fair presentation has replaced the 
pre-contractual duty of disclosure and non-misrepresentation and the remedies 
for the breach are also stated in the Schedule to the new legislation. 
                                         
312 Even in Phoenix v. Halvanon [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 599, the issue of innominate term raised by Hobhouse 
J should be regarded as obiter. 
313 See para 3.3.13 above, for the relevant sections of the statute, see s.14(1), s.14(3)(a) and s.21(2) of the 
Insurance Act 2015. 
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More importantly, the Insurance Act 2015 has been amended by the Enterprise 
Act 2016, which incorporates the duty of the insurer to make a timely payment 
and clarifies that damages which may exceed the policy limit is the appropriate 
remedy. Accordingly, the new legislation has made it clear that there is a specific 
duty on the insurer to make a timely payment and arguments about the 
post-contractual duty of good faith in late payment shall only have academic 
value in the future.  
3.4 The assumed insurer’s secondary obligation  
3.4.1 It needs to be pointed out at the beginning of this part that according to the 
amended Insurance Act 2015, the assured could, in practice, receive damages 
in cases of a qualified late payment by the insurer. Moreover, the Enterprise Act 
2016 has made it a contractual obligation of the insurer to make a timely 
payment, even though it does not express clearly whether it is the primary 
obligation of the insurer, which means that the “hold harmless” doctrine could be 
abolished, there are several reasons to assume that it should be so. 
According to that assumption, issues which need to be considered by the court 
within a commercial context are the rules for damage in Hadley and issues about 
the causation. In addition, once the primary obligation is changed there is little 
need to consider the position in The Lips, as what is delayed by the insurer is the 
contractual performance rather than the damage. Therefore, if the insurer fails to 
pay a valid claim or rejects a claim which later turns out to be a valid one, he will 
be under a secondary liability to pay the claim, as foreseeable damage subject 
to the rules in Hadley, and as interest according to statute. This assumption 
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could also be supported by the wording of the amended s. 13A of the Insurance 
Act 2015 where it is clearly stated that  
“It is an implied term of every contract of insurance that if the insured 
makes a claim under the contract, the insurer must pay any sums due 
in respect of the claim within a reasonable time.” 
3.4.2 Another reason for the possible abolition of this doctrine is found in the rule 
of causation. Historically, the chain of causation would be breached by the 
impecuniosity of the victim himself. Therefore, in Sprung, it was held that the true 
causation which caused the loss suffered by Mr. Sprung was impecuniosity 
rather than the late payment by the insurer; as a consequence, it might be that 
even though it was held that the primary obligation of the insurer was to pay a 
valid claim to Mr. Sprung and the late payment was initially the cause, Mr. 
Sprung could nevertheless not recover damages, as the chain of causation was 
breached by the his own impecuniosity at that time. 
Currently, the law seems to be more favourable to the assured as this is no 
longer the case. It has been settled in Lagden v. O’Connor that impecuniosity is 
not an obstacle for a victim to claim full damage. 
In addition, in order to be indemnified, the assured needs to mitigate the loss, 
which is always referred as a duty to “sue and labour” in maritime policy; without 
express policy wording, the loss caused by failure to mitigate would be 
irrecoverable. In Sprung, the mitigation should have been done by raising a loan 
from the bank and selling his property, however, because of the poor market 
conditions and his impecuniosity, it became impossible for him to mitigate his 
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loss. Again, according to Lagden v. O’Connor in such a situation the duty to 
mitigate might be exonerated. 
However, it has to be remembered that once an issue of fraud is involved, the 
assured will receive nothing as the whole claim will be forfeited. This problem 
was discussed by Mance J in ICCI that although the insurer might be under an 
obligation to act in a reasonable manner, the fraud of the assured, in fact, 
exonerated the insurer from such obligation.314 
3.5 Damage for tort and emotional distress 
3.5.1 It is common in tort law that in some circumstances punitive damages are 
available for victims with the aim of deterring outrageous behaviour, but this 
situation is rarely seen in contractual claims where insurance claims belong. 
However, in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth315 it was clearly 
expressed by Lord Bridge that 
“There is no question of punishing the contract breaker.”316 
In Canada, punitive damage has now become available for breach of contract 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co317 where the 
insurer was held to be liable for the non-performance of the duty to make 
payment and the punitive damage awarded by the jury was $1m and reduced to 
one-tenth by the court. 
                                         
314 ICCI [1997] LRLR 94, at p.136. 
315
 [1996] A.C. 344. 
316 ibid, at p.353. 
317
 [2002] SCC 18.   
142 
 
However, this approach is unwelcome in England, Australia and New Zealand. It 
could be argued that the general damage rule would be enough to deter an 
insurer’s delay in payment. 
It is further pointed out by Sutton that compared to tort, insurance is 
“…a contract of indemnity whereby the insurers agree to make good 
the assured’s actual loss and no more, whereas if damage is inflicted 
tortuously the victim has a right of damages against the wrongdoer as 
a matter of law and it is no concern of the wrongdoer if and how the 
sum representing his liability is spent by the victim.”318 
Additionally, in Australia each state has its own power to pass laws restricting the 
tortuous obligation of the insurer in order to prevent a crisis in the industry and 
such action takes into consideration the economical basis rather than the legal 
background and therefore it will not be discussed in depth in this work. 
3.5.2 Compared with the tortious remedy, the remedy for physical inconvenience 
and mental distress is more ambiguous. In England it was well established by 
Hirst J in The Italia Express (No.2)319 that both physical inconvenience and 
mental distress were not remedies provided by indemnity insurance, unless the 
policy clearly stated so;320 but this is not the conclusion in Australia and New 
Zealand.  
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In Baltic v. Dillon321 it was held by the High Court of Australia that emotional 
distress was available in general contract law and not limited to non-commercial 
contracts322 provided that the emotional distress came from either physical 
inconvenience (the first limb), or the contract itself was one of enjoyment, 
pleasure or free from distress (the second limb).323 
Accordingly, one may well believe that in insurance contracts mental distress will 
fall within the first limb if the insurer’s late payment causes physical 
inconvenience and in order to satisfy these limbs the assured has to be a natural 
person rather than a legal one. However, in Australia there is only one reported 
indemnity insurance case324 where mental distress was awarded.  
In Motor Accident Mutual v. Kelly325 even though it was held by the appeal court 
that the insurer was not liable for loss of profit due to the remoteness, the first 
trial’s conclusion on emotional distress was not reopened where it was held by 
the trial court that the insurer was liable for emotional distress valued at 
$12,500326 because of the long period of time of non-payment.327 However, in 
that case Baltic v. Dillon was not referred to, and instead the Australian court 
used New Zealand cases for reference.328  
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Accordingly, in Australia the door for a natural person assured to claim damages 
for mental distress is not completely closed even if the contract is not for 
relaxation or pleasure, but once the assured is a company, there is no way to 
possibility of satisfying the test. 
This may also be true in New Zealand, but it seems to be clearer in New Zealand 
that a natural person assured could be awarded damages for mental distress: in 
State Insurance Ltd v Cedenco Foods Ltd329 even though it was unnecessary 
for the court to rule on this point, it was nevertheless pointed out by the Court of 
Appeal that 
“…mental significance [of late payment by an insurer] may well be 
within the reasonable contemplation”330 
By contrast, the New Zealand court firmly rejected mental distress for legal 
persons assured in Infrapulse Distributors NZ Ltd v State Insurance Ltd331 
holding that 
“How a legal person which is but a statutory construct could suffer 
distress in any strict sense of the word was not explained.”332 
However, this opinion is strongly contested by Neil Campbell, who argues that 
“…the explanation is straightforward: in the same way that the law 
attributes the acts of individuals to a company so that it can be said, 
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for example, that the company breached a legal obligation, so the law 
can attribute the distress of individuals to the company.”333 
It has to be admitted that such a suggestion is very avant-garde, even though 
there is no legal support other than jurisprudence. The better understanding has 
to be drawn from the nature of the insurance policy and currently the law in this 
area is sufficient, at least sufficient in Australia and New Zealand: for example, if 
the insurer provides a policy for business interruption for a legal person and 
subsequently, because of the insurer’s breach, that legal person suffers further 
damage from the business interruption which should have been prevented by a 
timely indemnity payment, this amount, under current law in Australia and New 
Zealand, could be awardable as damage for late payment, provided the rules on 
damage and causation are satisfied. 
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this work, the primary and the secondary 
obligations of the insurer have been discussed in full, and from next chapter 
issues of the currently available remedies for the assured shall be dealt with. 
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Chapter 4 Interest in General 
4.1 The historical review 
4.1.1 It is now widely accepted that the most common remedy and the only 
legitimate remedy for the assured is interest. For example, the court refused the 
claim of damage to Mr. Sprung, but in addition to the contractual indemnity 
amount of the policy the court awarded Mr. Sprung simple interest.334 However, 
the law about interest is also, regrettably, far from clear and shows a lack of 
commercial sense. Therefore, in this chapter the discussion will be focused on 
the issue of interest.  
(a) The starting point: Procedural justice 
4.1.2 It has been stated repeatedly that generally in English law if a contractual 
party fails to perform the contractual obligation it could result in a breach of the 
contract and damages for such breach is available for the innocent party, 
provided that the remoteness tests is satisfied335. This might also be true in tort, 
but that will not be discussed in detail by this work. However, historically there 
was one “anomalous and unprincipled exception” 336  that interest was not 
admitted by the court as a legitimate award for breach of a contract. 
The first leading case on this point could be traced back to the 18th century: 
Moses v. Macferlan.337 In that case there was an agreement between Moses 
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and Macferlan which stated that Macferlan would not sue Moses, when Moses 
endorsed four promissory notes of Jacobs. However, Macferlan did sue Moses 
in the Court of Conscience and it was held that Moses was liable to pay 
Macferlan £6. Deciding not to sue for special breach in the High Court, Moses 
claimed for “money had and received”, which was supported by the court led by 
Lord Mansfield CJ, who delivered the famous and widely-cited judgment below: 
“This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not 
in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much 
encouraged. It lies for money which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant 
ought to refund; it lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a 
consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through 
imposition, (express or implied) or extortion; or oppression; or an 
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws 
made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In one 
word, the gist of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the 
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice 
and equity, to refund the money.”338   
It can be seen that Lord Mansfield CJ made no special reference to interest. 
However, this issue was mentioned when His Lordship stated the advantage of 
the claim of “money had and received”. As to the benefit to the defendant, he 
stated that 
“It is the most favourable way in which he can be sued: he can be 
liable no further than the money he has received; and against that, 
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may go into every equitable defence, upon the general issue; he may 
claim every equitable allowance; he may prove a release without 
pleading it; in short, he may defend himself by everything which 
shews that the plaintiff, ex aequo bono, is not intitled to the whole of 
his demand, or to any part of it.”339  
4.1.3 The meaning of the first part of the cited judgment of Lord Mansfield seems 
to be literal, that is to say, the award of the principal sum of the money had and 
received should be payable to the claimant. The legal effect of the second part, 
as to the benefit to the defendant, was explained by the Court of Common Pleas 
in Walker v. Constable.340 In that case the claimant claimed for the return of the 
money paid under an abandoned contract for the auction of land plus interest. 
Being unable to prove the specific contractual terms the claim could only be 
raised as a claim for money had and received. Even though Buller J was of the 
view that the claimant might perhaps be entitled to recover interest under the 
count for money had and received, the Court was of the opinion that it had been 
decided by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan that in an action for money had 
and received nothing but the net sum could be recovered without interest.  
It seemed, at that time, to be settled in common law that there would be no 
interest over the claim of money had and received. However, in De Havilland v. 
Bowerbank341 Lord Ellenborough made a proviso to this rule. According to the 
Attorney General, Lord Ellenborough was of the view that 
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“If the party lost the use of his money, it was his own fault in not suing 
for it. He thought, that where money of the plaintiff had come to the 
hands of the defendant, to establish a right to interest upon it, there 
should either be a specific agreement to that effect, or something 
should appear from which a promise to pay interest might be inferred, 
or proof should be given of the money being used.”342  
It has to be stressed that what was actually focused on in the judgment was the 
fact that it was not the party’s own fault in losing the use of the money, but it was 
the party’s own fault in not raising a claim for its return. Therefore, it might be 
inferred that Lord Ellenborough wished to stress the necessity of efficiency in 
litigation. However, it has to be noted that no matter how efficient the claimant in 
litigation is, there must be inevitable “gaps”, which could be the time loss in 
waiting for the trial and the time loss in waiting for the judgment, and based on 
such consideration, the discretionary power of the court is certainly required for 
achieving substantial and procedural justice.  
It needs also to be pointed out that, if one of these preconditions is satisfied, 
namely a specific agreement is written down in the contract, or a promise of 
paying interest is inferred, or the gain of the money could be proved, the interest 
would be available to the claimant. It does not matter if the money is a debt or 
damages. Additionally, this case only answered the question about “should there 
be interest or not”, the issues about the type of the interest and the rate of the 
interest remain unresolved. 
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(b) Lord Tenterden’s Act  
4.1.4 Subsequently, the position of Lord Ellenborough was narrowed into “debt” 
rather than all kinds of money possessed by the other party. This problem began 
in 1829 in Page v. Newman.343 In that case Mr. Page lent various sums of 
money to Mr. Newman in 1814 when they were prisoners of war at Verdun. Five 
years later Mr. Page claimed for the principal sum plus interest. According to the 
speech of Lord Ellenborough in De Havilland v. Bowerbank the claim for interest 
failed. It was held by the court that where there was an absence of special 
agreement, money lent as a debt did not carry any interest. Additionally, the 
court which was led by Lord Tenterden CJ raised another issue, namely the 
issue of “practical convenience”. It was believed by the court that should interest 
be allowed without special agreement in advance, difficulties might arise in 
determining whether a claimant had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. 
It was pointed out by the court that 
“… [i]t might frequently be made a question at nisi pirius whether 
proper means had been used to obtain payment of the debt, as such 
as the party ought to have used…”344 
This concern could be deemed as a confirmation of the importance of the 
statement made by Lord Ellenborough which stressed that the legal efficiency 
was required by law, however, it has to be pointed out again that the court at that 
time favoured legal efficiency so much that the issue of fair and just might have 
been ignored. Having recognized this disadvantage in the common law, Lord 
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Tenterden promoted the Civil Procedure Act 1833 which is now known as Lord 
Tenterden’s Act. In this Act juries were empowered to award interest on “debt or 
sums certain” in limited circumstances. It was stated in the Act 
“That upon all debts or sums certain, payable at a certain time or 
otherwise, the jury on the trial of any issue, or on any inquisition of 
damages, may, if they shall think fit, allow interest to the creditor at a 
rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the time when 
such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums 
certain be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain 
time, or if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of 
payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall 
give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of 
such demand until the term of payment; provided that interest shall be 
payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law.” 
4.1.5 Prima facie the scope of the 1833 Act was truly wide enough for awarding 
interest, as the only requirement for claiming interest was that notice should be 
given to the debtor that interest would be claimed, provided that the principal 
sum and the date of the repayment are certain or could be ascertained. In 
addition, it might be inferred that the juries were also empowered to award 
compound interest, provided that the rate did not exceed the current interest rate 
of the bank. Additionally, the principal sum was not limited by contractual debts 
and it could be extended to a principal payment of damages. 
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However, this was not quite the truth. After the Act was enacted, different 
interpretations were made by courts about the definition of “certain amount” and 
“certain date”.  
In Merchant Shipping Company v. Armitage,345 it was stated in a contract of 
carriage that the money was payable after the correct delivery of the cargo. It 
was held by the Exchequer Chamber that even if the exact time could be 
ascertained and became settled by the contractual event, the money was not 
payable at a “certain time” within the definition of the Act and therefore the claim 
for interest failed. While by contrast, one year after that decision, in Duncombe v. 
Brighton Club and Norfolt Hotel Company346, the majority of the court held that if 
the written instrument contained provisions on the happening of which the time 
of payment or the sum payable was ascertained the requirement of Lord 
Tenterden’s Act should be deemed as satisfied. 
(c) London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v. South Eastern Railway Co 
4.1.6 In the year of 1893 this dispute reached the House of Lords in London, 
Chatham and Dover Railway Co v. South Eastern Railway Co.347 In that case a 
joint traffic agreement was reached between two railway companies and they 
determined that accounts should be rendered by each company to the other. 
Specifically, it was stated in the contract that the amount of the payment was “not 
less than 75 percent on account of the balance appearing to be due on the face 
of the accounts so to be exchanged” and the date of the payment was “as soon 
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after the 1st of June and no later than 15th of June”. At the first trial, the official 
referee felt that the amount of the sum and the date of the payment could be 
ascertained under the Lord Tenterden’s Act and therefore interest was awarded. 
In the appeal, the court reversed the trial judgment, feeling that they were bound 
by the Armitage348 case rather than the Duncombe349. In the appeal before the 
House of Lords the claimant, along with the issue of the application of the Lord 
Tenterden’s Act, raised another head of claim, namely, even if the claim was not 
within the Act, interest could also be awarded by way of damages or wrongful 
detention of debt.  
In the leading speech Lord Herschell LC felt it would be unnecessary to decide 
whether Armitage and Duncombe were correct, even though His Lordship 
favoured the first.350 Alternatively, the learned judge put more weight on “debts 
or sums certain” rather than “payable at a certain time or otherwise”, and it was 
held that 
“I think that the certain sum payable must be a certain sum which is 
due absolutely and in all events from the one party to the 
other…within the term ‘debt.’ But here the payment of this 75 
percent was really provisional only… Nevertheless, if it had 
appeared that in reality, owing to errors in the accounts, 75 percent 
exceeded the amount due, that would have had to be adjusted by 
some kind of repayment or rectification in a subsequent account; and, 
therefore, this is not really a provision for the payment of a debt or a 
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sum certain absolutely from one party to the other; it is at best a 
provisional payment which may have to be undone by a subsequent 
adjustment. My Lords, for these reasons I do not think it can be held in 
the present case that there is a sum certain payable at a certain time 
by virtue of a written instrument.”351 
Therefore, according to the very special facts of the case, the House of Lords 
refused to apply the Act.  
4.1.7 However, by stating that the payment in that case was special and 
provisional, the House of Lords did not mean that the Act should be interpreted 
strictly. By contrast, Lord Herschell LC felt that the court should be granted more 
power to award interest even if the sum was “uncertain”. In a short comment, 
Lord Herschell LC expressed the view that 
“…when [Lord Tenterden] dealt with the allowance of interest in this 
statute he certainly introduced language which kept such claims 
within very narrow limits; speaking for myself, they seem to be too 
narrow for the purposes of justice.”352 
As to the other claim, namely the claim for damages or wrongful detention of the 
debt, Lord Herschell LC stated that 
“…the party who is wrongfully withholding the money from the other 
ought not in justice to benefit by having that money in his possession 
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and enjoying the use of it, when the money ought to be in the 
possession of the other party who is entitled to its use.”353 
However, His Lordship refused to reopen the issue decided in Page v. Newman 
and therefore the alternative claim also failed. To that extent, the outcome of that 
case turned out to be curious, notwithstanding the hint that “the benefit of the 
money in possession” might be calculated by at least compound interest. 
Furthermore, the second quoted part of the speech made by Lord Herschell LC 
could be deemed as a very powerful, although obiter, statement that it might still 
be possible to award interest in common law once the former House of Lords or 
the current Supreme Court felt it fair and just to reopen the issue in Page v. 
Newman.  
It has to be pointed out that from the cases given above, it could be found that 
the court had become more in favour of granting interest, whether simple or 
compound, in common law in debt, or certain/uncertain sums of money. However, 
due to the outcome, even with reluctance and the special facts of the case the 
issue of interest on debt or damage seemed to be settled after London, Chatham 
and Dover Railway Co but efforts were taken by some lower courts to distinguish 
that case.  
4.1.8 The case of Johnson v. The King, 354 as pointed out by Lord Mance,355 
was a good example in the early 20th century. In that case Johnson fraudulently 
overcharged the Government by more than £8,000. A claim for repayment of the 
principal sum and a claim for interest were raised by the Government. In the 
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lower court interest was allowed, but the Privy Council reversed the judgment 
and it was held by Lord Macnaghten that 
“…he (the trial judge) thought the law would ‘imply a promise from [the] 
defendant to pay back to the plaintiff the money paid in excess.’ He 
thought the allegation of special damage in the statement of claim 
sufficient, and gave ‘judgment for the plaintiff for £428.13s.3d 
damages by way of interest without costs.’ Having regard to the law 
as settled by the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of 
London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v. South Eastern Railway 
Co it is impossible to support the decision...”356 
In fact, this case could be regarded as one of a claim of restitution and it can be 
seen that the Privy Council extended the application of London, Chatham and 
Dover Railway Co rather than narrowing it, which, according to the very special 
facts of the case, should be the right approach. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the law in Johnson v. The King deviated again from what the law should be. 
In addition, the words “special damages” caused further disputes and 
uncertainties which lasted for more than a hundred years until it was settled by 
the House of Lords in the following cases, including the famous Sempra case.  
4.2 The modern development 
(a) The progress of Denning LJ 
4.2.1 About 50 years after Johnson v. The King, the way to the right approach 
was pointed out by Denning LJ (as he then was) and with whom Romer LJ 
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agreed, in a landmark case Trans Trust SPRL v. Danubian Trading Co Ltd357. In 
that case an agreement was entered into between the buyer and the seller and 
according to that agreement the buyer agreed to provide a confirmed letter of 
credit forthwith; however, no such letter was actually provided and no money 
was paid in accordance with a chain of sales contracts and the seller therefore 
suffered loss from the non-payment of the money. In the claim for damages the 
defendant argued that even though there was a failure to pay money the law, 
according to earlier cases which stated above, had never allowed any interest on 
that account. However, Denning LJ took another approach and stated  
“…the only real ground on which damages can be refused for 
non-payment of money. It is because the consequences are as a rule 
too remote. But when the circumstances are such that there is a 
special loss foreseeable at the time of the contract as the 
consequence of non-payment, then I think such loss may well be 
recoverable.”358 
Therefore, in that case the application of London, Chatham and Dover Railway 
was limited and the real effect of that case was understood as “interest was 
generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties”.359 This 
approach which was taken by Denning LJ should be deemed as the right one. It 
was because, as mentioned above, the payment made in London, Chatham and 
Dover Railway was not only provisional, but also uncertain. This was especially 
true at that time; due to the rise and fall of the market, the money paid on a 
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percentage basis might be difficult to reclaim as a certain amount. Therefore, it 
might be too difficult to argue that the exact interest loss was within the 
contemplation of the parties when the agreement was reached. However, the 
latter statement made by Lord Herschell LC might still be used as a good starting 
point both in claims of damages or restitution.  
(b) The dawn of common law? 
4.2.2 Even though the opinion of Denning and Romer LJJs was obiter in 
Danubian360 it was still followed and approved in Wadsworth v. Lydall361 and 
became law.  
In that case the claimant and the defendant entered into a partnership 
agreement with regard to the agriculture business in the farm owned by the 
defendant. At the dissolution it was agreed by the parties that the claimant would 
give up possession of the farm on or before an agreed date and once 
possession was given up the defendant would make a payment of £10,000. The 
claimant moved out of the farm on the agreed date and several days before he 
left, he had made another contract with a third party for new accommodation as 
he believed that the contractual payment by the defendant under the dissolution 
agreement would be enough. In fact, when the agreement between the claimant 
and the third party was entered into the claimant had no capital and the price 
under that new accommodation agreement was the same as the dissolution 
money, namely £10,000. However, no payment was made by the defendant and 
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the solicitor for the third party served a notice to the claimant after two months. 
After another three months part of the dissolution money of £7,200 was paid by 
the defendant and in order to complete the agreement with the third party the 
claimant had to raise a mortgage from the third party and certainly there was 
loss for costs and interest.  
Smith J in the first trial awarded damages of some £2,300 but refused the 
interest claim. It should be noted that in this case, the payment of money was a 
“certain sum” and the date of the payment could also be ascertained in 
accordance with the claimant’s behaviour and unlike London, Chatham and 
Dover Railway, the payment was final. Therefore, the Court of Appeal found a 
chance to clarify the legal position at that time with the guidance laid down by 
Denning LJ.  
It has to be stressed that in Wadsworth the interest claimed did not arise from 
the unpaid sum by the defendant, but arose from the delay in completion of the 
contract between the claimant and the third party. In other words, the interest in 
dispute was not a sum from being deprived of the use of the money, but 
damages caused by non-performance of the contractual duty.362 Therefore, 
technically, the facts in Wadsworth were different from London, Chatham and 
Dover Railway; additionally, it could be inferred with commercial sense that 
interest on money borrowed by the claimant from the third party should be 
calculated on a compound basis. Another fact which should be noted in 
Wadsworth was that at the time of the dissolution the defendant had already 
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noticed the fact that the claimant had no other capital and he needed to look for 
other accommodation, therefore, once the damages were allowed, it would fall 
under the second limb of Hadley v. Baxendale.  
In the Court of Appeal, interest as special damages was allowed and Brightman 
LJ concurred with the obiter of Denning LJ. It was therefore held that 
“In my view the court is not so constrained by the decision of the 
House of Lords. In London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. South 
Eastern Railway Co. [1893] A.C. 429 the House of Lords was not 
concerned with a claim for special damages. The action was an action 
for an account. The House was concerned only with a claim for 
interest by way of general damages. If a plaintiff pleads and can prove 
that he has suffered special damage as a result of the defendant's 
failure to perform his obligation under a contract, and such damage is 
not too remote on the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 
341, I can see no logical reason why such special damage should be 
irrecoverable merely because the obligation on which the defendant 
defaulted was an obligation to pay money and not some other type of 
obligation.”363 
4.2.3 Accordingly, it could be concluded that after Wadsworth the interest loss 
was not as confusing as it used to be: it could be regarded as damages and if it 
was foreseeable it could be recovered under the general rules of damages. 
However, even London, Chatham and Dover Railway was carefully 
distinguished in Wadsworth; the Court of Appeal, perhaps due to the lack of 
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authority, made no comment on that historical case. That is to say, the loss of the 
use of the money, without the intervention of another loan or a mortgage raised 
by the third party, was still unable to be calculated by common law. Therefore, 
Wadsworth did not recognize all of the statements of Denning LJ in Danubian 
because the loss of use of the money, generally speaking and once proved, 
could be deemed as special damages. However, the distinction made on the 
ground of general or special damages caused a further problem. 
(c) The non-erasable common law blot 
4.2.4 Not too long after Wadsworth, the House of Lords had another chance to 
make a further statement about the legal position on interest in common law, 
although, with respect, that attempt could now be regarded as a mistake.364  
In The La Pintada 365  the charterer delayed the payment of freight and 
demurrage in a charterparty. The charterparty incorporated an arbitration clause 
and according to that clause the arbitration umpire not only awarded interest, but 
also awarded it on a compound basis. The charterer appealed the interest award 
on a point of law, the appeal was rejected by the High Court and the dispute 
finally reached the House of Lords.  
From the facts of the case it could be found that the type of interest loss in The 
La Pintada was different from that in Wadsworth because the interest loss in The 
La Pintada was not the loss suffered from a loan or mortgage between the 
claimant and the third party, but it was a claim based on the loss of the use of 
money by the innocent party itself and therefore, it was more likely that London, 
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Chatham and Dover Railway would bite. Therefore the House of Lords should 
have taken the chance to review the latter statement in London, Chatham and 
Dover Railway and, if possible, reopen other issues in Page v. Newman and 
other cases which were decided almost 100 years earlier. However, the House 
reversed the judgment and allowed the appeal and the decision was mainly 
based on London, Chatham and Dover Railway alone.  
However, Lord Brandon, by whom the leading judgment was made, approved 
Wadsworth and the learned judge tried to reduce the application of London, 
Chatham and Dover Railway rather than overrule it. In order to achieve that Lord 
Brandon regarded the general damages as the same thing as what was stated in 
the first limb of Hadley v. Baxendale, which was the damages from the ordinary 
course of things, and the special damages as the second limb which was the 
damages specifically contemplated and agreed by the parties when the contract 
was concluded.366 Based on such understanding the legal effect of Wadsworth 
and London, Chatham and Dover Railway was decided by the House of Lords 
as follows: 
“On the facts of the case before him Lord Justice Brightman found 
that, by reason of special matters known to both parties at the time of 
contracting, the two items of special damages claimed by the plaintiff 
came within the second part of that rule. Accordingly, treating 
the London, Chatham and Dover Railway case, [1893] A.C. 429 as 
applying only to damages falling within the first part of the rule 
in Hadley v. Baxendale (general damages), he saw no reason why the 
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plaintiff should not recover the two disputed items of special damages 
under the second part of that rule. 
 In my opinion the ratio decidendi of Wadsworth v. Lydall, [1981] 1 
W.L.R. 598, that the London, Chatham and Dover Railway case, 
[1893] A.C. 429, applied only to claims for interest by way of general 
damages, and did not extend to claims for special damages, in the 
sense in which it is clear that Lord Justice Brightman was using those 
two expressions, was correct and should be approved by your 
lordships. On the assumption… the effect will be to reduce 
considerably the scope of the London, Chatham and Dover 
Railway case…”367 
4.2.5 It was true that the loss suffered by the claimant in Wadsworth was 
foreseeable and the words “special damages” were used in both Wadsworth and 
Danubian; however, from the starting point of Denning LJ it might be found that 
more weight was put on the word “special” because it referred to the rule of 
remoteness, which was the key point in both limbs of Hadley v. Baxendale; 
additionally in Wadsworth, Brightman LJ, by distinguishing London, Chatham 
and Dover Railway, focused more on the capability of the claimant to prove the 
actual loss: it might be appropriate to cite the stressed point stated by Lord 
Brightman again that: 
“[i]f a plaintiff pleads and can prove that he has suffered special 
damage…”368 
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Therefore, the interest loss in The La Pintada which was pleaded and proved 
before the arbitration tribunal and subsequently awarded by the umpire should 
have been regarded as “special damages” and the application of London, 
Chatham and Dover Railway should be restricted even further, if not overruled 
completely. In fact, it could be found that Lord Herschell LC, by whom London, 
Chatham and Dover Railway was decided, felt reluctant when the conclusion in 
common law was reached, and this was also noticed by Lord Roskill in The La 
Pintada. It was commented by Lord Roskill that 
“I have arrived at this conclusion… with both regret and reluctance. It 
has long been recognized that London, Chatham and Dover Railway 
Co. v. The South Eastern Railway Co., [1893] A.C. 429, left creditors 
with a legitimate sense of grievance and an obvious injustice without 
remedy. I think the House in 1893 recognized those consequences of 
the decision, but then felt compelled for historical reasons to leave 
that injustice uncorrected.”369 
Therefore, it could be found that, based on historical reasons, there was a “blot” 
on common law from the very early stage and such a blot survived all reviews by 
the House of Lords from London, Chatham and Dover Railway. In The La 
Pintada both Lord Roskill and Lord Brandon noticed it, but in that case the 
House of Lords decided to keep it alive or at most merely erase it partly; this 
approach, with respect, could not be justified. Additionally, the right progress 
made by Denning and Brightman LJJs was wrongfully interpreted and it would 
lead to an absurd result: even if the claimant could plead and prove an actual 
                                         
369
 The La Pintada [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 9, at p.11. 
165 
 
interest loss resulting from being deprived of the use of the money, he could not 
recover when that kind of interest is to be regarded as the ordinary course of 
things, namely, general damages as defined by Lord Brandon.  
(d) The development of the statute 
4.2.6 Before introducing the landmark case on interest in common law, Sempra 
Metals, it is appropriate to pause here and discuss the development of statute. 
About 40 years after London, Chatham and Dover Parliament enacted section 3 
of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (the 1934 Act) which 
replaced the part related to interest in the Lord Tenterden's Act. The 1934 Act 
empowered courts to award simple interest where there was a claim for 
damages or debt. The amount of interest could be calculated during the period 
from when the cause of action arose to the date of judgment. 
It should be noted that there are several differences between the 1934 Act and 
Lord Tenterden’s Act: 
Firstly, there was no requirement about the “certain date of payment” or “certain 
amount of money claimed” in the 1934 Act, therefore, the power of discretion of 
the court was extended; and should the 1934 Act be applied to London, 
Chatham and Dover there would be no need for the claimant to seek for a 
common law remedy as they could succeed on a statutory basis.  
Secondly, even though the 1934 Act broadened the discretionary power of 
courts on awarding interest, the amount of the award of interest was narrowed 
and limited on the simple basis.  
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Thirdly, there was no provision for the payment of interest where a debt, or a 
sum for damages, was paid after the commencement of legal proceedings but 
before judgment; nor did the section apply where a debt or a sum for damages 
was paid late but before the inception of legal proceedings. 
4.2.7 One year after Wadsworth the 1934 Act was superseded by section 35A of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 (the 1981 Act) which is still in force. The relevant 
part of the new statutory provision reads as follows: 
“(1) Subject to rules of court, in proceedings (whenever instituted) 
before the High Court for the recovery of a debt or damages there 
may be included in any sum for which judgment is given simple 
interest, at such rate as the court thinks fit or as rules of court may 
provide, on all or any part of the debt or damages in respect of which 
judgment is given, or payment is made before judgment, for all or any 
part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose 
and— 
(a) in the case of any sum paid before judgment, the date of the 
payment; and 
(b) in the case of the sum for which judgment is given, the date of the 
judgment. 
… 
(3) Subject to rules of court, where— 
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(a) there are proceedings (whenever instituted) before the High Court 
for the recovery of a debt; and 
(b) the defendant pays the whole debt to the plaintiff (otherwise than 
in pursuance of a judgment in the proceedings), 
the defendant shall be liable to pay the plaintiff simple interest at such 
rate as the court thinks fit or as rules of court may provide on all or any 
part of the debt for all or any part of the period between the date when 
the cause of action arose and the date of the payment. 
(4) Interest in respect of a debt shall not be awarded under this 
section for a period during which, for whatever reason, interest 
on the debt already runs. 
… 
(6) Interest under this section may be calculated at different rates in 
respect of different periods.”370  
It can be seen from the 1981 Act that the discretionary power of the court 
increases to a large extent in deciding the rate and the period of interest, and 
from this point the 1981 Act provided a solution to the problem which common 
law could not solve from London, Chatham and Dover by providing statutory 
interest as a remedy for late payment of money. However, the statutory interest 
could only be awarded on a simple basis and it could not be awarded when the 
money is paid late, but before the beginning of legal proceedings; additionally, 
according to the 1981 Act, the statutory interest could only start to run when 
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there is no other agreed interest rate but the owner is deprived of the use of the 
money owed. 
4.2.8 After the discussion above, a pause is appropriate here to come to a 
conclusion on the position of interest in both common law and statute before 
Sempra Metal:  
Firstly, it is certain that the late payment of money, damages or debt, could cause 
a loss of interest, and it is the obligation of the person who delays the payment to 
compensate the innocent party.  
Secondly, there are, generally, two types of interest losses which might be 
caused by the late payment of money: one is damages suffered from the late 
payment of money, and this kind of loss could result from the intervention of a 
third party371; it needs to be noted that only in this type of interest loss the two 
limbs in Hadley v. Baxendale will bite. The other is the interest loss resulting from 
being deprived of the use of the unpaid money;372 in other words, in these 
circumstances the interest could better be deemed as the value carried by the 
money unpaid. Additionally, it could be inferred that, without extraordinary 
circumstances, 373  most of the interest loss from the late payment of an 
insurance claim could be counted as the latter type.  
As to the cases introduced above, it could be found that most of them, except 
Wadsworth, are claims for being deprived of the use of money, and due to the 
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differences between those cases and Wadsworth it could be argued that there is 
no common law remedy for being deprived of the use of money, that is to say, 
the common law remedy applies only where the loss of interest could be proved 
and pleaded. 
However, the statutory remedy, according to the wording of all the statutes (Lord 
Tenterden’s Act, the 1934 Act and the 1981 Act), is able to be used in both types 
of loss, even though the statutory remedy is not a full remedy as it could only be 
awarded on a simple basis. Therefore, there would be an overlap in common law 
and statutory remedy. This situation was pointed out by Lord Bridge in The La 
Pintada that 
“…the alternative rule which must of necessity take its place could 
only be that in all cases of late payments general damages would be 
recoverable as of right calculated in accordance with the same 
common law principles that govern the award of general damages in 
the case of any other breach of contract. Such a sweeping provision 
would not merely be inconsistent with, but would, it seems to me, 
effectively override the … statutory provisions for the discretionary 
award of interest in certain cases so as to render them a dead 
letter.”374 
Even though the concern of Lord Bridge was true, however, the conflict had 
already occurred in Wadsworth and according to Wadsworth if the claimant 
could plead and prove the interest loss, common law would provide a full 
remedy rather than the statutory remedy. Therefore, even if the 
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understanding of Lord Brandon about the definition of “general damages 
and special damages” were correct,375 the common law, by providing a 
remedy in Wadsworth or similar cases, superseded part of the statutory 
provision and it could be argued that the statutory provision would not apply 
or could only apply in a modified way when a common law remedy is 
awarded. It should be pointed out that this situation is not unpredictable, 
because at the very beginning the statutory remedy in Lord Tenterden’s Act 
was designed to fill the gap where a common law remedy was unavailable; 
again, in Lord Tenterden’s Act, even though the prerequisite was more 
difficult to be satisfied than in the 1934 Act and 1981 Act, the remedy 
provided by the Act could be a full remedy. During the development of the 
statute, Parliament should have considered the unsatisfactory effect of the 
common law as the disadvantage of cases such as London, Chatham and 
Dover has been pointed out by a number of judges; therefore what the 
statute should have done is to reduce the prerequisites in Lord Tenterden’s 
Act, retain the effect of its availability to grant a full interest remedy and 
even to empower judges with more discretion once a claim of interest is 
raised.  
4.2.9 Notwithstanding the discussion above, in two subsequent Acts even 
though the original prerequisites were removed, it is hard to understand the 
reason why the power of a court to award full remedy was removed as well. 
Additionally, the effect of 1981 Act is to make compensation, in the name of 
statutory interest, in relation to the late payment of damages or debt; 
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however, what is the exact legal definition of that compensation? Prima 
facie, it should be the damages. However, Lord Brandon also held in The 
Lips that there would be no cause of action where there was a claim for 
damages caused by late payment of damages. To read The Lips and the 
1981 Act together, the effect would be that where a damage caused by late 
payment of damages occurs, the right of the claimant is protected by 
statute, but according to common law the claimant is not allowed to plead 
and prove it; in contrast, the court will use the discretionary power from the 
statute and such result sounds illogical and does not represent the 
intention based on Lord Tenterden’s Act. Therefore, it would be hard to 
reconcile common law and statue in relation to interest with commercial 
sense and accordingly, there is a “blot” not only on common law, but also 
statute and this problem was further discussed by the House of Lords in the 
leading case: Sempra Metals v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (IRC).376 
4.3 Removing the blot: Sempra Metals v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 
(IRC)  
(a) The fact and the judgment of the then European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
4.3.1 In Sempra Metals the claimant company paid advance corporation tax  
(ACT) to the Inland Revenue Commissioners (IRC) , as required by domestic law, 
and this payment could be set off against future tax when it became due. In fact, 
there was always a time gap of about eight months between the date when ACT 
was paid and when the actual payment of tax was due. It was held by the 
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) that the domestic law which required 
companies to pay ACT was contrary to article 52 of the EU Treaty and it was 
then held that it was the duty of the national law to provide 
“…an effective legal remedy in order to obtain reimbursement or 
reparation of the financial loss which they have sustained and from 
which the authorities of the member state concerned have 
benefited…”377 
The ECJ also stressed the point of interest by stating that 
“The mere fact that the sole object of such an action is the payment of 
interest equivalent to the financial loss suffered as a result of the loss 
of use of the sums paid prematurely does not constitute a ground for 
dismissing such an action… it is for the domestic legal system… to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing such actions, including 
ancillary questions such as the payment of interest, those rules must 
not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law.”378 
Therefore, it could also be noted that the traditional English common law would 
potentially contravene the judgment laid down by the ECJ, because it would not 
be able to provide an effective legal remedy, but it would render the right of the 
claimant, which was supported by the ECJ, practically impossible and 
excessively difficult to exercise. At this time the House of Lords, under the 
pressure of the ECJ, had to revisit issues related to interest in full. 
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(b) The decision of the House of Lords 
4.3.2 The claim raised by Sempra Metals contained three causes of actions: 
damages for late payment of money, tax paid pursuant to an unlawful demand 
and payments under a mistake of law.  
As a final outcome, it was held by the majority of the members of the House of 
Lords that the claim would succeed on a restitutionary basis, and compound 
interest would be allowed. Additionally, the House of Lords also confirmed that 
the Court had a common law jurisdiction to award damages for late payment or 
non-payment of money, however, the money paid late was limited to the late 
payment of the debt. 
Long before the judgment of Sempra Metals in Europe and in cases in some 
other common law countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the USA it had 
been well settled that claims for interest loss by way of damages due to the 
principal breach of a contract are available for the innocent party and it was also 
pointed out that that kind of decision should have been made over a century ago. 
It seems to be the case that Sempra Metals is a case in which the traditional blot 
on English law relating to interest loss claims is removed; however, that work is 
not finished completely and a detailed discussion of the outcomes in Sempra 
Metals shall be held below.  
(c) Damages for late payment of money 
4.3.3 As a starting point, Lord Nicholls introduced and summarized the common 
law position that 
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“…a claimant can recover damages for losses caused by a breach of 
contract or a tort which satisfy the usual remoteness tests. This broad 
common law principle is subject to an anomalous, that is, unprincipled, 
exception regarding… claims for interest losses by way of damages 
for breach of a contract to pay a debt...”379 
It has to be pointed out that, the anomalous and unprincipled exception is not 
only limited to late payment or non-payment of debt, but, according to Lord 
Brandon’s unsupported obiter in The Lips, the exception also existed in relation 
to late payment or non-payment of damages. 
Lord Nicholls continued 
“The common law should sanction injustice no longer. The House 
should recognise the remnant of the restrictive common law exception 
for what it is: the unprincipled remnant of an unprincipled rule. The 
House should erase the remains of this blot on English common law 
jurisprudence.”380 
By doing so, the House of Lords in Sempra Metals refused to accept the 
definition of general and special damages by Lord Brandon in The La Pintada. It 
was unanimously agreed that both general and special damages would be 
awarded by the court if they could be pleaded and proved.381 Therefore, Lord 
Nicholls reached a conclusion that 
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“…in principle, it is always open to a claimant to plead and prove his 
actual interest losses caused by late payment of a debt. These losses 
will be recoverable, subject to the principles governing all claims for 
damages…”382  
Regrettably, the House of Lords limited the right to damages for late payment of 
debt only; the judgment did not extend to late payment of damages without any 
interpretation. However, there might be room for an argument that it was not the 
intention of the House of Lords to limit the damages for late payment in debt: 
firstly, in the judgment the House intended to remove the anomalous and 
unprincipled exception, which, of course, contained damages for late payment of 
damages; secondly, the Hose of Lords stressed the point of “provability”, as it 
was stated by Lord Nicholls that  
“The common law’s unwillingness to presume interest losses where 
payment is delayed is… unrealistic. … If a party chooses not to prove 
his interest losses the remedy provided by the law is to be found in the 
statutory provisions.”383 
It should be noted that in the paragraph quoted above, the word “payment” was 
used instead of “debt”, and it could be found in that statement that the only event 
in which common law would rest and statute would apply is the situation where 
the claimant could not prove the interest loss. This argument could also find 
support from Lord Hope: 
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“The reality is that every creditor who is deprived of funds to which he 
is entitled and which he needs to run his business will have to incur an 
interest-bearing loan or employ other funds which could themselves 
have earned interest. It is a short step to say that interest losses will 
arise ‘in the ordinary course of things’ in such circumstances.”384 
It seems that even though the foreseeability of interest loss as damages would 
be easy to presume, the actual proof such as an interest-bearing loan or 
employment of other funds are nevertheless required to be actually proved 
before the court. Once the claim for interest loss due to the late payment of 
damages is excluded the outcome would be anomalous.  
4.3.4 Assuming that Mr. S insured his property against certain kinds of risks and, 
at the underwriting stage, he said to the insurer that once the payment of 
insurance money was not made in time, a high interest-bearing loan had to be 
raised in order to repair the property; sadly the property was destroyed the 
insurance payment was unduly delayed and the loan was raised. Mr. S claimed 
interest loss due to the late payment of insurance money. According to Danubian 
and Wadsworth the interest loss suffered by Mr. S would be awarded as special 
damages. However, once Sempra Metals is to be understood narrowly, there 
would be no common law remedy for Mr. S and the only reason for that is, 
according to current law, an insurance payment is not to be treated as debt even 
though all other requirements of Sempra Metals are satisfied.  
It might be argued that even though there is no common law remedy for Mr. S, 
there is still a statutory remedy in accordance with the 1981 Act; however, the 
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remedy provided by statute is not a full remedy, as discussed above, because as 
a statutory remedy only simple interest would be awarded; and simple interest, 
according to the opinion of Lord Hope, is an “artificial construct”385 which could 
not reflect the value of the payment delayed. His Lordship also quoted and 
agreed with the position of the Scottish Law Commission that  
“…the case against the compounding of interest was essentially a 
case against interest itself.” 386  
It has been mentioned above that the ECJ required the national law to provide 
an efficient legal remedy to the claimant, therefore, simple interest would not 
apply in this case and the House continued in reaching a conclusion that 
compound interest should be the right approach in order to provide an efficient 
and full remedy but that compound interest was, again, limited by the late 
payment of debt. 
(d) Compound interest 
4.3.5 Even without the requirement of the ECJ, the House of Lords had already 
noted that compound interest was more practicable and businesslike. It was 
pointed out by Lord Nicholls that 
“We live in a world where interest payments for the use of money are 
calculated on a compound basis. Money is not available commercially 
on simple interest terms. This is the daily experience of everyone... If 
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the law is to achieve a fair and just outcome when assessing financial 
loss it must recognise and give effect to this reality.”387 
Therefore, even though Sempra Metals was not necessarily decided on the 
issue of damages, it was approved by a majority of the members of the House of 
Lords that once the claimant could prove the interest loss as damages, he would 
be awarded a full remedy388 by way of compound interest. 
(e) The position of s. 35A of the 1981 Act 
4.3.6 It has already been mentioned that there is a potential conflict between 
common law and statute in relation to interest loss as damages, and this issue 
was also considered by the House of Lords in Sempra Metals and it was 
generally believed that there was no conflict. 
The main reason given by the House of Lords was that, once the claimant 
refused to prove the interest or could not prove the amount of interest loss, the 
court would award a partial remedy according to statute.389 Additionally, two 
detailed reasons were given by Lord Nicholls.  
Firstly, s.35A of the 1981 Act was not intended to replace the common law 
jurisdiction and the discretion which the courts possess to award interest; 
secondly, the statutory interest did not preclude a court from taking interest 
losses into account when awarding damages. With respect, both of these 
reasons require further clarification.  
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As to the first reason, Lord Nicholls put things in the wrong order. According to 
the historical review provided in this chapter, it could be easily found that the 
intention of the statutory remedy is to fill the gap left by common law; therefore, 
once the common law is effective enough to provide the remedy, the application 
of the statute is unnecessary; it is for the common law jurisdiction and its 
discretion on interest to replace the application of the statute, rather than the 
statute to displace common law jurisdiction. 
As to the second reason, Lord Nicholls pointed out that in cases relating to torts 
compound interest was awardable while the 1981 Act did not apply.390 This 
statement does nothing but stress the “second -in- line” nature of the statute, 
which means that where the common law remedy is available it is unnecessary 
for the court to apply s.35A of the 1981 Act. 
Furthermore, by rejecting the definition provided by Lord Brandon in The La 
Pintada Lord Nicholls, with whom the other members of the House agreed, 
defined general damages as damages which needed to be pleaded and proved, 
but to be quantified in monetary terms by the courts; and special damages as 
damages which needed to be pleaded in quantified money terms.391 Even 
though it was believed that there would be no common law remedy for general 
damages, 392  the suggestion made by Lord Hope 393  would make the 
foreseeability of damages for interest loss almost “axiomatic” and could be easily 
quantified; for example, once the payment is delayed by one year, the claimant 
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could go to the court with the published interest rate provided by a bank and 
argue that the money should have been put into a saving account. Therefore, it 
could be concluded that the application of s.35A of the 1981 Act is very limited. 
However, the claim for late payment of indemnity insurance money falls within 
the very limited application of the 1981 Act, the reason is purely technical, 
namely the claim is not a claim for late payment of debt but damages. It could 
therefore be predicted that it is only because of that technical reason that s.35A 
of 1981 Act is kept “alive”, even though the reason is a purely technical one and 
makes the law anomalous. 
(f) The partly removed blot 
4.3.7 What is confirmed by the House of Lords after Sempra Metals is that a full 
remedy could be awarded by common law in relation to the late payment of a 
debt, and the blot on common law has been partly removed. The blot is that 
there was no interest remedy for late payment of money; but after the decision 
made by the House of Lords interest is now awardable: a full interest remedy 
can be awarded in cases of late payment of debt or tort, while only partial 
interest (simple interest) is awardable in cases of late payment of damages. This 
is especially true when insurance claims are considered. It is settled that in the 
case of contingency insurance claims the damages for late payment could be 
recovered. However, it must be pointed out that once the damages for the late 
payment of damages is not reconsidered with full reasoning the blot will always 
exist in common law.  
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Additionally, in Sempra Metals the House of Lords had no chance to consider 
two other important questions: firstly, is it correct to regard an indemnity 
insurance claim as a claim for damages? Secondly, is the unreasoned obiter 
namely, there is no damage over damage provided by Lord Brandon in The Lips, 
correct? 
As to the first issue, the ignorance could be justified as the case has no apparent 
relation with indemnity insurance; as to the second one, however, The Lips was 
mentioned by Lord Nicholls394 and Lord Mance395 but surprisingly the House 
refused to revisit that issue and it is certain that without doing so the blot could 
never be removed in full.396 
It was critically discussed by academics after the decision in Sempra Metals was 
made. However, most of them focused only on interest in a restitution claim or 
debt397 and these articles shall be dealt with in the next chapter. As to indemnity 
insurance claims, it is generally accepted that Sempra Metals could not apply to 
indemnity insurance claims directly as such claims are claims for damages,398 
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while by contrast the compound interest in contingency insurance such as life 
insurance could find support from Sempra Metals399. 
In Australia, the problem mentioned above has been solved. For example, in 
Walker v. FAI Insurance (No.2)400  the claimant assured suffered loss caused by 
the late payment of the insurer and in order to rebuild the damaged shop the 
assured raised a loan at the rate of 17% interest compounded monthly. 
According to the statutory remedy, in the first trial the interest was calculated at 
the rate of 11% only. The Supreme Court of Tasmania held that in this 
circumstance the interest should be awarded in full and accordingly remitted the 
case. 
In Canada there is no such a problem either because it seems that under 
Canadian law a plaintiff is entitled to recover interest charges actually incurred 
on money borrowed on the defendant’s default, or if the plaintiff owes money to 
anyone equal to the amount of the claim and is paying interest on it:401 for 
example, in Atlantic Salvage Ltd. v. City of Halifax402 the plaintiff’s claimed for 
interest and succeeded on the ground that it had been indebted to its bank for a 
sum exceeding the amount of the claim throughout the period. 
(g) The effect of the Enterprise Act 2016 
4.3.8 According to the discussion above, it should be noted that the problem of 
interest in indemnity insurance could not be solved after Sempra Metals and 
                                         
399 This point is mentioned by both Malcolm Clarke and Chris Nicoll in their articles quoted above. 
400
 [1992] TASSC 15. 
401 See Waddams, The Law of Damages (Canada Law Books, 1983), at s.833. 
402
 (1978) 94 DLR (3d) 513. 
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what is worse, the answer to that problem remains uncertain even after the new 
Enterprise Act 2016 comes into force. 
It is affirmed by the Act that 
“Remedies (for example, damages) available for breach of the term 
implied by subsection (1) are in addition to and distinct from— 
(a)any right to enforce payment of the sums due, and 
(b)any right to interest on those sums (whether under the contract, 
under another enactment, at the court’s discretion or otherwise).” 
Before moving on to the detail of the problem several points need to be pointed 
out here, as introduced by chapter 2 and 3 of this work, that: 
Firstly, according to The Lips there is no causation of damages caused by the 
late payment of damages; and according to The Fanti that the payment made by 
the insurer is a payment of damages: both of them are cases ruled upon by the 
House of Lords. 
Secondly, what is implied by the Enterprise Act 2016 is that the insurer is obliged 
to pay the indemnity within a reasonable time otherwise the assured is entitled to 
a remedy such as damages and interest. 
Thirdly, according to this chapter, late payment of debt could carry compound 
interest while late payment of damages only carries simple interest. 
The problem is that regardless of the original intention of the new legislation, 
either The Lips or The Fanti shall be overruled by the statutory implication: if The 
Lips is to be regarded as good law The Fanti shall be deemed as overruled and 
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the payment made by the insurer shall no longer be treated as damages 
because the statute allows damages over the payment of the indemnity; if The 
Fanti is to be regarded as good law then The Lips shall be deemed as overruled 
because the statute allows damages over the late payment of damages. 
Notably, according to either assumption made above, the assured’s new right to 
claim for damages granted by the Enterprise Act 2016 would not be affected, 
while as to the matter of interest it is another story, according to the third point 
above. Based on the current evidence it is uncertain which approach the court 
should adopt, but it is more businesslike for the court to overrule The Fanti in 
order to enable the assured to claim damages plus compound interest rather 
than simple interest. Compared with the uncertainty in a court trial arbitration has 
provided a clear answer in awarding interest.  
4.4 A lesson from the Arbitration Act 1996 
4.4.1 Unlike common law or the 1981 Act, the arbitrators are clearly empowered 
by s.49 of Arbitration Act 1996 to award compound interest in any kind of claim 
for late payment of money, debt or damages. The relevant section of the 1996 
Act reads as 
“49. Interest 
(1) The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal as 
regards the award of interest. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties the following provisions 
apply. 
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(3) The tribunal may award simple or compound interest from such 
dates, at such rates and with such rests as it considers meets the 
justice of the case— 
 (a) on the whole or part of any amount awarded by the tribunal, in 
respect of any period up to the date of the award; 
 (b) on the whole or part of any amount claimed in the arbitration and 
outstanding at the commencement of the arbitral proceedings but 
paid before the award was made, in respect of any period up to 
the date of payment. 
(4) The tribunal may award simple or compound interest from the date 
of the award (or any later date) until payment, at such rates and with 
such rests as it considers meets the justice of the case, on the 
outstanding amount of any award (including any award of interest 
under subsection (3) and any award as to costs). 
(5) References in this section to an amount awarded by the tribunal 
include an amount payable in consequence of a declaratory award by 
the tribunal. 
(6) The above provisions do not affect any other power of the tribunal 
to award interest” 
(a) The non-compulsory power to award interest 
4.4.2 Subsections (1) and (2) of s.49 of the 1996 Act make it clear that this 
section is not compulsory and therefore the right of the arbitrators to award 
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interest could be removed or agreed otherwise by the arbitration agreement 
between the parties. Where there is no such an agreement, the default power 
granted by s. 49 would govern the jurisdiction of arbitrators in relation to interest, 
and it is certain that such power is greater than both s.35A of the 1981 Act and 
common law remedies; therefore, it is rightly pointed out by Professor Rob 
Merkin that 
“The ability of the arbitrators to award compound interest is a 
particular innovation.”403 
Practically, in marine cases or commercial cases such as marine insurance, it is 
widely believed that the power of awarding compound interest is necessary. For 
example, it is believed by the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA) 
that it is the general practice to award compound interest quite simply because it 
seems commercially just to do so. The Worshipful Company of Arbitrators 
commented that the power to award compound interest should be exercised 
unless there is good reason in the particular case not to do so. 
According to the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Report on 
Arbitration Bill 1996 (The DAC report), it is believed that allowing arbitrators to 
award compound interest would not cause the problem of abusing the power to 
transfer the compound interest into a punitive one rather than a compensatory 
one, and it is also believed that once the arbitrator does make an award of 
punitive compound interest, then the award would be open to challenge.404 
                                         
403 Merkin, Arbitration Law (loose leaf, Informa Law), at para.18.61. 
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 See DAC Report, at para.237 
<http://uk.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&bl
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Even though it has not been clearly mentioned in the report on which basis the 
arbitrator could be challenged, it might be argued that once the arbitrator failed 
to understand the function of interest, as the DAC indicate, that arbitrator would 
be regarded as having a lack of competence and therefore s. 67 of the 1996 Act 
could be the proper regime. 
(b) The procedural rule 
4.4.3 If the default power of s.49 applies to an arbitration proceeding, the power 
of arbitrators to award interest will not be ousted by substantive law, even if 
under that substantive law no interest is legally allowed. This point was 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. 
Impregilo SpA.405 In that case the contract was governed by the law of Lesotho 
while the arbitration agreement was governed by the 1996 Act. Under the law of 
Lesotho no interest was actually allowed in that specific circumstance. However, 
the arbitrators, relying on s.49 (3), awarded interest and that award for interest 
was challenged under s.68 (2) (b), namely the arbitrators had acted with serious 
irregularity by reason of an excess of powers.  
At the first trial Morison J held that the award of interest was a matter of 
substance and therefore it should be governed by the law of Lesotho as he  
“…could see no good reason why, if the issue of contract was a matter 
for the applicable law, it should cease to be so where the claim was 
for interest damages.”406 
                                         
405 [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 310. 
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 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA , [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 497, at [22]. 
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Therefore, by awarding interest, the trial judge held that even though the seat 
was in London the arbitrators had no power to award interest. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that judgment and further held that if the 
applicable law to the contract had a specific provision on interest there would be 
no room for the tribunal to award interest by using the procedural power granted 
by s.49 of the 1996 Act; it was stated by Brooke LJ that  
“The unpaid party to a contract is entitled as of substantive right to 
interest from the time when payment is contractually due. There was 
no need for the parties to agree the express exclusion of s. 49(3) of 
the 1996 Act, because of the saving provision in s. 49(6).”407 
However, that outcome was firmly reversed by the House of Lords. It was held 
by Lord Steyn, with whom the majority of other members of the House agreed, 
that firstly the power of the arbitrators in relation to the award of interest was 
granted by the procedural law, and the mere fact that the substantive law 
provided otherwise did not preclude such power;408 secondly, the true effect of 
s.49 (6) did not oust the operation of s.49 (3); and even though it neither ousted 
any other power to award interest, it did not confer priority on such power.409 
Therefore, the challenge under s.68 (2) (b) failed and it could be inferred that 
such a challenge was hardly likely to succeed in the future succeed in the future.  
4.4.4 However, another problem arises: could the award of interest be 
challenged by s.69 (3) of the 1996 Act, on a point of law? More specifically, 
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 ibid, at [48]. 
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currently there is no remedy for late payment in indemnity insurance or 
compound interest on late payment of damages, not even when the Enterprise 
Act 2016 comes into force; what if the parties agree to refer the claim to 
arbitration and the award of compound interest is made along with damages? 
There is no reported case on this point; however, it could be inferred that such 
appeal, even technically available, could hardly succeed:  
Firstly, it is required by s. 69 of the 1996 Act that an award is challengeable only 
if the award is “obviously wrong” and may “substantially affect the right of 
parties”.410 According to the discussion about common law, even though the 
award could be arguably counted as “obviously wrong” in accordance with the 
unsupported obiter in The Lips, the award of compound interest would not 
substantially affect the rights of other parties as the right affected by such an 
award could not itself be justified.411 
Secondly, even if compound interest is not allowed by s. 35A of the 1981 Act, on 
the one hand the intention of 1996 Act is to give a wider power to arbitrators than 
judges; on the other hand, it has been mentioned by courts at times that only 
compound interest could represent a “fair and just” outcome.  
Thirdly, the wording of s.49 (3) is wide enough. Therefore, the position is 
summarized by Professor Rob Merkin that 
“…it is hard to conceive of any situation in which the arbitrators’ 
decision could be second-guessed on this matter…the restrictive 
                                         
410 Arbitration Act 1996, s.69(3). 
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conditions which govern the grant of permission to appeal coupled 
with the right of the parties to exclude the right of appeal accordingly 
mean there is very little prospect of such a challenge even being 
mounted, let alone succeeding”412 
(c) The post-award interest 
4.4.5 Before moving onto s.49 (4) an argument provided by Professor Eggers 
needs to be recalled. In short, it is argued by Professor Eggers that once the 
judgment is made, there will be no remedy if the damage is caused by the late 
performance of the judgment by the losing party. This, however, is not 
completely the case once an arbitration award is made. According to s.49 (4), 
the arbitrators can award compound interest from the date of the award until the 
date of the actual payment, and therefore it provides a strong incentive for the 
losing party to obey the award and pay the sum rapidly. Based on this point, it 
could be noted that the power of arbitrators is indeed wider than judges. 
(d) The defect and the conclusion 
4.4.6 It needs to be pointed out that interest on sums paid late, but before the 
arbitration proceeding, could not be awarded without special agreement, and 
this position leaves a gap in the same way as the 1981 Act. 
However, it still needs to be admitted that in reaching a “fair and just” outcome, 
arbitrators could do better than judges, but the approach provided by the 1996 
Act is not free from problems.  
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Practically, it might be argued that in order to reach a more “fair and just” 
outcome, assureds could have chosen to insert arbitration agreements in each 
and every policy, but in practice it rarely happens and this is especially true when 
consumer insurance is considered.  
In s.91 of 1996 Act it states that a claim of a small amount is usually deemed as 
automatically unfair and could not be referred to arbitration and in the Unfair 
Arbitration Agreements (Specified Amount) Order 1999 the amount is fixed at 
£5,000; additionally, even if the amount is above £5,000, the arbitration 
agreement has to pass the test in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999.413 
Additionally, the 1996 Act has brought a new problem: under the 1996 Act the 
award of interest is a purely a matter for the arbitrator’s discretion and s.1(c) of 
the 1996 Act clearly states that the court cannot intervene unless provided by the 
Act; accordingly, a question has to be answered, namely, once the arbitrator fails 
to award interest, what should the court and the losing party do? 
4.4.7 The first case in which this problem was considered was Walker v. 
Rowe.414 In that reinsurance case the tribunal made two awards: the award on 
merit and the award on cost. There was no dispute between the parties about 
the award on merit which dismissed the reinsured’s claim; but as to the award on 
cost, which stated that the reinsured should pay a certain sum to the reinsurer, 
the problem appeared. 
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In the cost award, the reinsured was required to pay the cost on 9th November 
1998 but the post-award interest was not mentioned. On 11th March 1999 part of 
the cost was still outstanding and the reinsurers applied to the court to enforce 
the award. On 7th May 1999 Mance J (as he then was) granted the order with 
interest to be calculated and the reinsurers subsequently applied for an order to 
set the rate of interest in accordance with s.35A of the 1981 Act, while the 
reinsured applied to set aside Mance J’s order because the post-award interest 
should be a matter considered purely by the arbitrators rather than by the court. 
The dispute was heard by Aikens J (as he then was). The judge firstly pointed 
out a significant difference between the 1996 Act and its predecessor, the 
Arbitration Act 1950. It was rightly pointed out by Aikens J that under the 1950 
Act the post-award interest was not to be considered by the arbitrator because 
interest with the same rate of judgment debt attached automatically;415 but this 
was not the case in the 1996 Act because 
“Under s. 49(4) it is left solely to the arbitrators to decide whether (and 
if so what) "post-award" interest should be granted on an outstanding 
sum of an award, including "pre-award" interest. The sub-section 
states specifically that it applies to an award of costs. This provision 
means that a party seeking an award of "post-award" interest must 
ask for it and even if he does, the tribunal is not obliged to award it.”416 
Additionally, Aikens J felt that to set an interest rate in accordance with s.35A of 
the 1981 Act in this case was nothing more than unnecessarily intervening in the 
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416
 ibid. 
193 
 
arbitration proceeding and altering the award and therefore he dismissed the 
claim. 
Accordingly, it should be noted that Aikens J believed that the court should not 
intervene when the arbitrator did not award interest with or without pleading by 
either party.   
This judgment, despite being regarded as a general principle, has to be read 
with caution because in this case Mance J was asked to give leave for 
enforcement and in that leave Mance J suggested that post-award interest 
should be added and his suggestion was criticized by Aikens J as such a 
suggestion would be a way by which the court would intervene without justified 
grounds.  
However, once there is a justified ground the court could award interest even 
though the arbitrator intentionally refused to do so; as such interest awarded by 
the court is the interest on the judgment debt, rather than a part of the award. 
This point was firstly raised by Aikens J himself in Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Deanswood 
Ltd417, in which the learned judge held that once the award was enforced in 
accordance with s.66 of 1996 Act then the award had the same effect as a 
judgment and therefore a simple interest in the Judgments Act 1838 could 
attach418 and this point has recently been confirmed by Flaux J in Sonatrach v. 
Statoil.419 
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According to these judgments, it seems that the court can only award interest 
after an arbitration award is enforced as a judgment and the starting date of such 
interest could be no earlier than the date when that award is enforced. 
However, the problem has not been answered in full: when the interest should 
have been awarded but nevertheless ignored by the arbitrator, will the court still 
stand aside? The short answer will be that: the court could not award interest 
itself, but it could remit the award and require the arbitrator to clarify this point. 
This is especially true when interest should have been awarded and there is no 
good reason for not awarding interest.420 
Therefore, even though the 1996 Act makes great progress in awarding interest, 
the common law and statutory remedies are still of great importance and the blot 
needs to be removed by further legal reform, and it is also an important question 
which should be answered by the new Enterprise Act 2016. 
4.5 Judgment debt and statutory interest 
4.5.1 It has been mentioned above that an arbitrator could allow compound 
interest for the late payment of the award; the court also has such power in order 
to make sure that the judgment should be honoured and such power is granted 
by s.17 of Judgments Act 1838 (the 1838 Act) that “every judgment debt shall 
carry interest” and according to The Judgments Debts (Rate of Interest) Order 
1993 the interest is fixed at 8 percent per year.421 
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Therefore, it could be found that unlike the statutory interest in s. 35A of the 1981 
Act, the interest on judgment debt is not intended to compensate the loss by the 
claimant but a way to make sure that the judgment is honoured and therefore the 
rate of the interest, although on a simple basis, is comparatively greater than the 
value of the money owed; and it also seems that there is an element of 
punishment for the late performance of the judgment. 
Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that the fixed interest rate could only be 
reduced but not increased, as in s.17 (2) of the 1838 Act it states that  
“Rules of court may provide for the court to disallow all or part of any 
interest otherwise payable under subsection (1).” 
Again, a difference could also be found here between the 1981 Act and the 1838 
Act. In the 1981 Act the rate of the statutory interest could be decided on what is 
the commercial reality and therefore the interest rate is the one at which the 
claimant would be able to borrow the money while the interest rate in 1838 Act 
could only be reduced by the rules of the court. 
4.5.2 In Sycamore Bidco Ltd v Breslin422 Mann J noticed that there was a time 
when the commercial interest rates were generally higher than 8 percent and 
now the situation has been reversed, but he stressed that what was important in 
distinguishing interest under 1981 Act from the 1838 Act was the time when the 
judgment was delivered; therefore, it was summarized by Mann J in that case 
that 
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“It is desirable that the matter should remain clear — interest changes 
on the date of the judgment.”423 
Accordingly, it should be noticed that the award of interest is by no means an 
easy issue to work through and becomes even harder in indemnity insurance 
cases and this issue shall be discussed in full in the next chapter of this work. 
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Chapter 5 Interest in indemnity insurance claims 
5.1 Interest in indemnity insurance claims 
5.1.1 In the last chapter, the issues about interest were introduced and 
discussed generally, and it was found that only if compound interest is available 
within the court’s jurisdiction could it be deemed as, and should be accepted 
judicially as, the right approach for commercial cases including indemnity 
insurance.  
However, according to the judgment of Sempra Metals and academic 
discussions424 about that judgment, the conclusion reached is that currently 
there is only simple statutory interest for late payment of indemnity insurance 
money425 even though it has been admitted by the courts that the function of 
interest is to reimburse the loss suffered from being kept out of the money426; 
and according to decided cases there is a paradox between the current law and 
the purpose of the law itself.  
Therefore, in this chapter, the focus will be put firstly on the statutory interest in 
indemnity insurance claims. It might also be argued that these unclear decisions 
on statutory interest are caused by the isolated recognition of the duty of the 
insurer in indemnity insurance and the date when the cause of action of the 
assured arises.  
                                         
424 See Malcolm Clarke in ‘Compensation for failure to pay money due: a “blot on English common law 
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since the contingency insurance claim is deemed to be a kind of contract debt, there would also be a valid 
claim for damages for delay in payment of that debt. 
426
 For example, see Kuwait Airways v. Kuwait Insurance Co (No.3) [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 678, at p.688. 
198 
 
Additionally, it needs to be noted that after Sempra Metals the law on restitution 
has been well developed and even though it has not been firmly decided 
whether this might have an influence on indemnity insurance, it could be 
predicted that some approaches might be taken by the courts in the future. 
(1) The defects of statutory interest 
5.1.2 It has been stated in the last chapter that in an indemnity insurance claim 
the interest could be awarded by s.35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 on a 
simple basis. The controlling principle of awarding interest, rightly summarized 
by Malcolm Clarke, is 
“…that a successful plaintiff should be compensated for the loss 
involved in being kept out of his money”427 
Meanwhile, Professor Clarke also points out the fatal defect of the statute: there 
would be no available statutory interest, not even on a simple basis, if the 
insurance money is paid late, but before the legal proceeding. Moreover, in that 
situation, the assured could not seek for common law remedies either, because 
the statutory interest is the only remedy available. This situation was found by 
the House of Lords in The La Pintada428and it was pointed out by Lord Roskill 
that the current law 
“…places the small creditor at grave disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
substantial and influential debtor. The former may fear to offend the 
latter by instituting legal proceedings either swiftly or at all and it is 
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notorious that some substantial and influential debtors are not slow to 
take advantage of this tactical strength, especially in times of financial 
stringency.”429  
In summary, the current statute has two defects: firstly, there is no authority for 
courts to award compound interest even though sometimes compound interest 
seems to be redundant and secondly, the law does not cover all types of late 
payment of money, and for the main purpose of this work it means the late 
payment of money in indemnity insurance claims. These two defects, according 
to Sempra Metals430, could be resolved by courts’ discretion if the claim is one of 
debt, but as to indemnity insurance law as long as the unsupported obiters in 
The Lips431 and The Fanti432 stand, there is no room to remove that blot. Since 
the defective statute applied to indemnity insurance claims is the only available 
remedy currently, the courts have to find a way to interpret the statute and 
common law within a commercial setting. However, the approach taken by the 
courts is unsatisfactory, as it is pointed out that 
“It is out of line not only with the reasonable expectations of 
commerce but also with other rules of insurance law.”433 
(2) The position of the courts 
5.1.3 The general legal position of interest can be found in a very important case: 
Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3)434. In that case, a series of “substantial” issues were 
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decided in the first two judgments and in the third one Langley J made a detailed 
explanation of the application of the general principle of interest in an indemnity 
insurance claim.  
In that case, aircrafts and spare parts owned by Kuwait Airways (KAC) were 
insured against war risks by Kuwait Insurance (KIC) and the latter subsequently 
reinsured the risk in London. The limit of the cover in respect of a single 
occurrence for aircrafts and spares was $300m and $150m.  
On 2nd August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and removed 15 aircrafts plus a large 
quantity of spares and equipment from Kuwait International Airport and after five 
days the loss suffered by KAC was notified to KIC but that claim was rejected on 
5th December 1990. 
On 30th July 1991, KAC issued a writ and in October 1991, points of claim were 
served. On 14th May 1993, the claim was raised by KAC’s solicitors officially for 
the purposes of future legal proceedings. 
KAC submitted that interest should be awarded from 2nd August 1990, the date 
on which the loss occurred and on which KIC failed to hold KAC harmless from 
loss, and the rate of interest should be calculated by the US Prime Rate plus 1 
percent.  
KIC argued that since the claim was officially raised by KAC on 14th May 1993 
and the reasonable and honest investigation of that claim would take several 
weeks, the start date of interest would be postponed to 30th June 1993 (six 
weeks after the official claim by KAC), and the rate should be calculated by the 
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London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which was 2.5 percent below the US 
Prime Rate. 
During the trial, it was found by Langley J that in this particular case, no party 
acted unreasonably, 435  notwithstanding the fact that both the insurer and 
reinsurers began investigating the loss after September 1990.436 As to the date 
on which the cause of action arose, Langley J provided a straightforward answer, 
according to The Fanti, even though counsel argued that The Fanti was 
somewhat anomalous, that the cause of action arose on 2nd August 1990 
when the loss occurred.437 As to the function of the statutory interest, Langley 
J held that 
“In principle interest is to be awarded to compensate the claimant for 
being kept out of the money from the date when it has been 
established that it was due to him; it is not based on fault or the 
wrongful withholding of payment by the defendant.”438 
5.1.4 This legal position is widely accepted even though it has some 
disadvantages. Firstly the statutory interest, as the only remedy for late payment 
of an indemnity insurance claim, is not a fault-based remedy, and that is to say, 
even if the insurer wrongfully withholds the money due to his own fault the 
statutory interest is unable to reflect a punitive nature. This point is fine when late 
payment of debt is concerned because damage for late performance is punitive 
and interest could retain its compensatory nature, but when it comes to late 
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performance of damage the non-punitive interest could hardly protect the 
non-defaulting party. Secondly, even it has been admitted that the interest 
should have been awarded from the date when the assured is kept out of the 
money, the fact is that there are always two dates when interest is calculated: 
the date when the loss occurs and therefore the insurance payment is due, and 
the date when the interest begins to run; these two days rarely match in practice 
and there is no remedy at all during the gap between the two dates. Accordingly, 
it could be argued that the statutory interest, in fact, is an “artificial product” 
which could provide some protection but not enough. 
Additionally, Langley J also interpreted the application of s.35A of the 1981 Act 
by saying that there was 
“…discretion both as to the period and rate of interest save that the 
period cannot commence earlier than the cause of action arose and 
must end no later than the date of judgment”439 
Therefore, once the judgment is made, but the payment of the amount according 
to the judgment remains outstanding, no statutory interest under s.35A of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 would be granted as from that point the calculation of 
interest is taken over by s.17 of the Judgments Act 1838. It is generally believed 
that the post-judgment interest is also calculated on the simple basis and that 
interest is usually on a fixed rate of 8 percent.440 Even though to some extent 
the interest carried by a judgment could help with the fulfilment of judgment by 
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the guilty party, it is less effective than the protection granted by the Arbitration 
Act 1996. 
Moving back to Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3), Langley J had to decide firstly the 
starting date of interest based on the assumption that the insurance contract was 
breached when the loss occurred; and secondly on which rate the interest was 
to be calculated.  
5.1.5 The first case which Langley J reviewed was General Tire and Rubber Co 
v. Firestone.441 In that case the defendant began to infringe the patent (not 
granted) in March 1958 and the patent was actually granted in January 1963. It 
was held by the majority of the House of Lords that interest began to run from 
January 1963. In reaching that conclusion Lord Wilberforce held that 
“In a commercial setting, it would be proper to take account of the 
manner in which and time at which persons acting honestly and 
reasonably would pay.”442 
According to the specific nature of the patent claim, His Lordship continued 
“…in normal commercial practice royalties in respect of use before 
grant are not expected to be paid until grant…”443 
The opinion of Lord Wilberforce was accepted by the majority of the House444 
and it was unanimously decided that 
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 [1975] 1 WLR 819. 
442 General Tire Rubber Co v. Firestone [1975] 1 WLR 819 at p.836. 
443 ibid. 
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 Lord Salmon dissenting and His Lordship believed that the interest should run from the date when 
infringement began; this was also the judgment in the first trial; see General Tire Rubber Co v. Firestone 
[1975] 1 WLR 819, at [841]. 
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“Interest is not awarded as punishment against a wrongdoer for 
withholding payments which he should have made. It is awarded 
because it is only just that the person who has been deprived of the 
use of the money due to him should be paid interest on that money for 
the period during which he was deprived of its enjoyment.”445 
Accordingly, it could be inferred that the aim for the statutory interest is to 
compensate the value of the money deprived from the claimant due to the late 
payment. However, the value of the money is better to be reflected by the 
available compound rate rather than a simple basis rate only.446 Therefore it 
could be argued that the statutory interest itself is a paradox. Therefore, and it 
would not be surprising if the court seeks to interpret the first statement provided 
by Lord Wilberforce widely in order to reach a more fair and just outcome; and in 
fact, it was also the approach which was taken by Langley J in Kuwait v. Kuwait 
(No.3); by denying the interest-free investigation period, the judge stated that 
“There is, however, no ‘independent evidence’ before me as to any 
normal commercial practice in relation to insurers’ settlements. The 
aircraft claim was paid without interest. As a matter of commercial and 
common sense it is, I think, also evident that insurers will usually and 
reasonably require some period to assess and consider a claim, but it 
does not necessarily follow that interest is not payable or paid 
for that period.”447 
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 Per Lord Salmon, See Firestone [1975] 1 WLR 819 at [841]. 
446 See the judgment by Lord Nicholls in Sempra Metals [2007] UKHL 34. 
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5.1.6 Langley J went on to consider another case named BP Exploration Co 
(Libya) v. Hunt (No.2)448 in which the a restitution claim for unjust enrichment 
was raised following the frustration of the contract.449 In that case, the defendant 
who owned an oil concession in Libya, contracted with BP to exploit the oil and 
the costs incurred spent by BP shall were to be reimbursed by the defendant if 
the oil was found. A massive amount of oil was found, but in December 1971 the 
Libyan government took over BP’s half share. In June 1974, BP notified the 
defendant that a claim against it would be made. 
That case was heard before Robert Goff J (as he then was) and it was held that 
the contract was frustrated in December 1971 and that date was also the time 
when the cause of action arose. The judge further confirmed that 
“The basic principle is…that interest will be awarded from the date of 
loss…the mere fact that it is impossible for the defendant to 
quantify the sum due until judgment has been given will not 
generally preclude such an award…There must have been many 
cases in the commercial court in which, although the quantum of 
damages was in doubt until the date of the judgment, interest was 
awarded from the date of loss.”450 
5.1.7 However, notwithstanding the understanding on the nature of awarding 
interest, Robert Goff J refused to award interest from the date when the cause of 
action arose. It was found by the court that the intention of BP to make a 
                                         
448 [1979] 1 WLR 783. 
449 The differences in restitutionary claims between unjust enrichment and wrongdoing will be discussed 
below. 
450 BP v. Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 WLR 783 at [846], notably this judgment in fact deviates from London, 
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restitutionary claim was a “genuine surprise”451 to the defendant: according to 
the special agreement between the parties in the case, it was agreed mutually 
by the claimant and the defendant that they were prepared to concentrate on the 
claim against the Libyan Government together. Therefore, considering the 
discretion to award interest was “unfettered”,452 the judge emphasizes several 
exceptions in awarding interest: 
The first group of exceptions concerns the position of the defendant and when 
the court believes that it is unjust to make the defendant pay when the cause of 
action arose, the start date of interest would be postponed until a claim is 
officially raised or when a reasonable investigation of the claim is finished. 
However, this group of exceptions has to be understood strictly and it has to be 
applied in very limited cases. A classic example could be found in Firestone 
where it was too uncertain for the defendant to predict that there would be a 
future claim as the grant of the patent was not a certainty. The second example 
is the case before Robert Goff J in which the learned judge stressed that the 
restitutionary claim raised by the claimant was a “surprise attack”; in other words, 
it could be understood as that by cooperating with the defendant rather than 
suing him, the claimant waived the right to interest, but only partly waived the 
right to interest during the period of co-operation: and once the co-operation 
ended interest started to run.  
                                         
451 ibid, at [848]. 
452
 ibid, at [846]; it might be argued that even though according to the statute the discretionary power of the 
court is large in considering the rate and the period of the statutory interest, the type of interest is strictly 
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However, it is obvious that these exceptions could hardly apply to indemnity 
insurance claims, because when a claim is notified to the insurer the latter must 
be aware that there will be a claim in the future and that claim could hardly 
surprise the insurer when a claim is subsequently made. Additionally, this legal 
position implies a requirement on the insurer during the claim handling stage: in 
order to reduce the interest loss the claim must be investigated with reasonable 
speed, no matter how complicated the facts are. This could be inferred from The 
Berwickshire.453 It was a collision case and the facts were complicated; the 
defendant argued that the interest accruing during the time spent on reasonable 
investigation should be excluded but that argument was finally rejected by the 
court.  
The second group of cases concerns the behaviour of the claimant. In order to 
encourage claimants to prosecute claims properly, the culpable or unreasonable 
delay of prosecution may entitle the court to decline to award interest up to the 
full period. 
More caution has to be taken with this explanation. It has been widely accepted 
that the statutory interest is not based on the fault of the wrongdoer, let alone the 
fault of the claimant. Therefore, a more precise interpretation has to be given to 
this group of exceptions bearing in mind that, as well as the first group, this 
group has to be interpreted strictly. It might be appropriate to make reference to 
the doctrine of waiver again. That is to say, once the claimant assured waived 
the entitlement to interest, the court would deduct the waived amount and that 
amount could be either part of or the full amount of the interest. A hint of support 
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for this doctrine can be found in the judgment of Robert Goff J. When he tried to 
explain the second group of exceptions, he said that: 
“…such conduct may lull a defendant into a false sense of security, 
leading him to think the claim will not be pursued against him”454 
Therefore, if the assured decides not to raise the claim or to notify the insurer, 
knowing that he should have done so, the insurer may lose the chance to 
investigate the claim; in that situation, not only the award of interest but also the 
amount of the principal payment would be affected. In Milton Keynes BC v Nulty 
and NIG455 due to the intentional delay of the assured the principal sum of the 
claim was reduced by 15 percent. Accordingly, it is true that the award of interest 
would be deducted based on the “fault” of the assured, but it has to be noted that 
it would be better to view these very limited situations in the sense of “waiver”. 
5.1.8 After reviewing those exceptional cases with Firestone and BP v. Hunt 
(No.2) Langley J held that the fundamental principle and the starting point of 
interest claims was that the interest should be awarded from the date of loss, 
and 
“…doubts as to the amount of loss or damages and as to the merits of 
a claim are generally immaterial…”456 
However, it is still true that those cases mentioned above are not indemnity 
insurance cases, and in order to consider the special nature of an indemnity 
insurance claim, a further reference is required. 
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5.1.9 It could be inferred that a straightforward answer should have been found 
in most indemnity insurance cases, namely the interest should be calculated 
when the insured risk occurs, as it has been stated that generally the time used 
in calculating or investigating the loss would not postpone the starting date of 
interest and exceptions should only apply in very limited cases. However, legal 
practice goes the opposite way: courts are strongly in favour of granting insurers 
an “interest-free” period to make their investigations and adjustments. 
Additionally, by doing so, courts always refuse to admit that exceptions are in 
fact used as common cases. 
In Burts & Harvey Ltd v. Vulcan Boiler & General Insurance457 a business 
interruption policy was issued. The factory owned by the assured was affected 
by insured risks twice, on 19th May 1961 and on 4th June 1961, and the claimant 
prosecuted in 1964. As to the merit of this case it was held by Lawton J that the 
assured should be indemnified from the period of 19th May 1961 to 6th August 
1961.458 However, as to the starting date of interest the learned judge refused to 
award interest from that period, but instead held that the starting date of interest 
was 30th November 1962 when a letter was sent to the insurer and the insurance 
payment was requested accordingly. In reaching that conclusion, Lawton J held 
that  
“It has taken over three years to get this dispute to Court, and the 
industrial undertaking could have made as good use of the money 
which is in issue as could the insurance company. In those 
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458
 ibid. 
210 
 
circumstances, I see no reason at all in this case why the insurance 
company should not pay interest on the amount which is due at a rate 
which bears some relation to the commercial rates of interest which 
have been in operation during the period between the end of 1962 
and the present time.”459 
It should be noted that the learned judge failed to give a sound explanation for 
the reason why the starting date of interest was delayed, but the “three years” 
were calculated from the date when the loss occurred; it should also be noted 
that, according to his judgment on the merit460 and on interest,461 Lawton J 
believed that this case was neither unusual nor bizarre and therefore, it would be 
assumed that should this case happen after Firestone or BP v. Hunt (No.2) there 
would be no justifiable reason for the learned judge to depart from the general 
principle by delaying the starting date of interest and the interest should have 
been awarded on and from the date of loss.   
5.1.10 However, the assumption above has never become reality; in contrast the 
general principle has been regularly disregarded and subsequent cases provide 
some examples.  
In McLean Enterprises Ltd v. Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc462 a fire policy 
was issued and the covered risk occurred on 24th June 1983. As to the issue of 
interest, Staughton LJ stated that 
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“… I do so not because of ruing in any way that the insurers should 
not have investigated this claim nor the time taken to investigate it. 
But if upon investigation the material which they assemble is not 
sufficient to establish that it is not a proper claim under the policy, it 
seems to me that the interest on the money which they have retained 
meanwhile and which the insured has not had meanwhile should be 
transferred…”463 
It should be noted that in that case Staughton LJ refused to state clearly in the 
judgment the reason why such an “interest-free” investigation should be 
supported; by contrast, the speech quoted above was rather a reflection on the 
general principle in Firestone and BP v Hunt (No.2).  
However, the starting date of interest conflicted with that speech, as it was held 
to be August 1st 1983, some five weeks after the risk even though it was clearly 
stated by Staughton LJ that the payment of indemnity was due as soon as the 
fire occurred. Therefore, it could be argued, with respect, that in that case, 
Staughton LJ deviated from the general principle without any sound reason and 
it might be argued further that in that case the court in fact “implied” exceptions 
into the indemnity insurance claim and exceptions are commonly used. 
5.1.11 In 1984 the Court of Appeal should have grasped a good opportunity to 
give a clear answer to this question about interest in The Popi M.464 It is a case 
of significant importance in the history of marine insurance not only because of 
the issue of interest, but also the famous rule in applying the “Sherlock Holmes 
                                         
463 McLean Enterprises Ltd v. Ecclesiastical Insurance Office Plc [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 416 at pp.427-428. 
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exception”. However, more focus should be put on the issue about interest, as it 
was rightly stated by Langley J that 
“I have been referred to a number of other authorities in the particular 
context of insurance but, apart from The Popi M, I do not derive great 
assistance from them.”465 
In that case, the vessel Popi M set sail in a good condition, but subsequently 
sank due to the entry of water in good weather and perfect sea on August 5th 
1978 and the assured raised the claim in September 1980. 
At the first trial, it was admitted by Bingham J that the facts of the case were 
“unusual and in many respects bizarre”,466 and the case was decided on a 
change of claim by the claimant. Therefore, the judge refused to award interest 
from the time of the loss. Instead, the starting date of interest was postponed 
until January 1st 1983 when the changed claim was properly raised. In reaching 
that conclusion, it was held that 
“…it does seem to me on the facts of this case to be wrong to treat the 
plaintiff as having been kept out of his money when he has put his 
claim on a basis substantially different from that which has proved 
successful… I think that the order for interest should be very much 
less favourable to the plaintiffs than would ordinarily follow in a case 
of this kind, and I think that justice is done.”467 
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It might be noted that although it was admitted that the facts of the case were 
unusual and bizarre, the award of interest was not decided or influenced on this 
point but on the claimant’s change of case. It also seems that the award of 
interest, based on the view of Bingham J, was a more practice-based remedy 
rather than merely indemnifying the loss of the use of the money by the assured: 
because even though the case was changed by the assured it did not 
necessarily mean that the assured was at fault in any way or had any intention to 
waive the right of interest on changing the case and it could not be denied that 
the assured was deprived of the use of the money due to the late payment of the 
insurer.  
Another fact to be noted is that even in this case the assured did not intend to 
claim interest from the time of loss; instead, the claimant asked for interest from 
January 1979 as the relevant material for the claim was given to the insurer in 
December 1978 and it was believed by the assured that the insurer could finish 
the reasonable investigation and adjustment in that period. In other words, it 
seems that the interest-free period was granted in the first place by the assured 
and the assured actually waived the entitlement to the interest during that time; 
but what was done by the court was to extend that period without any sound 
reason. Accordingly, it can be found that the general rule of awarding interest in 
Firestone was deviated from and in certain cases even the claimant did not 
follow the general principle. It is true that the assured could always do that 
because waiving the right is not forbidden by law, but it is at least open to serious 
doubt whether the court could extend the interest-free period. 
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The claimant in The Popi M appealed on the issue of interest and the claim was 
heard by the Court of Appeal before Sir John Donaldson MR, O’Connor and May 
LJJs. On the appeal, Sir John Donaldson MR, with whom May LJ agreed, held 
that the assured did not conceal information or mislead the assured, but the 
learned judge noticed the unusual nature of the case and agreed that  
“…underwriters could not reasonably be expected to pay immediately 
that the claim was presented.”468 
Nonetheless, the starting date of interest was in favour of the assured as Sir 
John Donaldson further held that 
“The casualty occurred on Aug. 5, 1978. The writs were not issued 
until September, 1980, by which time underwriters must have made 
up their minds to reject the claim. They may well have undertaken 
further investigation…, but from Oct. 1, 1980, and perhaps 
considerably earlier…the underwriters were in breach of their 
contract to indemnify the owners and were thereafter enjoying the 
use of the owners’ money.”469 
Prima facie, the majority of the Court of Appeal believed that the starting date of 
interest had a strong connection with the issue of the writ by the court, because it 
could be inferred that after the writ was issued the insurer must have finished the 
reasonable investigation and adjustment; accordingly, the fact of the majority 
judgment was that the court tended to support the interest-free investigation 
period, even though the judgment was made in favour of the assured. 
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Additionally, it was not clearly stated by Sir John Donaldson MR whether the 
judgment would follow the general principle, because in the decision the issue of 
the cause of action was not clearly considered. What was mentioned by the 
Court of Appeal was that the defendant might have breached the contract from 
the time when the writ was issued or “perhaps earlier”, and it meant that it was 
not certain to Sir John Donaldson MR and O’Connor LJ at that time when the 
cause of action in an indemnity insurance claim would arise. 
5.1.12 However, this issue was considered by May LJ and he prepared to award 
interest from an earlier date than October 1980. It was held that 
“…a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. Where an 
insured suffers a loss due to a peril insured against he is prima facie 
entitled to have that loss made good to him by insurers directly it 
happens. A contract of insurance is different in this respect from… a 
contract for the sale of goods under which the buyer is by its terms of 
custom allowed credit for a period... In the insurance situation, 
although reasonableness and commercial practice may on the 
authorities lead a Court to deny an insured interest on his 
indemnity monies for a period after the loss, in my opinion this 
should be limited. Of course in most cases insurers will in practice 
need to investigate claims made upon them by their assured, but it 
should be remembered after a claim has been ultimately admitted or 
proved after litigation, that in law insurers had been liable to pay the 
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admitted or proved amount from the date of the loss and that prima 
facie at least interest should be awarded accordingly.”470 
It is clear that the judgment made by May LJ reflected the current judicial 
understanding of both the primary obligation of the insurer and the principle 
which should be applied in indemnity insurance cases:  
Firstly, the primary obligation of the insurer, under current law, is to hold the 
assured harmless, and therefore the cause of action for the breach of the 
insurance contract arises as soon as the loss occurs.  
Secondly, unlike sales contracts, generally there should be no interest-free 
period; even a reasonable interest-free period for investigation is always 
required by the insurer and in practice it is always granted by the assured.  
Thirdly, that interest-free period is not in line with the general legal principle, but 
courts always deviate from that principle to achieve fairness and commercial 
reality, despite saying that such a period granted is exceptional and could only 
be granted in limited situations.  
Although May LJ did not give any examples of this exception, it could be inferred 
from the discussion about BP v. Hunt (No.2) above that generally the exceptions 
should be split into two groups: the first group is where the insurer does not or 
could not reasonably know that there is a loss and the second group is where 
the assured “waived” all or part of the right to interest. 
However, the judgment made by May LJ was not clearly accepted by Langley J 
and no persuasive interpretation was given.471 Nonetheless, it needs to be 
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pointed out that should the approach taken by May LJ be accepted, a further 
question will arise: it is common practice that the insurer could not know or have 
any reasonable ground to know that the insured peril happens and causes 
damage unless the assured notifies the insurer; based on this fact, the exception 
in BP v. Hunt (No.2) will no longer be an “exception” in indemnity insurance 
claims, but a certain “routine” in almost every claim; therefore, it could be argued 
that the law is to some extent self-contradictory. 
5.1.13 According to the discussion above, it might be inferred that it is better to 
regard the new implied obligation stated in s.28 of the Enterprise Act 2016 as 
intending to replace the original obligation of the insurer to hold the assured 
harmless by a new contractual obligation to make the payment of indemnity 
within reasonable time, and accordingly the decision of the House of Lords in 
The Fanti shall be overruled or limited in original indemnity contracts of liability 
insurance. Therefore, the assured has no cause of action against the insurer 
unless and until a reasonable time has passed, which could be decided by 
relevant circumstances, such as the nature or the size of the claim;472 and the 
insurer is able to enjoy an interest-free period to investigate the claim 
reasonably.  
5.1.14 After reviewing these cases, Langley J decided to follow the general 
principle stated in Firestone and BP v. Hunt (No.2)473 but the judge found the 
condition of “waiver” was satisfied by the assured’s intentional silence. Therefore, 
the judge expressed the view that 
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“…it is wrong to view the claimant as kept out of or deprived of the use 
of money payment of which he has delayed in seeking. [Especially] in 
which a claimant consciously and for his own reasons chose not to 
pursue a claim immediately and notified the potential defendant…”474 
As to the starting date, the judge continued that 
“…once it was clear, as it was on 12 November 1990, that a claim in 
respect of the loss of spares was now being pursued and insurers had 
had a little time both to appreciate that fact and consider or 
re-consider it,…interest …to be due should accrue. In fact KIC 
rejected the claim in its entirety on 5 December 1990 and it is on and 
from that date that I think it appropriate to award interest.”475 
Accordingly, it could be found that even though the date of paying interest was 
due on 12 November 1990, the judge nonetheless granted an interest-free 
period for about a month for the insurer to hold a reasonable investigation or to 
properly consider the claim. It could also be inferred that should the assured 
decide not to delay the claim, which would not make him be blamed for waiver 
by the judge, but to claim as soon as the loss occurred, the same interest-free 
period would nevertheless be granted. In other words, no matter whether the 
assured elects to waive or postpone the starting date of the interest the courts 
will always grant an interest-free period from the date when the insurer is aware 
of the claim and the length of that period is the period for a reasonable insurer to 
finish the proper investigation and make the decision. 
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5.1.15 It needs to be remembered that in The Popi M, which has a significant 
influence on the present case, the claimant claimed the interest from the date of 
prosecution, rather than from the date of the loss, in the official claim form before 
the court; but in Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3) it was clearly claimed by the claimant 
that the interest should be awarded from the date of loss; however, this 
difference had no actual effect because in both cases interest-free periods were 
eventually granted; and it would be more surprising to find out that in both cases 
the periods were about one month.  
Additionally, in both cases, courts admitted that interest should have run when 
the cause of action arose and there were limited exceptions; however, in Kuwait 
v. Kuwait (No.3) Langley J in fact applied the exceptions twice: the first time was 
to postpone the starting date from the date of the loss to the date of the claim 
due to the “waiver” and the second time was to postpone the starting date from 
the date of claim to the date when the learned judge believed that the insurer 
had finished the investigation and had thereby rejected the claim. 
Therefore, it might be predicted that in indemnity insurance claims, based on the 
current law, the starting date of interest has nothing to do with the general 
principle in Firestone or BP v. Hunt (No.2);476 what is of relevance is the date of 
a proper claim raised by the assured and a period of reasonable investigation or 
consideration by the insurer and this position has been noted by Lord Mance 
that 
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“…both parties to an insurance case would probably see the real 
obligation of an insurer as the paying of a valid claim after a 
reasonable period for investigation…”477 
According to the discussion above, it should be noted that there is a difference 
between legal principle and commercial practice on the starting date of interest 
and this difference could be solved by understanding the new Enterprise Act 
2016, which imposes an obligation on the insurer, and effectively replaces the 
traditional definition of the primary obligation of the insurer. 
5.1.16 Notwithstanding the difficulty in understanding the starting date of interest 
in indemnity claims, it is well settled that once the interest begins to run, the only 
way to stop it is the fact that the dominant reason for the assured being kept out 
of the money is the fault of the assured, and this argument was accepted by 
Tomlinson J in The Julia478 that 
“Where a claimant has been guilty of excessive delay in making the 
original claim or in pursuing it, the starting date may be adjusted 
adversely to him. The rationale for doing so is that it would be wrong 
to view the claimant as kept out of or deprived of the use of money, 
payment of which he has delayed in seeking.”479 
Additionally, Tomlinson J noted that in order to stop the running of interest, the 
fault of the claimant must be substantial and culpable. Even though the learned 
                                         
477 See Lord Mance, ‘The 1906 Act, Common Law and Contract Claims All in Harmony?’ [2011] L.M.C.L.Q 
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judge might be wrong in the part dealing with the starting date of the interest, the 
judgment on this issue is correct. Therefore, the reconciliation of the legal 
principle and commercial practice on the starting date of interest is the only 
problem and this problem has never been answered directly.  
5.1.17 In order to solve this problem, one must firstly remember that according to 
the general legal principle, interest should run as soon as the cause of action 
arises and in an indemnity insurance case the cause of action arises when the 
insurer’s primary obligation is breached, but again, what is the primary obligation 
of the insurer?  
It has been argued in this work that the primary obligation should be regarded as 
the one to pay a claim within a reasonable time rather than to hold the assured 
harmless by preventing the loss. Once the insurer’s obligation is regarded as the 
one to hold the assured harmless a time gap will inevitably appear between the 
date when the cause of action arises and the date when interest starts to run in 
practice; however, once the insurer’s obligation is regarded as one to pay a valid 
claim within a reasonable time, the reconciliation of general legal principle and 
commercial practice will be achieved. According to this understanding the 
starting point is that interest should not run until a reasonable time for the claim 
handling has been exhausted and that period should be decided by reference to 
market practice for different kinds of polices as well as by the special facts for 
each case. This argument could also be testified to and supported by the 
following cases and conclusions; and therefore this aspect of understanding 
should carry more weight when the Enterprise Act 2016 is to be interpreted480. 
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5.1.18 In Adcock v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd481 the assured’s house 
which was insured against fire was burned down on January 13th 1990. After 
immediately notifying and claiming for the insured sum against the insurer the 
assured demolished the damaged house and rebuilt it. The insurer made two 
modest interim payments in August 1990 and January 1992. Due to the 
unsatisfactory negotiation, the assured commenced legal proceedings in 
December 1995 and the case was then heard in May 1999. At the first trial, HHJ 
Langan QC awarded the principal sum of £13,577 plus interest of £6,788 which 
was calculated from February 1993 until the date when the judgment was given. 
The insurer appealed the judgment on interest, alongside the principal sum. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision but, unlike Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3), 
Waller LJ, who gave the judgment, did not explain the reason why the starting 
date of interest was delayed nor made any comment about the relation between 
the date when the cause of action arose and the date when the statutory interest 
should begin to run. Instead, Waller LJ made that judgment from another aspect. 
After analysing the Supreme Court Act 1981, the learned judge found that the 
statutory interest was a matter of discretion482 and believed that the trial judge 
made no favourable judgment for the assured and even if there was misdirection 
Waller LJ expressed the opinion that he would not interfere.483  
The assumption made above was followed by Thomas J in Quorum AS v. 
Schramm (No.2)484 by holding that 
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482
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“…the Court usually exercises its discretion on the basis it is proper to 
allow insurers some time to consider the claim. The time varies 
accordingly to the nature of the loss, the way in which the claim is 
presented and the circumstances that require investigation.”485 
In The Vergina (No.3)486 Aikens J (as he then was) further clarified this position. 
In that case, the vessel sank off the West African coast and salvage work paid by 
the assured was done in February 1994. Aikens J firstly noticed that a contract of 
marine insurance was a contract of indemnity and the primary obligation of the 
insurer was to hold the assured harmless.487 However, the learned judge 
postponed the starting date until 17th May 1996 based on reasons below: 
Firstly, Aikens J believed that the assured would not make a “formal” claim 
against the insurer until the salvage arbitrations or settlements had been 
completed even though the insurer had been notified by the assured. 
Secondly, Aikens J noted that in fact the insurer began the investigation from 
February and March 1994. 
Thirdly, on 17th May 1996 the insurer denied the claim and it was believed by 
Aikens J that by doing so the insurer must have finished the reasonable 
investigation. 
Aikens J further expressed his opinion on the starting date of interest in 
indemnity insurance; he held that 
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“…the correct approach in the case of a claim under an insurance 
policy where there is no obligation to submit a formal claim is that the 
initial starting date of interest is the date when the insurer is in breach 
of its obligation to hold the insured harmless. That date might well be 
moved forward to give insurers a reasonably short time to consider 
whether there is a valid claim under the policy…”488   
Therefore, it could be found again that the starting date of interest and the date 
of the cause of action were isolated in The Vergina (No.3). Additionally, even 
though a “formal” claim would not be the condition precedent to the starting date 
of interest, the insurer still needed to be informed about the loss. 
Aikens J further held that the court was entitled to stop the running of the interest, 
but it could only be done so in very limited situations and after reviewing The 
Athenian Harmony489 he held that 
“…the Court should not disallow interest unless it can be shown that 
the “predominant cause” of the claimant being kept out of money that 
the Court has held he is entitled to is the claimant’s own failure to 
prosecute the claim, as opposed to the defendant’s maintenance of its 
defense.”490 
5.1.19 Accordingly, the way in which interest works in practice in indemnity 
insurance currently could be concluded as follows: 
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Firstly, the time spent between the date when the cause of action arises and the 
date when the insurer is notified should not be counted as interest period, 
because the insurer could not be aware of a claim during that period and any 
delay in notifying the insurer is to be attributed to the assured. Additionally, since 
the assured has no right to interest during this period, the theory of waiver, which 
has been mentioned above, could not apply. 
Secondly, once the notice, formal or informal, is given to the insurer an 
interest-free period will follow and the length of that period is a matter of 
discretion. It could be inferred that the argument that the insurer in fact does not 
investigate due to the lack of a formal claim would be rejected by the court 
because the decisive point is not about whether the notice is formal or informal, 
but whether a reasonable insurer, after receiving the notice, should begin the 
investigation. 
Thirdly, once the interest-free period is exhausted the interest should run from 
that point on. However, if the assured, for his own reasons, is indolent in making 
a claim to the court it might be possible for the court to hold that the interest loss 
is predominantly caused by the assured.  
5.1.20 Even though the analysis above seems to be correct according to current 
law, it reflects only the academic position and the general position of the court 
underlying the judgments. However the way the court uses its discretion remains 
unclear and unpredictable.  
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It is better to start this problem with The Julia.491 In that case the vessel suffered 
an actual total loss by fire on 15th May 1994 and the assured sent the claim form 
to the insurer the next day but it did not reach the insurer’s representatives until 
August 1994. After a reasonable investigation and consideration the insurer 
denied liability on 22 December 1994. The judgment delivered by Tomlinson J 
was surprising as the interest was awarded from 15th June 1994, and the reason 
was that 
“I consider that a period of one month within which underwriters are 
entitled to investigate the loss and decide whether to accept or 
decline the claim is a modest allowance…”492 
With respect, it could be hardly said that an underwriter could finish the 
investigation within one month without knowing that there is a claim against him. 
According to the facts, the learned judge in fact permitted the assured to 
“ambush” the underwriter, which was not allowed in either Firestone or BP v. 
Hunt (No.2), and this case might be wrongly decided.  
The position of the court seems to be clear in modern cases. In AXL Resources 
Ltd v. Antares Underwriting Services Ltd493 Gloster J held that  
“… I exercise my discretion to award interest as from 1 April 2009. I 
choose this date to reflect the fact that the defendants are entitled to 
some time to consider the claim before interest should start to accrue. 
Although the claim was made on 27 January 2009, their loss 
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adjusters’ report was not signed until 12 March 2009, and I have 
allowed them some time after that date to consider their position.”494 
In Synergy Health v. CGU Insurance Plc495 Flaux J expressed the same opinion 
by holding that 
“I consider that the insurers were entitled to a reasonable period in 
which to investigate the loss before interest should be payable, even if 
technically they were in breach of contract from the date of the ﬁre.”496 
5.1.21 In Australia there once was a debate on whether assureds should be 
allowed to claim interest when the payment by the insurer was delayed and 
ALRC, after a discussion about the nature of the insurance industry, provided an 
affirmative answer that:  
“…[a] requirement to pay interest would diminish an existing incentive 
to delay. As the rate of return on investments would probably exceed 
the rate of interest payable, the insurer would not be under any 
pressure to settle quickly or to forgo proper investigation of claims. 
Thirdly, the proposal would have the effect of adding appreciably to 
the cost of insurance. This argument certainly has some merit. Costs 
would obviously increase. But the new cost would be the real cost of 
effective insurance, account being taken of the loss suffered by an 
insured if interest were not paid. If the payment of interest were 
required not from the date of loss, but only from the time after which 
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further delay by an insurer would be unreasonable, there would be 
little, if any, increase in costs.”497 
This issue was also developed by academics, especially on the type of interest. 
It was suggested that  
“If the plaintiff was expecting payment for a consignment of goods, but 
did not receive his money, the extent of his loss could be measured 
approximately by the amount of income that he could otherwise have 
generated simply by putting the proceeds into a deposit account at a 
bank. Such a move would attract compound interest, since the bank 
would automatically add to the account any interest generated. 
Equally, a plaintiff in a tort action can be thought of as incurring 
opportunity costs best measured by compound rather than simple 
rates. Had he received his award immediately upon the damage 
occurring, it may be assumed that he would have invested it at 
compound rates in just the same way as would the plaintiff who is 
suffering from a breach of contract.”498 
5.1.22 Several years later, the issue of interest was developed further by 
Hungerfords v. Walker,499 which could be described as the “Sempra Metals in 
Australia” case. In that case Walker made an overpayment to the Tax 
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Department due to the miscalculation of Hungerfords Accounting Group 
(Hungerfords), a and some of the amount overpaid could not be recovered from 
the Tax Department because of the statutory bar in Australia. Accordingly, 
Walker could only claim damages from Hungerfords and the key question of the 
case was “can interest be awarded for damages under common law?” 
The answer provided by the High Court was simple: yes, and this judgment, to 
no-one’s surprise, brought a new era in general contract law as well as 
insurance law in Australia. 
It has been proposed in this work that in England it was once described as a 
“blot” that no interest could be awarded for late payment of money and after 
Sempra the blot was partly removed, but in Australia the blot was removed in 
full. 
In reaching that conclusion, it was noted by Mason CJ and Wilson J that the 
distinction made by the House of Lords in The La Pintada should not be 
followed500 and further held that 
“…the plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for the loss which he 
sustains in consequence of the defendant’s wrong… Judged from a 
commercial viewpoint, the plaintiff sustains an economic loss if his 
damages are not paid promptly, just as he sustains such a loss when 
his debt is not paid on the due date.”501 
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According to that speech, the first part of the blot in Australia was removed, that 
is to say, interest could now be awarded for late payment of damages and it was 
rightly pointed out that there should be no commercial difference between the 
remedy for late payment of debt and late payment of damage. 
Unlike the House of Lords in Sempra, the High Court continued in dealing with 
the type of interest. It has to be mentioned that in Australia the statute only 
allows simple interest, but the High Court found that compound interest should 
nevertheless be allowed in common law by holding that 
“The award of interest was of necessity compound interest. Simple 
interest would not reflect accurately the extent of the respondents’ 
loss. Simple interest almost always undercompensates the injured 
party’s true loss.”502   
Therefore, it is now settled in Australian law that compound interest would be 
awarded in late payment of money, no matter whether it is debt or damage, and 
accordingly the common law “blot” no longer exists in Australia. However, it 
needs to be mentioned that, notwithstanding the great progress in the law of 
interest, according to the rule in Hungerfords, that case could only govern the 
pre-judgment interest and it means that in some states of Australia such as New 
South Wales compound interest is still prohibited. 
Additionally, it is also clear in Hungerfords that the interest loss which could be 
awarded is not limited to the actual rate of the money borrowed by the claimant 
due to the wrongful act of the defendant, but also the chance to gain profit from 
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the money and it is also clear that in Australia courts have a great discretion in 
awarding interest loss as additional damage. 
5.1.23 However, this common law principle in the insurance field is problematic 
because it has been argued that Hungerfords would not necessarily apply to 
insurance cases503 since the statutory remedy for interest loss has been well 
established in s.57 of the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (the ICA 1984) and 
subsection (4) of the statute was designed to provide an “exhaustive interest 
remedy” for the assured, and in subsection (5) (b) it is clear that s.57 would 
replace any rule on interest in common law. Therefore, the statutory provision 
and the statement that “the statutory power is a complement to award interest in 
common law rather than a prohibition” conflict with each other and until now 
there has been no response from the High Court of Australia to provide a 
solution for this problem.504 It was also suggested that s.57 of the ICA 1984 
should be changed when the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 was 
enacted but that section remains unchanged. 
It has been suggested by the English Law Commission that, in certain cases, the 
assured should be entitled to interest under s.57 as well as Hungerfords505 and 
this argument is supported by Sutton.506 
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Accordingly, it might be argued that the statutory interest remedy in s.57 should 
no longer be the exhaustive remedy and the common law approach should be 
used. It may also be argued that, once there is an accurate interest loss which 
can be proved and claimed, that loss should be named as “Hungerfords damage” 
rather than interest under s.57; this argument could be supported by the 
Australian Sprung case Moss v. Sun Alliance Australia Ltd.507 It has been 
shown in this work that in Moss the assured was awarded interest loss by way of 
damage and the amount of the payment was calculated on a common law basis 
in accordance with Hungerfords instead of s.57 of ICA even though s.57 is to 
provide an exhaustive interest remedy. It might be argued that once the accurate 
amount of the loss of the use of money could be properly proved, the “interest” 
should also be regarded as a part of the damage and that understanding it in 
that way might be the only way to reconcile s.57 of the ICA and Hungerfords. 
While there is only a claim for the loss of the use of money without clear 
reference to the way in which the money should have been used, then the 
statutory interest would be the appropriate remedy;508 and as to the interest, the 
insurer could only argue on two grounds: one is, based on the wording of the 
policy and market practice, to convince the court to extend the period for 
investigation, and the other is to blame the assured for his own delay.509 
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5.1.24 Notably, based on the application of the ICA 1984, if the Act does not 
apply there will be no room for s.57. For example, the Act does not apply to a 
marine insurance claim which is regulated by the Australian Marine Insurance 
Act 1909 (the MIA 1909) and where it is a claim made by the assured against the 
broker for non-placement of the insurance s.57 does not apply, because it is not 
a claim under insurance contracts, even if the amount for payment is calculated 
on the “prospective insurance” basis.510 Additionally, once the obligation of 
payment turns into an obligation to reinstate, the issue of interest will not arise, 
but if the insurer unreasonably delays the election the obligation under the duty 
of good faith will make the insurer liable to pay for damage caused thereby.511 
5.1.25 Along with the common law and statutory regulation of interest, the 
calculation of the starting date of interest has also been reviewed by Australian 
courts several times in a few decades.  
In Bankstown Football Club v CIC Insurance Ltd512 the High Court of Australia 
had a chance to review the standard of a reasonable period for an insurer to 
handle the claim and its connection with the duty of utmost good faith. The High 
Court restored the trial judgment delivered by Cole J and agreed unanimously 
that 
“A reasonable period is to be given to the insurer to investigate and 
determine its position but if it adopts an incorrect position in relation to 
its obligation to pay under the policy, that, in my view, does not mean 
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that simply because that incorrect position is adopted on a bona fide 
basis, it becomes reasonable for the insurer to decline to pay the 
sums otherwise due.”513 
Accordingly, it is safe to conclude that in Australia once the insurer’s defence is 
rejected by the court, however reasonably reached at the time of denying liability 
under its policy, the reasonableness would be decided by the court rather than 
the insurer itself514 and the insurer’s behaviour could not be used as a barrier to 
the obligation for the late payment.  
This understanding is also correct in awarding interest: s.57 (2) of the ICA rules 
that the insurer’s liability to pay interest arises once a reasonable period has 
elapsed and that reasonable period is also to be decided by the court using the 
same principle.515 Additionally, as to the liability to pay interest, the insurer is in a 
worse position: sometimes the insurer has no financial resources to perform the 
contractual obligation due to the late payment of the reinsurer, but this fact does 
not stop the counting of interest516 and the insurer could not claim interest from 
the reinsurer as the ICA is inapplicable to reinsurance contracts. 
5.1.26 In Nguyen v. QBE Insurance Ltd517 the Australian court found a chance to 
illustrate how the interest could be awarded when a third party beneficiary was 
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involved. In that case Nguyen, a 20-year-old boy was stabbed and became a 
paraplegic in a function where the security service was provided by H, and QBE 
was the liability insurer of H. In the claim against H, Nguyen was awarded 
$2,823,700 (the principal sum) in a default judgment and then H became 
bankrupt; the QBE policy was subsequently assigned to Nguyen and in an 
earlier decision it was held that QBE was liable to indemnify the principal sum.518 
Nguyen then claimed in that case for the interest over the principal sum in 
accordance with s.57 of the ICA. 
It was argued by QBE that firstly Nguyen was not a person who was entitled to 
payment under a contract of insurance and accordingly s.57 of the ICA was not 
applicable; should that argument be wrong, QBE insisted that the right to interest 
under s.57 could not be assigned in alternative. 
Duggan J, who was in favour of Nguyen, refused both arguments. The judge 
held that in the present case, s.57 had to be explained widely and he found 
Nguyen was within the literal meaning of s.57 (1);519 the judge also stated that 
one of the main purposes of s.57 was to provide interest so as to deter any 
unreasonable delay in performing the contractual obligation to indemnify and the 
present case clearly fell within such scope. Accordingly, Duggan J further 
expressed a view that Nguyen’s right to claim interest came from the assignment 
of the right to be indemnified and the fact that the original assured was liable for 
the damage; in conclusion, the judge held that Nguyen was the right person to 
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claim interest under s.57 of the ICA and His Honour continued to deal with the 
quantity of interest. 
The default judgment between the original assured and Nguyen was entered on 
30 July 2002; the same day Nguyen sent the judgment to QBE and QBE denied 
its liability under the policy. Accordingly, it was found by the judge that at that 
date QBE was aware of its liability and the principal sum and even though the 
policy was assigned to Nguyen later, the interest started to run from 31 July 2002. 
As to the type of interest, Duggan J confirmed that the court had discretion to 
make it compound interest, but in that case there was no basis for doing so. 
The impact of this case is significant: it firstly confirmed that, according to a wide 
interpretation of s.57, the assignee of the policy has the right to claim for the 
interest.520 More importantly, it expresses a clear and robust attitude by the 
Australian court towards the insurer’s obligation to make payment: that 
obligation is of primary force and could not be affected by a proper assignment 
and it could give rise to the statutory interest which could not be stopped or 
suspended by assignment either. Additionally, once the insurer denies liability 
under the policy it becomes the insurer’s risk for the interest afterwards, because 
the law will regard the denial as a signal of the completion of the investigation.521 
Unlike Australian state legislations and the Supreme Court Act 1981 in England, 
interest under s.57 starts to run whenever the payment should have been made, 
no matter whether there is litigation or not, and the only way to stop or postpone 
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the clock is to persuade the court that there is a reasonable ground for paying 
late522 but the insurer’s lack of funding is not a justifiable ground. 
Before s.57 (4)523 was added into the statute, it was unclear about how to deal 
with the conflict between the ICA 1984 and the law from each state,524 but with 
such amendment, it is now clear that the rate of the statutory interest is to be 
decided in accordance with regulations and the ICA 1984 is the only applicable 
law on statutory interest.525  
Therefore, the Australian understanding is clearer: the insurer’s primary 
obligation under the contract is to make payment and once the insurer fails to do 
that within reasonable time interest will start to run and damages may be 
incurred. 
(3) Academic views  
5.1.27 After reviewing the comparative approach taken by Australian law, it is 
appropriate to discuss academic views in English law as they carry great value 
when the current legal position is uncertain. In the academic world, it is almost 
unanimously believed that the default position in an indemnity insurance claim is 
that the interest should not run until a reasonable period for investigation has 
been exhausted by the insurer, just as with the current legal position of Australia.  
In Halsbury’s Law of England it is suggested that  
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“If the insurers have reasonably required an opportunity of deciding 
whether to meet a claim, it seems that interest will be awarded only 
from the date by which they have enjoyed such an opportunity.”526 
It is also pointed out by Andrew Pincott of Elborne Mitchell that  
“…a court would not award interest from the date of the assured’s loss 
itself, but rather would postpone the running of interest until the date 
at which the insurer had been given a reasonable opportunity to 
consider the claim.”527  
The same conclusion is also reached in MacGillivray on Insurance Law528 that 
an interest-free period should be granted to the insurer for a reasonable 
investigation. 
Professor Rob Merkin also makes a same conclusion by stating that 
“Although the Court undoubtedly has power to award interest starting 
from the date of loss in insurance cases and is still likely to do so in 
straightforward cases, there are several instances in reported cases 
where interest has been awarded from a later date, so as to allow a 
reasonable time for investigation by the insurer after notification of the 
assured’s claim before interest starts running.”529 
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However, it might be argued that even though the learned professor stated that 
in “straightforward cases” the starting date of interest would match with the date 
of the cause of action in current law (the date when the insured risk happens), 
there is no reported case on that point; and it could also be argued that 
“straightforward cases” will not go to the court. This argument is supported by 
Professor Malcolm Clarke, who summarizes the exceptions in awarding interest 
with the approval of Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3) and states that the starting date of 
interest will not run until a notice is given, because 
“The defendant insurer neither knew, nor reasonably could have been 
expected to know, that the plaintiff was likely to make a claim.”530 
5.1.28 It has been mentioned that in this work the focus is put on indemnity 
insurance, however, as to the award of interest it is nevertheless 
appropriate to make cross-reference from contingency insurance. 
It is common ground now that the payment under a contingency insurance 
contract is a contractual debt, and therefore the claim could be made as a 
claim to recover the liquidated debt stated in the insurance policy. 
Additionally, once the contingency insurance claim is paid late, the assured 
will have a cause of action for the damages caused by the late payment of 
debt. Since it is clear that the word “damages” is used here the assured’s 
claim will not be limited by the insured sum: according to the principle of 
compensation the assured could not only recover the insured sum but also 
the damages caused by the late payment. 
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However, it needs to be noted that in a contingency insurance claim the 
interest would be awarded in two ways: one is the statutory interest which 
is to be used as a way to compensate the loss of the use of the money, 
which is the same as an indemnity insurance claim; the other is interest on 
borrowed money as damages531 and this could be named as the common 
law interest which is in fact a payment of damage rather than “real interest”, 
and according to the powerful obiter in Sempra Metals that once there is a 
lack of a clear clause on interest between the assured and the third party, 
the common law interest should be awarded on a compound basis to 
reflect commercial reality. Additionally, it should be noted that there would 
be an overlap in the statutory interest and the common law interest and the 
common law interest should have the priority while the statutory interest, 
after the common law interest is awarded, will be adjusted by the court 
applying its discretion.532 As to the statutory interest the contingency 
insurance claim shares the same principle with the indemnity insurance 
claim, and as to the common law interest it would be calculated by 
reference to the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. 
Accordingly, it seems that the rules on contingency insurance sound far 
more logical than indemnity insurance and therefore, one question has to 
be asked: is it appropriate to apply the rules of contingency insurance to 
indemnity insurance? Prima facie a negative answer is to be given because 
it has been emphasized in this work that, unlike contingency insurance, the 
payment in indemnity insurance is damages rather than debt, and there is 
                                         
531 See Trans Trust SPRL v. Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 297. 
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no room for common law interest because the common law interest is in 
fact damage; but what if the current understanding on indemnity insurance 
is changed, and once it is changed will there be a better understanding? 
According to the interpretation of the function of the implied obligation in the 
Enterprise Act 2016, which is to replace the insurer’s obligation from 
holding the assured harmless by paying a contractual indemnity, it seems 
that a positive answer may be given after the Bill is actually enacted. 
(4) A better understanding? 
(a) The problem under current law 
5.1.29 It has been pointed out that under current law, the starting date of interest 
seldom matches the date when the cause of action arises, and instead, the date 
is usually postponed twice: firstly the date will be postponed until the notice of 
the claim is sent to the insurer and this postponement seems to be justified by 
Firestone and BP v. Hunt (No.2)533.  
However, it needs to be pointed out that the insurance contract is not the same 
as other types of contracts in English law, a bill of lading for example. In a bill of 
lading contract once a consignee asks for delivery without a bill of lading he is 
well aware or could be reasonably expected to be aware that there would be a 
claim against him; but in most, if not all, insurance cases insurers could not know 
about the claim unless the assured notifies the insurer. Therefore, the exception, 
prima facie, could apply to each and every insurance claim and that fact could 
make an insurance claim isolated from other contracts and also make the 
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exception become the normal situation and a practical routine. This is very much 
like the illusory definition of “hold harmless” which also makes the insurance 
contract isolated from other contracts and anomalous. 
Secondly, in most cases the court would also grant an interest-free period for 
reasonable investigation and this postponement could be justified by the 
discretion granted by s.35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981. However, this 
discretion is somehow in conflict with the right approach provided by May LJ in 
The Popi M as the judge pointed out that 
“… after a claim has been ultimately admitted or proved after 
litigation… in law insurers had been liable to pay the admitted or 
proved amount from the date for the loss and that prima facie at least 
interest should be awarded accordingly.”534 
Additionally, the discretionary power granted by the statute could hardly be 
challenged, 535  even if the deviation from common law in the first trial is 
unjustifiable. 
(b) The proposed solution  
5.1.30 It could be well noted that even though the current law on interest seems 
to be unfair and unclear, these problems have their legal basis, either from 
statute536 or from common law537. However, it needs to be remembered that all 
these cases mentioned above are decided under an unsupported and 
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 Namely, the discretion power granted by s.35A of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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anomalous legal fiction: the primary obligation of the insurer is to prevent the 
loss suffered by the assured and therefore once the loss occurs the insurer 
breaches that obligation and therefore the cause of action arises at the same 
time. 
In chapter 2 of this work, it has been discussed that this legal fiction should no 
longer stand and the primary obligation of the insurer should be replaced by a 
more realistic one, namely to pay a valid claim after the happening of the loss in 
a reasonable time. That approach could also provide assistance to the court 
when applying the discretion in awarding interest and it will make a new rule 
which is the same as the rule in contingency insurance claims and is more 
reasonable. 
Firstly, each and every assured understands that the insurer will not pay a claim 
unless and until the insurer knows that there is a claim or potential claim; 
therefore, the assured must understand that, by delaying the notification, the 
loss of the use of the money is caused by the delay of the assured rather than 
the insurer; this understanding makes more commercial sense than the current 
law. Additionally, it could find support from the changed legal understanding: the 
period spent in giving the notice should not be counted as an exception in 
awarding interest because during that time the cause of action has not occurred 
when the insurer’s primary obligation is regarded as one to pay a valid claim. 
Secondly, once the assured makes a claim, without special terms538 in the 
contract or special requirements in regulations,539 it should be presumed as the 
                                         
538 Once the primary obligation is regarded as one to pay a valid claim, the contractual clause in Tonkin 
might be presumed as an agreement of advance payment. 
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common knowledge of the assured that the payment will not come as soon as 
the claim is given to the insurer, and there will always be an interest-free period 
for the insurer to make reasonable investigation and adjustment. The discretion 
granted by the statute should be used in deciding whether the actual time spent 
in assessing the claim and in making an investigation is reasonable; once it is 
not, the court could fix the starting date of interest before the date of the actual 
payment, but after the date when the notice is made. Additionally, this approach 
does not mean to reduce the discretionary power as the court could also decide 
the fact that, if the claim was properly made, it could draw an inference as to the 
intention of a reasonable insurer. Therefore, it is important for the assured to 
know that even if there is an intention to reach a settlement with the insurer, it is 
better to give an official claim notice and the words such as “without prejudice” 
should be put into settlement claims. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that those two points mentioned above also support 
the understanding of the effect of the Enterprise Act 2016 and once the payment 
under an indemnity insurance claim is deemed as a payment of contractual debt 
the court will then award compound interest in certain cases according to 
Sempra Metals and therefore the blot on English common law shall be removed 
in full. 
Additionally, this understanding has another advantage: once the insurer’s 
obligation is accepted to be “paying a valid claim within reasonable time” by law 
the late payment, especially the unreasonable delay, could be clearly regarded 
                                                                                                                       
539 For example, see the Australian General Insurance Code of Practice, where advance payment is 
available when certain conditions are met. 
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as a “wrong-doing” and that understanding could open a very important door for 
the future: restitutionary interest and even though there is no clear authority 
which decides that the assured could not make a claim of restitution for interest it 
might be argued that even under current law the assured should be entitled to do 
so as a last resort. 
5.2 The restitutionary interest 
(1) An inspiration from the rate of statutory interest 
5.2.1 It shall be remembered that the rate of the statutory interest is also a 
matter of discretion and the court is granted such power by s.35A (1) and (6) of 
the 1981 Act; and since it has been widely accepted that the award of statutory 
interest is not a matter of punishment but of compensation to the assured for the 
loss of the use of the money540 the court has to consider the appropriate interest 
rate with commercial rates offered by banks and therefore two types of widely 
used rates are often provided by parties in disputes: prime rate and interbank 
offered rate.541 The position was summarized by Steyn J (as he then was) in 
Banque Keyser Ullman SA v. Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd542 that 
“The selection of an appropriate interest rate is a matter of discretion. 
But it is not an entirely open textured discretion”543 
In Tate & Lyle Food and Distribution Ltd v. Greater London Council544 Forbes J 
held that 
                                         
540 For example, see The Popi M and Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3) [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 678. 
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 The prime rate is preferred by the assured while the interbank rate is preferred by the insurer. 
542 The decision on interest was unreported, December 1987. 
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 ibid. 
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“…interest is intended to reflect the rate at which the plaintiff would 
have had to borrow money… The correct thing to do is to take the rate 
at which plaintiffs in general could borrow money… If commercial 
rates are appropriate I would take 1 per cent over the minimum 
lending rate as the proper figure for interest…”545 
This approach was also accepted by Styen J in Banque Keyser and Langley J in 
Kuwait v. Kuwait (No.3)546 but it was held by Langley J that, based on the 
evidence of the case, the assured was able to raise a loan with the US Prime 
Rate and therefore there would be no need for the court to find the minimum 
commercial rate and add 1 percent and accordingly Langley J awarded the 
interest at the rate of the US Prime Rate directly. 
5.2.2 It should be noted that the rate of interest is more economical than legal 
and therefore the general legal position could hardly be summarized since the 
rate of interest has to be decided in accordance with the general economic 
environment during a specific time, the economic position of the claimant and 
the special facts of each case; however, the leading guideline was provided by 
Steyn J (as he then was) in Banque Keyser case, in which he expressed the 
view that 
“The purpose of an award of interest is to achieve restitutio in 
integrum (restitution to the original position).”547 
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However, even though the court could obtain guidance from commercial 
rates from banks, restitution could not be fulfilled by using the statutory 
interest, because even if the claimant borrows the money from the bank at 
the prime rate and that rate is also awarded by the court, there is still a gap: 
the money borrowed by the claimant from the bank is calculated by the 
compound prime rate whilst the interest awarded by the court is on the 
simple prime rate; and more importantly, before the changing of the 
primary obligation of an indemnity insurer that situation would not change. 
Additionally, the definition of statutory interest also sounds like 
compensation for a restitutionary claim: it is not based on fault nor is it a 
form of punishment. However, the words in the statute are clear: no 
compound interest could be awarded by way of statutory interest and in 
order to achieve the purpose of restitution another proposed type of 
interest might be suitable for further consideration: interest-based 
restitutionary claims. 
(2) An inspiration from Sempra Metals 
5.2.3 It has been widely accepted that after Sempra Metals compound interest 
could be awarded for late payment of debt, while the indemnity insurance claim 
is a claim for damages and therefore Sempra Metals could not apply to 
insurance claims directly. However, it needs to be remembered that in Sempra 
Metals the claim was advanced in restitution as well and in fact the House of 
Lords decided the case on the ground of restitution and what was commented 
about debt could only be regarded as a powerful obiter. 
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In Sempra Metals it was decided that the advanced payment wrongfully withheld 
by the IRC was in fact a massive interest-free loan and it was held by Lord Hope 
that 
“…there can be nothing unjust about requiring the Inland Revenue to 
pay compound interest…on the huge interest-free loan constituted by 
Sempra’s payment of ACT.”548 
Therefore, in indemnity insurance claims, it could be argued that once a 
reasonable period of investigation is exhausted, the insurer is in fact holding the 
sum payable under the policy and no wonder that the sum withheld by the 
insurer is very much like the interest-free loan in Sempra Metals and, prima facie, 
there should be no reason to reject the restitutionary claim for compound interest 
by the assured based on the House of Lords decision in Sempra Metals.  
Additionally, it has been widely accepted as well that restitutionary claims could 
be made in cases of multi-causality: they could be made for unjust enrichment 
as well as wrongdoings,549 and once the current unclear position towards the 
primary obligation of the insurer is changed it could be argued that the assured 
could make a claim based on the wrongdoing of the insurer once the payment is 
unreasonably delayed and a claim based on unjust enrichment if the insurer 
does nothing wrong. 
It needs also to be pointed out that once the payment should have become due, 
even if it later turns out that no actual profit is made by the insurer, it could 
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 See Sempra [2007] UKHL 34, at [118] per Lord Nicholls. 
549 See James Edelman, ‘The measure of restitution and the future of restitutionary damages’, Restitution 
Law Review, v.18, 2010 Autumn, p.1-13. 
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nevertheless be argued that the free use of the sum owed to the assured is a 
kind of benefit and therefore the restitutionary claim should be supported 
because the possession of the money is itself a benefit. 
5.2.4 Even under current law, there is no reported case to support the argument 
that the assured should have a chance to raise a restitutionary claim; there are, 
however, obiters from which this argument could find support: firstly, as it has 
been argued above, it was pointed out by Steyn J that interest itself was a 
restitutionary award; additionally support could also be found in the speech 
presented by Lord Walker, who observed that there were different types of 
claims of restitution, especially 
“… (2) personal claims for an account of profits (that is, for a sum 
equal to the profits actually made by the defendant) and (3) personal 
claims for interest which represents (in a more or less conventional 
way) the benefit which the defendant is presumed to have derived 
from money in his hands…”550  
It has be stressed at times in this chapter that even under the current law 
statutory interest is widely accepted to be the money used for compensating the 
loss of the use of the principal sum by the assured, and therefore, it could be 
found that there will be an overlap in restitutionary interest and statutory interest: 
both of them could be used as the compensation for the claimant but the 
statutory interest is calculated by the “loss suffered” by the claimant while the 
restitutionary interest is calculated by the “benefit enriched” by the defendant, 
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and there is no reason why statutory interest is widely accepted and 
restitutionary interest is refused. 
Additionally, under current law, there is no contractual obligation for the insurer 
to pay the claim within a reasonable time, but once the payment is delayed no 
one could deny the fact that the money that should have been obtained by the 
assured is actually withheld by the insurer and therefore an equitable claim for 
restitution should be allowed. 
It might also be noted that due to defects in s.35A of the 1981 Act, the 
restitutionary function could not be achieved in full by statutory interest, while the 
restitutionary interest has no such limitation: by rejecting the limitation in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC551 the House of Lords 
in Sempra Metals held that the restitutionary interest could be awarded in the 
exercise of the court’s common law restitutionary jurisdiction and the court’s 
discretionary equitable jurisdiction in order to provide full compensation to the 
claimant.  
Therefore, it might be suggested that once the restitutionary interest is awarded 
and the court is satisfied that the compensation made from the restitutionary 
interest is enough the court could, based on the discretion granted by s.35A of 
the 1981 Act, refuse to award further statutory interest. 
However, this approach does not mean that discretionary interest is abolished. It 
was decided in Sempra Metals that in order to apply for the restitutionary interest 
the claimant had to plead and prove the loss. Therefore, the statutory interest 
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could still remain as the bottom line as a constructive legal remedy once the 
claimant could not plead or prove the amount suffered by the loss of the use of 
the money. 
(3) The measurement 
5.2.5 It has been discussed above that under current law restitutionary interest 
might be awarded for the assured and once the law is changed, namely when 
the Enterprise Act 2016 comes into force, restitutionary interest should be 
awarded for the assured. Therefore, it is of importance to discuss the 
measurement of restitutionary interest. Before starting the discussion, one 
important distinction should be made in the first place: restitutionary interest is 
not the same as the interest awarded by Lord Denning MR in Danubian552 
because restitutionary interest has no element of damages.553 
However, it is not easy to measure restitutionary interest as it might be measured 
either by restitution for unjust enrichment or restitution for wrongdoing554 and it 
is suggested that the award made for restitution for wrongdoing should be 
counted as “restitutionary damages”.555 It was pointed out by Lord Hope that 
“…the remedy of restitution differs from that of damages. It is the 
gain that needs to be measured, not the loss to the claimant. The 
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 See para 4.2.1 of this work. 
553 This argument is also supported by Lord Walker in Sempra [2007] UKHL 34. 
554 Differences between these two options were talked and discussed in Sempra Metals by Lord Nicholls (at 
[116]), Lord Scott (at [132-146]) and Lord Mance (at [230-231]).  
555 See James Edelman, ‘The measure of restitution and the future of restitutionary damages’, Restitution 
Law Review, v.18, 2010 Autumn, p.1-13. 
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gain needs to be reversed if the claimant is to make good his 
remedy.”556 
Therefore, the difficulty in the measurement of restitutionary interest is in fact the 
measurement of the “gain” of the insurer. 
According to Sempra Metals two ways of measurements are to be chosen: one 
is the actual profit made by the insurer and the other is the constructive profit 
that “should be made” by the insurer. Additionally, it is suggested that both of 
them belong to the idea of “the immediate gain”557 and once the assured makes 
the restitutionary claim due to the insurer’s wrongdoing the court would award 
the constructive profit rather than the actual profit. 
In Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd558 it 
was held by Denning LJ that the restitutionary award for wrongdoing focused 
upon the objective benefit to a person in the defendant’s position rather than the 
actual benefit received by the defendant or the loss suffered by the claimant. 
That decision was approved by Brightman J in Wrotham Park Estate Co v. 
Parkside Homes Ltd559 and Sempra Metals. 
5.2.6 However, this is not the end of the discussion on restitutionary interest, as 
a restitutionary claim could also be made as a profit-stripping claim which will 
focus on the actual profit received by the insurer and this claim is described as 
                                         
556 See Sempra Metals [2007] UKHL 34 at [28], emphasis added. 
557 See James Edelman, ‘The measure of restitution and the future of restitutionary damages’, Restitution 
Law Review, v.18, 2010 Autumn, p.1-13. 
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“disgorgement damages”.560 This argument is supported by an old obiter in 
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company 561  by Lord Blackburn that the 
disgorgement damages could be decided  
“…by the consideration whether the damage has been maliciously 
done, or whether it has been done with full knowledge that the person 
doing it was doing wrong. There could be no doubt that there you 
would say that everything would be taken into view that would go 
most against the wilful wrongdoer…” 
In that case the respondent mined under the appellant’s land innocently but 
caused no damages and the court only awarded nominal damages. However, 
based on the obiter quoted above, the House of Lords suggested that once bad 
faith or sinister intention was found the full profits would be returned to the 
appellant as the disgorgement damages. 
Caution is needed when considering the disgorgement damages as even though 
the word “damages” is used here, the disgorgement damages is not the same as 
the real damages in Hadley v. Baxendale.  
This difference was noticed by Arden LJ in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v. 
Sanofi-Aventis SA562 where Her Ladyship refused to award the disgorgement 
damages as Hadley v. Baxendale damages would be an adequate remedy in 
that case.  
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The disgorgement damages was also noted by Lord Nicholls in Attorney General 
v. Blake563 where his Lordship held that the disgorgement damages would not 
be available if other remedies such as damages, specific performance and 
injunction were adequate. 
In Greenwood v. Bennett564 S promised to B that he would repair the car owned 
by B for £85 but fraudulently sold the car to H. H bought the car in good faith and 
spent a reasonable sum of £226 to repair the car. It was held by the court that 
once the car was recovered by B he was unjustly enriched by £226 and 
therefore Lord Denning MR awarded £226 as the restitutionary award for unjust 
enrichment. 
Based on that case, a deviation should be made here in order to consider a 
situation in which the insurer withholds the money in good faith and therefore 
believes that the assured’s claim is invalid but this belief is subsequently held by 
the court to be wrong. Generally speaking, in that case the court could refuse to 
award the restitutionary interest, but the statutory interest could nevertheless be 
awarded, because objectively speaking the assured is still deprived of the use of 
the money. 
It is also suggested by James Edelman that the award of disgorgement 
damages is of great importance when normal remedies are inadequate to deter 
breach,565 but under current law in insurance this argument will fail as there will 
be no breach even if the insurer intentionally withholds the money. Therefore, 
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under current law a better understanding would be that restitutionary interest 
would be allowed only in the name of wrongdoing or unjust enrichment and 
therefore the award would be quantified by the constructive amount rather than 
actual profit. 
However, once the current law is changed into a better position, namely when 
there is a contractual obligation of the insurer to make the payment within a 
reasonable time, it could be appropriate for the assured to claim the 
disgorgement damages in order to deter the breach. 
5.3 Conclusion 
5.3.1 According to all the discussion above, it can be seen that the award of 
interest is not a simple issue due to the different understanding of the nature of 
statutory interest and restitutionary interest and it needs to be pointed out that 
these two kinds of interest should be awarded at the same time but once the 
restitutionary interest is awarded the court may reduce the amount of statutory 
interest. 
As to the statutory interest, the starting date of the interest is seriously affected 
by the current unprincipled understanding of the primary obligation of the insurer 
and therefore the award of statutory interest in indemnity insurance cases has 
deviated from general principle and in order to reach a better understanding the 
current law should be changed according to the new Enterprise Act 2016 and 
therefore it could be assumed that the application of the statutory simple interest 
shall be limited while the common law compound interest according to Sempra 
Metals could be more suitable.  
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As to restitutionary interest, since there is no contractual obligation of the insurer 
under current law to make the payment in reasonable time, the fact that the 
insurer wrongfully withholds the money should constitute an equitable right of 
the assured to claim restitutionary interest but there is no reported case on this 
point and therefore the argument will remain academic. 
5.3.2 In light of the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2016, the issue about the 
interest in indemnity insurance could be deemed as settled by the new 
legislation, however, it should also be remembered that not all indemnity 
insurance disputes will be referred to court: a great number of insurance 
disputes are subject to arbitration, settlement and other alternative disputes 
resolutions. The legal position of arbitration has been introduced and discussed 
in this work and it is clear that the discretionary power of an arbitrator is greater 
than a judge. In the next chapter, other alternative dispute resolutions will be 
discussed among which the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS) in this 
country and the comparative Australian General Insurance Code of Practice (GI 
COP) are of great importance. 
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Chapter 6 FOS and other remedies 
6.1 Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 
6.1.1 It has been pointed out by the Law Commission that “contracts of 
insurance are ultimately contracts based on trust”.566 Unlike other contracts 
such as a sales contract, the assured pays the premium to the insurer not for 
goods, but for the promise that the agreed payment should be made when the 
insured risk occurs; the Law Commission recommends that in addition to 
changing the legal position about the primary obligation of the insurer, other 
remedies also play very important roles when damage to the assured is caused 
by the late payment of the insurer. 
In chapter 4 and chapter 5 one of the most important remedies, interest, 
(common law, statutory or restitutionary) has been fully introduced and 
discussed and it needs to be noted that there are some other remedies which 
are still available to the assured other than interest and these remedies have 
been introduced by the Law Commission567 as well.  
Therefore, in this chapter other remedies will be introduced and discussed with 
the guidance laid down from the Law Commission Paper. 
Among all the other remedies, the FOS is the most important one for small 
businesses and the natural person. Technically, FOS is not a “remedy” but an 
“alternative dispute resolution (ADR)” and in the first part of this chapter, FOS 
and insurance disputes will be discussed. 
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(1) FOS: the historical development 
6.1.2 In 1981 an organization named the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (the 
IOB) was established voluntarily by some insurers from the market and 
subsequently more insurers joined the organization and became members of the 
IOB. The main purpose of this organization was to provide an alternative dispute 
resolution for the assured against the member in an independent, cheap, fair, 
and reasonable way. The dispute between the assured and the member could 
be dealt with by the board of the IOB and there was no charge to the assured, 
who was also known as the complainant in the IOB dispute resolution. 
Among all ADRs such as arbitration, the IOB had the most significant feature: 
the claim was not necessarily to be solved on a legal basis; in other words the 
claim could be decided based only on the market practice and the special facts 
of the claim; additionally, in R v. IOB, ex parte Aegon Life Assurance Ltd568 it 
was even held by the court that the claim heard before the IOB could not only be 
solved on a non-legal basis, but was also not necessarily subject to the legal 
review, because of the power of the IOB came from the contract between 
members and the IOB. 
Accordingly, the IOB was in fact a self-regulatory organization of insurers and 
since the IOB decisions were not bound by law the aim of flexibility could be 
easily reached; and since the IOB itself was an organization of insurers, which 
could be deemed as market specialists, the decisions could reflect the rules of 
the market better than judgments. It should also be noted that one of the most 
important aims of legal reform was to make the law more suitable for the market 
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practice and, therefore, the IOB could be regarded as the “trailblazer” and the 
“prophet” of legal development at that time. 
6.1.3 In 2000 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was established and 
became the single regulator for financial activities and according to the 
requirement of the FSA the IOB, along with some other organizations, merged 
into a new scheme and that scheme was known as the Financial Ombudsman 
Service (FOS). 
The FSA has the financial supervisory power over FOS even though the FSA 
and FOS are operationally independent, and according to that supervisory 
power the FSA has the right to approve the FOS budget and to decide the levy of 
the fee from FOS members. 
The FOS keeps to its main aim in the same way as its predecessor, the IOB, to 
provide a more convenient ADR for the assured, but the jurisdiction of the FOS 
is considerably wider: all insurance companies are compulsorily regulated by the 
FOS; the complainant is no longer limited to the natural person and it could be 
include small businesses and charities. Additionally, in the days of the IOB, 
unless the beneficiary had the authorization of the assured, a to the IOB, but this 
situation has been changed in FOS: if the beneficiary is a person he can bring 
the claim without the permission of the assured complainant, as the beneficiary 
of the policy, while if the beneficiary is a company, the claim cannot be brought 
directly to FOS without the permission of the original assured. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the government was satisfied with the function and 
activities of the IOB and has brought a wider jurisdiction to the successor of the 
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IOB and the role which is now played by the FOS in the insurance market 
becomes more and more important in insurance claims for small business and 
natural persons, especially consumers. 
6.1.4 In December 2001 the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
came into force and it became the procedural law for activities of FOS. The 
relevant parts of the activities of FOS are Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP) 
2 and 3; in other words, DISP 2 and DISP 3 are the “Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR)” for FOS activities. Even though the law is not binding on FOS 
decisions569, it does not mean that there are no general guidelines when the 
merit of a claim is under consideration and the most useful guideline is the 
Insurance Conduct of Business Rules (ICOB) which is now replaced by the 
Insurance: New Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) and the general 
principle of ICOBS is the same as the aim of both the IOB and FOS: to reach a 
fair and reasonable outcome. 
6.1.5 The importance of FOS and its role as the trailblazer and prophet can be 
found in the development of law on consumer insurance: in 1977 insurance 
contracts were excluded from the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the power 
of the arguments of by the consumer had become weaker since then. However, 
it was noticed by the IOB that this imbalance needed to be resolved in 
accordance with its leading principle that the outcome of an insurance dispute 
should be “fair and reasonable rather than legal” and it subsequently reflected 
that principle in its decisions and made recommendations to reform the law. This 
became a very important incentive for the Consumer Insurance Act 2012 and the 
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accuracy of the IOB and FOS could be found in this well-balanced new statute. 
According to the new Financial Services Act 2012, which amends the FSMA 
2000, the FSA has now been renamed as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
However, the relationship between FOS and the FCA seems to be the same as 
the relationship between FOS and the FSA, that is to say, FOS works 
independently from the FCA, but in order to carry out the function effectively, 
FOS needs also to cooperate with the FCA and the detail is clearly stated in the 
new Memorandum of Understanding.570 In other words, the general principle is 
that the FCA and FOS are to co-operate and communicate constructively to 
carry out independent roles and separate functions in order to benefit both 
consumers of financial services and the industry.  
Even though the FCA is the regulator of the financial markets and its strategic 
objective is to ensure that the relevant markets function well571 along with one of 
the operational objectives to secure an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers,572 it could not deal with individual complaints nor could it investigate 
such complaints, and therefore FOS has a very strong supportive role in 
assisting the FCA in order to make sure that the insurance market is developing 
a right approach. It needs also to be mentioned that, even though the FCA and 
FOS are independent, the FCA’s supervisory power is significant, as both the 
directors and the chairman of FOS could be appointed or removed by the 
FCA,573 and additionally, the FCA sets rules for the compulsory jurisdiction on 
                                         
570 <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/about/MOU_with_FCA-APRIL2013.pdf>, accessed on 2nd Jun 
2014. 
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 See Financial Services Act 2012 (FSA 2012) s.1B (2). 
572 See FSA 2012 s.1B (3)(a). 
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 The appointment or removal of the chairman must be approved by the Treasury. 
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complaint-handling by firms; activities covered; complainants eligible; time limits; 
limits on awards; and levies to cover the establishment and operation of that 
jurisdiction; and once the budget is approved by the FCA, it becomes the 
statutory responsibility for FOS to accept such budget. 
Throughout the reforming and development, the function and the success of the 
FOS was noticed by Rix LJ who expressed a judicial view that 
“For some years the insurance ombudsman (now within the FOS 
scheme) has been developing a new common law of insurance for 
consumer contracts, without which the courts would have been 
constrained to find, or alternatively to reject, solutions to problems 
from which they have been in the main shielded.”574 
Additionally, the accuracy of FOS in relation to damages for late payment could 
also be found in the draft bill of the new Insurance Act 2015 in which the 
damages were originally recoverable. Even though, as was stated in the first 
chapter of this work, the relevant section on damages for late payment was 
intentionally omitted before the House of Lords, it has now been brought back in 
the Enterprise Act 2016.  
(2) FOS and insurance claims 
(a) Introduction 
6.1.6 Any dispute which is brought to FOS is to be dealt with by adjudicators and 
ombudsmen and the way in which they deal with the claim must not only be fast, 
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 R (on the application of Heather Moor & Edgecomb) v. FOS [2008] EWCA Civ 642, at [87]. 
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but also fair and reasonable. These leading principles are now codified in ss.255 
(1) and 228 (2) of the FSMA and DIPS 3.6.1R and 3.6.2G. It also needs to be 
noted that these principles are “pivotal”575 and “override the duty to decide 
matters in accordance with the law”.576  
Accordingly, it could be found that even though the relevant law is a matter which 
has to be considered,577 the FOS award does not need to follow the law, and 
this fact also makes it clear that sometimes the current law is less helpful in 
reaching a fair and reasonable outcome and this is especially true when the 
damages for late payment is considered.578   
After the establishment of FOS and completion of its regulations, FOS has 
become one of the most successful and busiest ombudsman services in the 
world and it is well ahead in its development.579 In 2012/2013 FOS took on a 
record 575,836 new cases in total in 2013, an increase of more than one-third of 
those in 2012580 and among which 49% were in favour of the complainant;581 in 
2014/2015 FOS answered 1,786,973 enquiries from consumers – around 5,000 
each working day 582  and, excluding PPI cases, 53% of complaints were 
resolved within three months. In the first three quarters of 2013/2014 FOS has 
                                         
575 See Dr. Judith P Summer, Insurance Law and the Financial Ombudsman Service (Summer), (Informa 
Law from Routledge 1 Sep 2010), at para 1.8. 
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 ibid. 
577 Relevant issues which need to be considered by FOS in a dispute will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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 This will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
579 See Summer, (Informa Law from Routledge 1 Sep 2010) at para 2.15. 
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 Stuart Collins, ’PPI compensation: Claims drive record number of complaints in 2013’, Insurance Day, 
March 2014. 
581 For the sake of convenience, the assured or the relevant beneficiary from now on will be named as the 
complainant in this chapter. 
582 See <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar15/index.html#a1>, accessed on 20th 
March 20, 2016. 
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dealt with 407,200 disputes, 58% of which were in favour of the complainant583 
while in 2014/2015 this number was increased to 62%.584 According to this 
figure, it is clear that it is not that difficult for the complainant to argue that this is 
a “fair and reasonable” result from FOS. However, in order to present a claim 
before FOS several conditions have to be met and these conditions could also 
be seen as part of the disadvantages of FOS. 
(b) The qualified claim 
6.1.7 According to the rules of the Dispute resolution: Complaints (DISP)585 
2.2.1G FOS will not consider a claim unless the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
Firstly, the claimed event must have happened after 1 December 2001 because 
that is the date when FOS came into existence; 
Secondly, the firm which the claim against must be within the jurisdiction of the 
FOS, as well as the claimed activity. As to the firm, the answer is straightforward 
because it has been mentioned above that all insurers, indemnity or contingency, 
in the UK are in the compulsory jurisdiction of FOS and that is the requirement 
made by law. It could also be presumed that, according to the general principle 
in company law, once the activity is done by a foreign branch of the UK insurer, 
the jurisdiction of FOS will bite; whereas the activity is considered to be outside 
the jurisdiction once it is done by a foreign subsidiary, rather than a branch. 
                                         
583 See <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/115/chart_issue115.pdf>, 
accessed on 6th May 2014. 
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 See <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-news/131/issue131.pdf>, 
accessed on 20th March 20, 2016  
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 See <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DISP.pdf>, accessed on 22
nd
 Sep 2015  
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Additionally, if the majority of clients of a European insurance company are in the 
UK, that insurer could submit the jurisdiction to FOS voluntarily and therefore 
FOS could treat that insurer as if it were one in the UK. Additionally, according to 
the regulation of the FSA some activities of insurance brokers are within the 
jurisdiction of FOS unless 
(1) The broker is a travel agent and the policy is part of a package holiday; 
(2) The broker is handling an insurance claim on behalf of insurers under a 
delegated authority. 
However, as to the targeted activity of the insurer the answer is less 
straightforward as  
“…FOS will dismiss without consideration of merits a question that it 
considers involves a firm’s legitimate exercise of commercial 
judgment”586  
Therefore, once the insurer increases the premium based on reasonable and 
legal grounds when the policy is to be renewed, that activity will not be 
considered on its merit by FOS; however, once the activity breaches some 
codes or self-regulation rules such as the ABI guideline, FOS will interfere.  
Thirdly, the claim must be made by an eligible complainant and this requirement 
could be deemed one of the most significant disadvantages of FOS. The eligible 
complainant could be classified into two types: the basic complainant and the 
group complainant. 
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The qualified basic complainant is developed and broadened from the IOB and 
according to DISP 2.7.3R it could be a person, a small business which has a 
turnover less than £1m and a charity. Subsequently, a small business is 
redefined by the Payment Services Directive587 as a business which has less 
than 10 staff and a turnover of less than 2m Euro. 
The qualified group complainant is to some extent hard to define and according 
to a reported FOS award588 it was held that an employee could bring a claim 
against the insurer who provided a health policy for not only the complainant 
employee but also other employees, provided that the complainant employee 
could benefit from the group scheme. This issue is important as a group policy 
could not only cover the health of employees where the policy is a contingency 
one, but also properties of employees where the policy is an indemnity one and 
which is the main purpose of this work.  
In order to decide whether the group policy is for the benefit of the employee 
rather than the company, FOS has to consider the operation of the policy and 
“It is likely to be for the benefit of the employee if the benefits are paid 
or provided direct to him without the employer exercising any practical 
discretion over them, if the employee is involved in the claims process, 
and if the employer is only contractually obliged to pay benefits to the 
employee if the insurer accepts the claim”589 
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(c) The time bar 
6.1.8 According to the requirement of DISP 2.8.1R, in order to bring a claim to 
FOS, the complainant has to exhaust the remedy from the insurer by its internal 
dispute resolution and if the argument of the complainant is rejected, the insurer 
is required to provide a final response to the complainant to explain the reason. 
According to DISP 1.6.2R a qualified final response should contain a summary 
of the complaint, the outcome and the investigation of the insurer as well as the 
insurer’s acknowledgement of its own fault. If the insurer intends to make an 
offer of settlement, it should be recorded in the response as well. Additionally, 
the most important part of the final response is to remind the complainant that 
the dispute should be referred to FOS within six months and if the insurer fails to 
do so, the time bar will not apply and the assured could claim even after six 
months. If the insurer believes that the issue raised by the complaint is outside 
the jurisdiction of FOS, this issue should also be recorded in the response, but 
the insurer has to make it clear that the jurisdiction is to be decided by FOS 
rather than the insurer.  
Once the complainant goes to FOS directly without exhausting the internal 
remedy, FOS would not reject the complaint but it would transfer the complainant 
along with the relevant materials to the insurer. Once the complaint is referred to 
the insurer, but there is no final response after eight weeks from the date of 
submission, the complainant can refer the dispute directly to FOS. 
Therefore, it can be seen that FOS takes a strict view against the insurer’s claim 
handling stage as the final response is in fact a requirement and a reminder that 
the insurer should deal with the claim in a reasonable way within a certain period 
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of time. Before November 2007, it was required by the FSA that an insurer 
needed to notify the assured that it was under the jurisdiction of the FOS, but 
now there is no such a requirement. This change is questionable as it in fact 
postpones the acknowledgment of the existence of FOS to the complaint stage; 
and because it is common ground that FOS is a very important remedy for an 
eligible complainant, without such knowledge some of the potential 
complainants, in fear of the strong power of the insurer, might not even raise a 
complaint against the insurer through its internal procedure, let alone through 
the FOS. 
Therefore, it could be suggested that since the insurer has a better knowledge 
about the requirements of eligibility of a complainant to the FOS the insurer, in 
the underwriting stage, should have an obligation to disclose the jurisdiction of 
FOS if it believes that the assured is a potentially eligible complainant.  
Unless there are certain special circumstances,590 the complaint to FOS will be 
time barred after six years after the disputed activity or three years after the date 
when the complainant knows or has reasonable ground to know that the 
complaint could be referred to FOS. Since FOS is a non-legal based service, the 
legal time bar will not be stopped by a complaint to FOS, even though it seems 
to be unwise to bring a claim to the court while the FOS is in operation. 
Accordingly, once the insurer delays the payment or if the assured believes the 
speed for handling the claim is slow, it would be better if the assured begins the 
internal complaint resolution at an early stage, as it could force the insurer to 
speed up the process or to give a reasonable answer to the assured.  
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269 
 
(d) Dealing with the claim in FOS 
6.1.9 In order to be friendlier to the eligible complaint, there is no official 
requirement in FOS about how a complaint should be made. A complainant 
could even start a complaint by telephone and the staff of FOS will send the 
telephone complaint form to the complainant and the latter will check the 
correctness and sign the form and then return it to FOS.  
It has been mentioned that one of the most significant features of the FOS award 
is its efficiency, but in order to achieve that, FOS has to make some concessions 
and therefore most of the complaints are dealt with on a paper basis. It is 
commented by Dr. Judith P Summer that 
“The FOS is a sophisticated body dealing primarily with paper 
claims.”591 
Therefore, it is understandable that FOS rarely holds oral hearings and one of 
the most important rationales for that approach can be found in Heather Moor & 
Edgecomb Ltd v the United Kingdom592 a new case decided by the European 
Court of Human Rights where it was held that 
“…the fact that proceedings are of considerable significance for an 
applicant … is not decisive for the necessity of a hearing ... The court 
accepts that the relevant issues of fact and law could be adequately 
addressed in, and decided on the basis of, written submissions.” 
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There has been no published number of oral hearings recently, but in the 
FOS Annual Review 2009/10 there were less than 20 oral hearings among 
166,321 resolved complaints.593 Recently, in R (on the application of 
Calland) v. FOS594 it was confirmed by Males J that an oral hearing had to 
be held only when that was necessary to determine the dispute in question.  
Another concession in FOS is that it has no power for the 
cross-examination of witnesses, and therefore if either party believes that 
cross-examination is necessary the court is the better place to go.  
6.1.10 Once a complaint reaches FOS it will be considered by the 
adjudicator and the ombudsman on its merit subject to two exceptions. 
The first exception is set out in DISP 3.3.4R. Once a fair presentation is 
made by the complainant, orally or on paper, and the FOS believes that the 
case falls within one of the 18 circumstances in DISP 3.3.4R, the complaint 
will be dismissed without considering the merits. If the insurer wishes to 
avoid the FOS jurisdiction after the late payment, it will be better if a fair and 
reasonable settlement is provided to the complainant595 or if the insurer 
can prove that the late payment is still commercially reasonable.596 
The other exception is that if the FOS believes that the court is the better 
place to go to rather than to FOS itself. This will happen when the 
complainant becomes a test case597 and this will be decided within the 
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guidelines set out in DISP 3.3.6G598; or if the insurer promises that it will 
provide the legal costs to the complainant.599 However, this exception 
rarely happens.600 
(e) The FOS award 
6.1.11 In an award made by the FOS the facts and circumstances of the 
particular complainant will be considered on the civil law standard, the balance 
of probability, in order to reach a fair and reasonable outcome. It should be noted 
that the general principle of the IOB is maintained but with some changes 
because the ombudsman has to consider the relevant law and regulations and 
codes of practice and industry practice.601 The requirement of considering 
relevant codes of practice and industry practice is axiomatic, as without such 
consideration the award could never be described as “fair and reasonable”; 
however, the consideration of the relevant law is a little difficult to understand 
because in the age of the IOB it was found that the law was unnecessary for a 
fair and reasonable outcome if good insurance practice was properly considered. 
Additionally, it needs to be noted that some ombudsmen have no legal training 
background and it would be difficult for them to consider the relevant law.  
Therefore, Stanley Burnton J tried to solve the problem and it was held in R (on 
the application of IFG) v. FOS602 that even though it was necessary for the 
ombudsman to consider the relevant law, he could deviate from the relevant 
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legal principle, if he thought the deviation was helpful for a fair and reasonable 
outcome. According to this judgment, the effects of DISP 3.6.4R (1) and s.228 of 
FSMA are seriously diluted because the ombudsman could treat the 
consideration of the law as a formality; it could be stated in the FOS award that “I 
have considered the relevant legal principle” but in fact he has not; and since the 
requirement of DISP 3.6.4R (1) and s.228 of the FSMA remains in name only, 
there should be no problem abolishing them. 
This suggestion was supported by R (on the application of Heather Moor & 
Edgecomb) v. FOS.603 Firstly, the Court of Appeal confirmed the IFG decision 
that a FOS award was not bound by law; secondly, it was found by the court that 
in the award the ombudsman stated that 
“While I have taken into account the relevant law, I have determined 
this complaint based on what, in my opinion, is fair and reasonable 
bearing in mind all the circumstances of this case.”604 
The Court of Appeal also found in the award that the issue on the “school of 
thought” was raised by the insurer before FOS and the ombudsman made some 
comments on that issue in the award; the Court of Appeal then satisfied itself 
that the ombudsman had considered the relevant law clearly. 
Accordingly, it could be said that the court has a relaxed attitude towards the 
requirement of considering the relevant law and it could also be further argued 
that that requirement should be regarded as a formality. Since the FOS award is 
not required to be made by law, there is no reason to make the requirement of 
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considering the relevant law as a compulsory duty of the ombudsman. 
Alternatively, it would be better if the relevant law is a matter of the ombudsman’s 
discretion and should be provided by the parties in the dispute. 
6.1.12 Although currently the requirement of considering the relevant law has not 
caused many problems, once the jurisdiction of FOS has broadened so that 
more sophisticated cases can be involved then problems may appear. Therefore, 
it will be important to regard the requirement of considering the relevant law 
positively by the ombudsman as a matter of discretion, but once the relevant law 
is provided by the parties the ombudsman has to make a comment or 
explanation about whether the law is fair and reasonable for the complaint.  
The Heather Moor case is also of great importance when damage for late 
payment is considered as, although apparently unfair, no damage for late 
payment is legally available at this moment. Even though the primary and 
secondary obligation of the insurer is a relevant issue which the ombudsman 
should consider, it is fortunate for the complainant that the ombudsman is not 
bound by The Lips or The Fanti, let alone the notorious Sprung.  
6.1.13 Once either of the parties is unsatisfied with the award, a written 
response should be provided to the independent assessor of FOS within three 
months after the award. The independent assessor will not reopen the case, but 
he will investigate the service provided by FOS and report the proposed final 
award to the Chief Ombudsman. If the Chief Ombudsman does not accept the 
decision of the independent assessor, the award should then be made by the 
Board of FOS; however, it never happens in practice. 
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Unlike an IOB award, a FOS award could be judicially reviewed; however, a 
judicial review will generally focus on the way in which the award is reached 
rather than on the individual facts and merits of the complaint605 unless there is 
a serious error which deprives the award of its rationality. In R (on the application 
of Garrison Investment Analysis) v. FOS the court had a chance to reopen the 
case and interfere with the reasoning of the ombudsman because it was held 
that the award was entirely unconnected with the facts.   
It is also unwise for the complainant to start a judicial review too abruptly, 
because, compared with FOS, the legal requirement for presenting a case is 
much stricter, and it is rightly pointed out by Summer that 
“A common feature of these ‘failing’ cases is the judge’s criticism of 
the claimant’s argument, conduct, attitudes and evidence.”606 
6.1.14 Recently in R (on the application of Calland) v. FOS 607  Males J 
expressed some judicial comments on challenging the FOS awards. The learned 
judge pointed out the three most useful grounds for a successful challenge: 
failure to reach a determination of the case within a reasonable time, failure to 
hold an oral hearing when it was necessary and overall unfairness. It can be 
seen that the first two grounds for challenging an award are based on FOS 
procedure and the third ground is based on the merit of the outcome. 
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As to the first ground, Males J pointed out that the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of both parties and the manner in which the matter was dealt with by 
FOS had to be considered.608 It needs to be pointed out that these issues could 
be mutually affected by each other. In that case, the ombudsman spent over six 
years dealing with the complaint even though it was found by both the judge and 
the ombudsman that, according to the facts of the case, it could hardly be 
counted as a complex one. However, it was pointed out by the judge that since 
the claimant complainant raised the jurisdictional and procedural points 
repeatedly, along with a threat of litigation which never happened before the final 
award was made by the ombudsman, the case became much more complicated 
than it should have been; and accordingly the judge also found that due to the 
conduct of the complainant the ombudsman had to spend more time considering 
unnecessary issues. Therefore, the judge reached the conclusion, without any 
hesitation that the substantial delay was principally caused by the claimant’s own 
conduct even though the ombudsman delayed as well for some eight months.  
As to the oral hearing, it has been pointed out above that an oral hearing is 
unnecessary for each case and that whether an oral hearing should be held is a 
matter for the ombudsman’s decision with which the court would rarely interfere. 
As to the matter of fairness, the judge found that the claimant was fully 
compensated and therefore there was no unfairness. 
6.1.15 Additionally, once the complainant is unsatisfied with the speed of FOS, it 
is still unwise for him to present the case to the court directly while the procedure 
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of FOS is in operation. This can be illustrated by Tonkin.609 In that case, the 
complainant was aware that the loss adjustment stage by FOS would take some 
time and a claim was nevertheless brought to the court. Subsequently, the FOS 
dismissed the complainant due to the concurrent litigation and the court held that 
the time which had been spent waiting for the FOS adjustment did not carry any 
interest because the cause of the delay was the complainant’s misconduct. 
6.1.16 Before 1st January 2012 the limits of the FOS award was up to £100,000 
and according to Bunney v. Burns Anderson plc610 it was held that the amount 
which exceeded the limits was unenforceable, although it could nevertheless be 
regarded as a recommendation. Afterwards, the statutory cap of the FOS award 
increased to £150,000 and such award was binding on insurers but not assureds. 
It could be found from the increased limit that the weight of the role which FOS 
plays in the insurance market has become more and more important.   
However, even the increased limit is not absolute: like the voluntary jurisdiction, 
the parties could mutually agree611 that FOS could have the jurisdiction to make 
an award over £150,000 and it will then bind both parties. In case 74/10612 the 
ombudsman notified both parties that the statutory limit (at that time) was 
£100,000 and in that case the award might exceed that amount; the insurer 
confirmed that the full amount would be paid and then the limit was breached but 
the award was still binding. 
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It has been mentioned that the FOS deals with each complainant independently; 
therefore unlike case law the FOS awards are independent from each other, but 
it could be said nevertheless that the FOS awards are “practically binding”.  
6.1.17 The effect of the FOS award is stated in s.228 (5) of FSMA that 
“If the complainant notifies the ombudsman that he accepts the 
determination, it is binding on the respondent and the complainant 
and final.” 
According to s.229 (8) of the FSMA, the award can be enforced by the courts. 
The FOS award is then binding on both parties unless there is a successful 
judicial review. If the insurer refuses to pay the award, the FOS will assist the 
complainant and the court will also make a judgment or issue an injunction. 
In Clark v. In Focus Asset Management613 it was held that a complainant to FOS 
who accepted the award could not get any additional compensation by means of 
litigation if the cause of action remained the same; and if the complainant 
insisted on the litigation the court was entitled to strike out the claim, and the 
complainant could not recover any more than the FOS award. It was further held 
that the reservation of the right to litigate subsequently when accepting the FOS 
award had no effect, no matter whether the statutory maximum was reached or 
not. 
In that case the complainant was awarded £100,000 by the FOS plus a 
recommendation that the defendant to pay the full amount of the loss suffered by 
the complainant, the Clarks. The award was accepted, but a reservation of the 
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right to seek the balance through litigation was made by the Clarks and then the 
litigation for the rest of the loss began. At the first trial, it was held by Cranston J 
that the doctrine of merger did not apply to the FOS award as FOS itself was not 
a court, but a scheme to deal with complaints rather than with causes of 
actions,614 and then judgment was given for the Clarks. In the Court of Appeal, 
the issue of merger was not argued, but the defendant relied upon the doctrine 
of res judicata and succeeded. Arden LJ, who gave the leading judgment, took 
two approaches to apply the doctrine of res judicata: to interpret the “cause of 
action” broadly and to interpret s.228 (5) of the FSMA strictly.  
As to the cause of action, Arden LJ held that even though Rix LJ was right to say 
that the ombudsman was dealing with complaints rather than a “legal” cause of 
action, it was nevertheless sufficient that a complaint itself could be named as 
the cause of action for the purpose of res judicata.615 
As to the effect of s.228 (5) of the FSMA, Arden LJ accepted the argument that 
FOS was a scheme with a certain amount of limit which was well known by 
complainants and complainants were also free to reject the award; and therefore 
when Parliament was silent Arden LJ made a presumption that s.228 (5) of the 
FSMA must be strictly interpreted and Parliament did not intend complainants to 
be able to bring legal proceedings when they accepted FOS awards.616 
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(3) FOS and late payment 
6.1.18 FOS takes a strict approach on the claim handling stage of an insurer. It is 
pointed out that 
“The FOS does not like insurers to cite different reasons for rejecting 
a claim at different times, rather than all together. The FOS may 
penalize non-compliance with [fairness and reasonableness]”617 
Therefore, it will not be surprising if FOS treats insurers strictly when damage is 
caused due to the insurer’s unreasonable late payment. In the response to the 
Law Commission FOS suggests that it will compensate the effects of late 
payment in three ways: interest, distress & inconvenience and damages.618 
(a) Interest in FOS awards 
6.1.19 Since the main aim of the FOS award is to provide a fast and convenient 
solution to the complaint, when the complainant cannot prove the actual interest 
loss the FOS will generally award a simple interest of 8% from the date when the 
payment should have been paid to the date of the award.619 As it has been 
argued in previous chapters of this work, in order to provide full compensation 
the interest should be calculated on a compound basis; it could be suggested 
that in order to reach a fair and reasonable outcome, the interest in FOS awards 
should be calculated on a compound basis as well. In fact, FOS is prepared to 
                                         
617
 See Summer, (Informa Law from Routledge 1 Sep 2010), at para 2.28. 
618 See Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 6: Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good 
Faith (n.106), at para 6.3. 
619
 For recent indemnity insurance examples see FOS DRN1545885, DRN1545885,for a life insurance 
example, see FOS DRN2386314, available on <http://www.ombudsman-decisions.org.uk/>, accessed 
on 20
th
 March 20, 2016. 
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award compound interest in investment claims.620 Therefore, it will be presumed 
that if the insurance policy is partly a kind of investment, or if the complainant 
could prove the actual interest loss, the interest rate and its basis could be 
modified by FOS. 
(b) Distress and Inconvenience (d&i damages) 
6.1.20 Once the insurer’s late payment causes distress and inconvenience the 
FOS will, in appropriate circumstances, require the insurer to pay the d&i 
damages to the assured. The assured is not limited to persons, as the FOS 
treats sole traders and partnerships the same as personal customers. However, 
limited companies are excluded from d&i damages, because even though they 
may experience inconvenience due to the insurer’s late payment, they could not 
“suffer” distress or pain. 
There are three tiers of d&i damages: modest (less than £300),621 significant 
(£300 to £999) and exceptional (£1,000 or more) and the aim is to compensate 
rather than penalize622 and the detailed requirement of each tier can be easily 
found online.623 
                                         
620 See Ombudsman News Issue 33, available on 
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman.htm>, accessed on 22
nd
 Sep 2015. 
621
 It needs to be noted that the modest damage is not necessarily a pecuniary one, it could be an order to 
send flowers or to apologise, but in a recent FOS decision, a £200 d&i damages was awarded, see FOS 
DRN1545885 (n. 604) DRN 4505323, where a £100 damages was awarded; in DRN 5100827 the 
complainant was awarded £150 d&i damages and £50 damages for poor claim handling methods in a 
building insurance dispute in which the complainant was unable to live in the damaged house as 
originally planned, a similar conclusion was also reached in DRN 6238474. 
622 See Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 6: Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good 
Faith (n.106), at para 6.5. 
623<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/distress-and-inconvenience.htm#
19>, accessed on 20 May 2014. 
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(c) Damages 
6.1.21 Unlike the court, FOS is not bound by court decisions such as The Lips, 
The Fanti, and The Italia Express (No.2); therefore, the situation in Sprung will 
never happen in a FOS award. Not surprisingly, FOS regards the insurer’s 
primary obligation as one to pay claims within a reasonable time rather than hold 
the assured harmless by preventing the loss, and therefore once the insurer 
breaches such obligation FOS will certainly award pecuniary damages as the 
secondary obligation subject, of course, to the limit of £150,000. Additionally, it is 
suggested by FOS that in exceptional circumstances the foreseeable rule will be 
breached; that is to say, when the loss is unforeseeable when the policy is 
entered into, but foreseeable when the claim is made, 624  damages shall 
nevertheless be awarded by FOS. The rationale behind this approach is simple, 
namely, that that kind of loss is not absolutely “unforeseeable” but a loss caused 
by the insurer’s behaviour and therefore the insurer will be liable. 
(d) The balance 
6.1.22 In the FOS case 33/3 an insurer had overpaid the assured on the first 
claim. When the second legitimate claim was sent before the insurer, it was 
insisted on by the insurer that no money should be paid unless the overpayment 
was returned. In that case, FOS was prepared to award the assured foreseeable 
damages caused by these strong-arm tactics. 
                                         
624 See Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 6: Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of 
Good Faith (n.106), at para 6.15. 
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(4) Summary 
6.1.23 According to the discussion of the FOS above, it can be seen that the 
FOS could be regarded as a more appropriate scheme for achieving a 
reasonable and fair result, and approaches taken by the FOS should be 
regarded as significant guidelines for legal reform. 
6.2 The Australian General Insurance Code of Practice  
(1) Introduction to the Code 
6.2.1 It was stated in the last chapter that in Australia the General Insurance 
Code of Practice has a significant position as a market regulator with more 
self-regulatory features than that of FOS in the UK and accordingly it is 
necessary to discuss the Code of Practice in this work to provide valuable cross 
references for the English insurance market. 
At the beginning, it should be remembered that the General Insurance Code of 
Practice (the Code) has a limited application: it does not apply to reinsurance, 
marine insurance or other insurance which is governed by government statute or 
specific rules. The Code is a self-regulatory regulation for the insurance industry, 
which binds all general (non-life) insurers who sign it and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) have commented that the code 
plays 
“…an important part in how financial products and services are 
regulated in Australia”625 
                                         
625 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 183: Approval of Financial Services Sector Codes of Conduct (March 2013), 
available on 
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On 3rd May 2012 the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) appointed Mr. Ian 
Enright to review the Code and after about 12 months an important document 
was released,626 which had a great influence on the 2014 Code.627 It is well 
known that, prima facie, the Code is a self-regulation of the insurance market; it 
is not legislation or normal market practice, but it is well believed that the Code 
should have the principal place in the general insurance market in Australia. 
As to the general role of the Code, it is rightly pointed out that the function of the 
Code is to provide 
“…a regime of co-regulation where statutory provisions provide the 
enforcement and broad principles for regulation, but the details are 
left to more flexible industry-based Codes and dispute resolution 
arrangements”628  
The reason why such a self-regulation code is so important that it could be the 
principal rule in the general insurance market, is because the Code is regarded 
as a very important standard for the insurer’s behaviour even before the court, 
provided that the assured acts in a reasonable belief that the insurer is bound by 
                                                                                                                       
<http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-183-approval-of-fin
ancial-services-sector-codes-of-conduct/>, accessed on 13
th
 Nov 2014, at para 183.1. 
626 Ian Enright, ‘General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review 2013’, available on 
<http://www.insurancecouncil.com.au/assets/report/GI%20COP%20Independent%20Review%20Final
%20Report%202012-13.pdf>, accessed on 18th Nov 2014. 
627 Available on <http://codeofpractice.com.au/document>, accessed on 18th Nov 2014. 
628
 Financial System Inquiry, Discussion Paper (Nov 1996), available on 
< http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/DiscussionPaper.asp>, accessed on 19
th Nov 2014, at Overview page 
xix.  
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the Code 629 , and from this aspect, the Code could be regarded as a 
“benchmark”630 of the insurer’s conduct. 
(2) Historical Development 
6.2.2 The first version of the Code was developed by the Insurance Council of 
Australia (ICA) in 1994 in order to raise the standard of the general insurance 
service. In 2009 the Code was reviewed and was then amended in 2012: one of 
several major amendments631 which was relevant to this work was to make sure 
that the signatories of the Code were liable to provide appropriate training and 
education for their employers so that they could understand the requirements of 
the Code632 and comply with it in the insurance business. In the latest review of 
the code, Mr. Enright raises this issue again633 and clearly and rightly points out 
the importance: 
“…even with the considerable work to date and continuing, the ICA, 
Code Participants and the Code Governance Body must redouble 
their resources and efforts in training and education. The terms of the 
Code are a clanging symbol only, if the performance of Code 
Participants, employees, agents and Service Suppliers who work with 
customers and the community do not understand and implement the 
spirit and the standards in the Code.”634 
                                         
629
 ASIC Act, s.12CC (1) (h). 
630 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at para 6.22. 
631
 For a detailed information of the changes, see General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review 
(n. 613), at para 6.30-6.37. 
632 Especially s.3.6.7 of the 1994 Code. 
633
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at para 2.6. 
634 ibid, see also Insurance Law Service, Joint Consumer Submission to the General Insurance Code of 
Practice Independent Review 2012 Issues Paper (Nov 2012), available on 
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Another very important improvement from the 1994 Code to the 2012 Code is 
about the claim: even though both Codes require the insurer to act with good 
faith, in the 2012 Code it stresses the “honest, efficient, fair, transparent and 
timely manner”,635 and it adds a time limit for claim handling, which requires the 
insurer to make a decision within 4 months (in exceptional circumstances 12 
months),636 even though both Codes require the insurer to give reasons when a 
claim is rejected. As a security of the Code, it is required by the 2012 Code that 
each signatory must have an internal complaints board for claims for breaching 
the Code; and, very similar to FOS in the UK, once the assured still feels 
unsatisfied, that claim will be heard by the Australian FOS. However, unlike the 
FOS in England, the Australian FOS does not make sanctions for Code 
breaches itself directly, but it only passes its interim decision to the CCC (Code 
Compliance Committee) and the final decision is to be made by the CCC. 
(3) The Review 
6.2.3 In the independent review of the 2012 Code, Mr. Ian Enright starts with the 
nature of the Code: a self-regulatory rule. It has been mentioned above that it is 
now accepted that a self-regulatory rule should play the principal role in the 
market, but how has that conclusion been reached? 
It is well known that insurance is governed by several statutes and common law, 
and accordingly self-regulation may seem redundant; but ASIC does not agree 
and then provides that a self-regulatory code could 
                                                                                                                       
<http://www.humanservices.gov.au/spw/corporate/government-initiatives/centrepay-review/resources/s
ubmission-29-cclc.pdf>, accessed on 19
th
 Nov 2014, at pp.13-14. 
635 See the 2012 Code, ss.3.5 and 3.7. 
636
 These requirements are maintained in the 2014 Code, see below. 
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“...raise standards and to complement the legislative 
requirements that already set out.... We expect an effective code to 
do at least one of the following:   
• Address specific industry issues and consumer problems not 
covered by legislation;   
• Elaborate upon legislation to deliver additional benefits to 
consumers; and/or   
• Clarify what needs to be done from the perspective of a particular 
industry or practice or product to comply with legislation.”637 
No wonder ASIC’s statement is correct in saying that a self-regulatory code, 
especially in the insurance industry, could raise the legislative standards and put 
more weight on consumer protection; and from a broader point of view, the word 
“consumer” in the regulation could be rightly replaced, in insurance criteria, by 
“beneficiaries of the service supplier” so that both the original assured and the 
third party beneficiary could be protected by the Code. 
6.2.4 As a matter of fact, the Code was not that promising in its development. 
The self-regulation in general insurance used to be described as hindsight of 
securities and investment and it had no principal place in the market and it was 
even described as 
“…an orphan child of good intentions and political compromise.”638 
                                         
637 See ASIC Regulatory Guide 183: Approval of financial services sector codes of conduct (ASIC RG 183), 
available on 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-183-approval-of-fin
ancial-services-sector-codes-of-conduct/>, accessed on 19
th
 Nov 2014, at RG 183.5, emphasis added. 
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Subsequently, in 2000, a taskforce published a final report on self-regulation 
according to the market practice at that time.639 In that report the importance of 
self-regulation (general insurance included) was well noted and the Taskforce 
stated that 
“Industry self-regulation is increasingly being seen as an alternative 
means of promoting fair trading, ethical conduct and streamlining 
compliance with agreed product and service standards in an industry. 
While industry self-regulation can advance consumer confidence in 
products and individual companies, it also can promote good 
business practices.”640 
It was also found by the Taskforce that customers of the industrial services 
should participate in making and reforming the self-regulation.641 Along with the 
Taskforce, ASIC also noticed the importance of self-regulation and made some 
political and legislative amendments to self-regulation. It was once pointed out 
by Jillian Segal, deputy chair of ASIC then, that  
“For self-regulation to be effective, it needs to be properly integrated 
into the overall regulatory framework ... It needs to dovetail with the 
law and the regulator’s policies — not repeating or confusing 
                                                                                                                       
638
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review (n. 613) at para 7.20. 
639 Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, ‘Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets (August 2000)’, 
available on <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1131/PDF/final_report.pdf>, accessed on 20th 
Nov 2014. 
640 ibid, at p.17. 
641
 ibid, at pp.75,87,104. 
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requirements, but assisting and possibly extending them in some 
areas.”642  
This statement also reveals the fact that good self-regulation could not only 
explain the law, but also improve the standard of a relevant industry. As to the 
insurance industry, it was found by ASIC that self-regulation was necessary for 
customers to deal with “hot issues”.643 After these endeavours, the importance 
of self-regulation has now been well recognized and it could certainly justify the 
existence of the Code, and the key advantages are: 
1. The self-regulation is developed by the market (with some assistance from 
customers and government agency); it is more willing to be followed by the 
market. 
2. The self-regulation, compared with relevant law, is more practical and 
effective. 
3. It is axiomatic to say that a self-regulatory code provides a cheaper, faster and 
more accessible alternative dispute resolution. 
6.2.5 In the independent review, submissions were asked for about whether the 
2012 Code had provided adequate functions and in some of the submissions 
shortcomings of the Code were pointed out. 
6.2.6 In almost all submissions, it was pointed out that even though the Code 
worked, there was nevertheless a possibility to stress the existence of the Code 
                                         
642
 Jillian Segal, ‘Speech to the National Institute for Governance Twilight Seminar, Canberra’, 8 November 
2001, cited by General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review (n. 613), at para 7.25. 
643
 For example, natural disasters such as flood and earthquake make the Code known to assureds. 
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to customers644. It is very important to put this issue in first place because the 
awareness is the basis for wider application of the Code: without proper 
awareness the Code itself is nothing but a piece of paper and the latent power of 
the remedy645 rendered by it will also be ineffective. It was even suggested by 
some insurers that this aim could be achieved by improved measures taken by 
the Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) such as through a customer-friendly 
website, and with some help from insurers.646 It is therefore recommended that 
the Code should be promoted by the ICA as well as the Code participants, and 
there should be a body set up by the reformed Code to organize and coordinate 
the job.647  
6.2.7 In order to facilitate the application and the promotion of the Code, it is 
axiomatic that the Code should be stated in a simple and clear structure, and 
plain English should be used and this suggestion was made during the review; 
and in the latest version of the Code that standard has been maintained.648 
6.2.8 One of the fundamental characteristics of the Code is that it is voluntary for 
insurers to participate. During the consultation it was suggested the Code should 
apply compulsorily to all general insurance providers and the Australian 
Financial Services License (AFSL) holders.649 It needs to be noted that this 
suggestion may harm the reputation of the Code among insurers and will act 
against the spirit of self-regulation. However, even though this issue could not be 
                                         
644 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review (n. 613), at para 9.1-9.6. 
645
 For example, the deterrent effect of sanctions made by FOS. 
646 For example it is suggested by Suncorp that thanks to the Insurance Amendment Contracts Act 2013, 
insurers could deliver electronic versions of the Code to their customers easily with no extra cost. 
647
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review (n. 613), at pp. 70-71. 
648 ibid, at p.73. 
649
 ibid, at p.74. 
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lifted alone, it could be achieved by another way: that is to say, once the 
awareness of the Code is enhanced, assureds may become aware that there 
are so many advantages to the Code and they may prefer doing business with 
the Code participants and this commercial reality could invite more and more 
AFSL holders to join the Code “voluntarily”. 
It needs to be pointed out here that in Australia insurance brokers are governed 
by the National Insurance Brokers Association Code (the NIBA Code) and the 
spirit of the NIBA Code is in line with principles in the General Insurance Code, 
although the coverage of the latter will not extend to brokers, but the Code does 
cover both retail insurance and wholesale insurance; additionally, since the 
Code is specially designed for general insurance and general insurance only, 
there is no intention to expand the Code coverage to marine insurance or 
reinsurance. 
6.2.9 Among all the consultation issues this is probably the most debatable one. 
It was argued by insurers650 that should the Code become contractual terms, 
the flexibility of the Code would disappear and be replaced by “legalistic” 
interpretation, which was not in line with the spirit of self-regulation, and currently 
the sanctions provided by the Australian FOS are sufficient to protect customers, 
especially consumers. However, the Insurance Law Service (ILS) did not agree. 
It was advocated by the ILS that, without the compulsory application requirement 
by law and monetary sanctions for non-compliance651, the Code was “weak and 
unenforceable”. 
                                         
650 Insurance Australia Group (IAG) and Suncorp. 
651
 Notably, the monetary sanction will not go to the assured but to the government agency. 
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As with the issue of coverage, this issue could also be analysed with market 
practice. The reputation of an insurer has become more important in the modern 
insurance market, and the latent power of the Code Compliance Committee 
(CCC) should not be undermined652 and an example is appropriate to be added 
here to explain the effect of this power: a Code Participant agreed with the 
corrective action provided by the CCC and made an extra $5.3m payment to the 
assured due to the Code breach 653  and this outcome also supports the 
importance of the awareness of the Code. Additionally, this case also proves that 
the latent power of the CCC could achieve the aim of monetary sanctions: 
deterrence, but without the side effect654 of imposing monetary sanctions as a 
result of the Code breach. According to s.11F of the Insurance Amendment 
Contracts Act 2013 the deterrent effect could also be achieved by the power of 
ASIC over the insurer’s Australian Financial Service License (AFSL) and this 
newly-developed sanction also makes monetary sanctions redundant. 
Therefore, the compulsory incorporation and monetary sanction of the Code 
should not be recommended considering the fact that the Code is made up of 
principles, ethical principles and guidelines and the whole point of this kind of 
structure is flexibility, which will be ruined by compulsory incorporation. 
6.2.10 This issue has been stressed at the beginning of this chapter; it is 
recommended that the training and education should be enhanced, not only as a 
requirement of market practice, but also of the Australian Corporation Act 2001, 
                                         
652 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at para 9.53. 
653 CCC Annual Report 2011–2012, pp 9 and 53. 
654
 The side effects could be complexity, confusion and significant extra cost, see General Insurance Code 
of Practice Independent Review, at para 9.57. 
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and this aim should be achieved by the co-operation between participants and 
the Training and Education committee. 
Claim handling 
6.2.11 It is axiomatic to point out that the standard of the claim handling is the 
core of the Code, and it is not an exaggeration to admit that all the reviewed 
issues are to make sure that the Code can provide a satisfactory standard of 
claim handling and that standard shall be followed and improved in the new 
edition of the Code. 
It was firstly suggested that the insurer could not refuse the claim unless a 
careful assessment is made. Naturally, this suggestion requires the insurer to 
provide sufficient reasons for a rejection of a claim655 and it also imposes 
obligations on participants to upgrade the level of their actual service suppliers, if 
any.656 This will inevitably increase the cost, but such increased cost should be 
regarded as the necessary and ordinary costs of a healthy insurance industry.657  
It was then submitted by the Australian FOS that the time limit for communication 
with the assureds had caused difficulties for the Code participants to follow and 
this requirement could also incur extra cost;658 however, as mentioned above, 
those difficulties could be understood as reasons why the Code participants 
need to improve the standard of training and education; in fact some Code 
participants submitted that they could even do better than the requirement of the 
                                         
655
 It is therefore recommended that reasons for denials shall be disclosed to assureds, and the level of 
those disclosures is to be contained in the Code as good industry guidelines, see General Insurance 
Code of Practice Independent Review at p.97. 
656
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at p.97. 
657 The issue of increasing costs has also been addressed by ALRC.  
658
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at pp 94-95. 
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Code.659 However, the time limit becomes more difficult when unexpected 
external factors occur: it was submitted by Suncorp that once the situation was 
beyond the control of insurers660  
“…any arbitrary time limit could encourage poor repair practices to 
ensure it was met.”661  
Currently, the best solution is to disclose the situation and the reasons for the 
delay to the assured, plus information about internal dispute resolution (IDR) or 
external dispute resolution (EDR). Even though this “solution” is considered to 
be sufficient, it could also be regarded as a situation where it is time to show the 
flexibility of the Code: promoted training and education could certainly reduce 
the scope of factors which are beyond the control of insurers;662 it may also be 
suitable for the Code to provide guidelines or recommendations (rather than 
principles) for dealing with those difficulties.  
More importantly, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Code, 
self-regulation in its nature and generally unenforceable in most of its contents, 
is enforceable with legal effect only as to the manner of claim handling663: 
1. Once a sanction or corrective action is made due to the non-compliance with 
the Code, it is legally enforceable by the court.  
2. As a benchmark of unconscionable conduct in the claim handling stage, the 
legal effect of the Code could be divided into two parts. Firstly, it could be 
                                         
659 ibid, at p.95. 
660 Natural catastrophes are typical examples.  
661
 General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review, at p.95. 
662 ibid, at p.97. 
663
 ibid, at para 9.121. 
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enforced directly by the ASIC Act 2001 s.12CC(1)(h) and (3); and secondly, it is 
also true that once the assured is aware of the Code and the insurer is bound by 
it, the manner of claim handling in the Code becomes legally binding. Once a 
claim is heard before the court, compliance with the Code would become a 
decisive matter for s.57 of the ICA 1984 in awarding the statutory interest; and 
more importantly, it is also a great reference for the court to consider whether the 
behaviour of the Code participant insurer is in line with the duty of good faith in 
s.13 of the ICA 1984. As to the latter part, it comes back to stressing the 
importance of promoting the Code, again; and in fact, that will be a sufficient 
remedy for the assured, even though it will be better to make this effect 
expressly stated in the Code.  
6.2.12 It has been introduced above that as to the matter of claim handling the 
non-compliance of the Code will bring assureds a legal remedy; however, it 
needs to be remembered that the Code is not intended to facilitate claims before 
a court, but to reduce them; therefore, it is also important to discuss alternative 
dispute resolutions (ADR) provided by the Code. 
It is a requirement of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 that AFSL holders 
have to provide IDR and EDR to their retail clients and it is also recommended 
that IDR should apply to retail clients only. However, it is further pointed out that 
the current IDR scheme is insufficiently designed: one example may be named 
as “the FOS circle”, which means that once the assured lodges a dispute in FOS, 
FOS will refer this matter back to the IDR process of the Code participants, 
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rather than deal with the dispute by the FOS EDR664 and in order to solve this 
problem it would be better to extend the jurisdiction of the FOS EDR. It is always 
to be remembered that the Code itself will not provide assureds monetary 
remedies directly, but after the discussion above, there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that, with further developments665 the indirect remedy provided by 
the Code will be sufficient.  
(4) Important Changes in the General Insurance Code of Conduct 2014 
6.2.13 After the detailed and helpful review, the 2014 Code has been published 
and with some significant improvements: some of them follow the 
recommendations of the review and some go even further. Before going into the 
detailed changes, it should be mentioned that most of the changed sections666 
apply in retail insurance only. 
(a) Improved customer experience  
In order to promote the 2014 Code, a new website667 has been designed; it 
looks clear and easy and much useful information is contained within it and it has 
a special illustration for consumers about how the Code works. 
(b) The legal effect 
Unlike its predecessor,668 the 2014 Code makes it clear that, in appropriate 
circumstances, the Code could be used together with the law and provide a 
                                         
664 See General Insurance Code of Practice Independent Review at para 9.136, and this is also a step taken 
by the FOS in the UK. 
665
 See discussion about the 2014 Code below. 
666 They are ss.4,6,7,9,10. 
667
 See <http://codeofpractice.com.au/>, accessed on 10
th
 March 2015. 
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wider cover than the law669, and it is reasonable to believe that the Code could 
work well with the ICA 1984. 
(c) Governing body of the Code and sanctions 
The enforcement and compliance of the Code are now governed by the new 
Code Governance Committee (CGC), which is made up of a representative from 
the insurance industry, a consumer representative and an independent chair. No 
wonder this structure is more suitable for interpreting the Code with commercial 
reality. 
It has been mentioned above, that the CGC, like its predecessor the CCC, is not 
entitled to make direct monetary sanctions; however, this time the power of the 
CGC has been strengthened, since the non-monetary sanction made by it has a 
more binding670 and deterrent effect. The CGC does not only make corrective 
advice now,671 it can also require rectification with a clear timeframe and 
compliance audit;672 and the most deterrent feature is its publication: the CGC 
can now publish the Code participants’ non-compliance of the Code and no 
wonder this could easily “ruin” the reputation of that  participant and therefore, it 
is suggested that this sanction should only be used with extra caution and it is 
better for the CGC to consider both sides of the insurance contract.   
                                                                                                                       
668 Where the Code gives customers no right recognized by law. 
669 The 2014 Code s.1.4. 
670
 The 2014 Code, at s.13.16: The CGC’s decisions are binding on us (the Code participants). 
671 ibid, at s. 13.15 (c). 
672
 ibid, at s. 13.15 (a), (b). 
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(d) Complaint information and process 
In the 2014 Code the customer’s right of complaint will be attached with the 
communication between the Code participant and the assured as well as on the 
insurer’s website; further, detailed information about the complaint and its 
process will also be disclosed to the assured after any negative behaviour673 
made by Code participants and the detailed regulations on complaints are stated 
in s.10 of the 2014 Code. 
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of dispute resolutions, as introduced 
above: IDR and EDR. In the 2014 Code the IDR is divided into two stages which 
in total will not be more than 45 calendar days; the extension beyond that time 
limit or the customer’s dissatisfaction could trigger the EDR process which is 
governed and administrated by FOS and decisions made by the IDR and EDR 
are binding on the Code participants. 
(e) Claim handling 
It is confirmed in the 2014 Code that participants under the Code dealing with 
general insurance should behave honestly, fairly, transparently and timely. 
These behaviours do not only appear in claim handling but also in the 
placement674 and complaint.675 As to the claim handling the time limit in the 
Code remains unchanged676 and the 2014 Code further makes it clear that: 
                                         
673 They include denial of a claim or financial assistance, failure to comply with a timetable. 
674 The 2014 Code, ss.4-5. 
675
 ibid, at s.10. 
676 10 days after investigation or 4 months after receiving the claim or 12 months if the claim is influenced 
by exceptional circumstances. 
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1. Only relevant information about the insurer’s decision will be asked;677 
2. A timetable will be provided if the claim is complex in nature and the detailed 
information about the complaint will be attached with the timetable;678 
3. Assureds will be informed about the process of the claim;679  
4. Reasons will be given for denial and complaint information will be provided.680 
(f) Financial hardship 
In s.7.7 of the 2014 Code it states that where the assured reasonably 
demonstrates an urgent financial need of the benefits from the policy caused by 
the event which leads to the claim, the insurer may fast-track the claim handling 
or makes advance payment within 5 business days. This section is intended to 
deal with immediate hardship, but in practice several points are worth noticing: 
Firstly, it is always decided by the insurer about whether there is an urgent need, 
and if there is, whether it is appropriate to advance the payment (and what 
amount) or only fast-track the claim handling process, subject to the complaint to 
IDR or EDR; but once a complaint is initiated it means that the time is delayed 
and some loss may already be caused by that urgent hardship. 
Secondly, it is for the assured to prove the causation; that is to say the urgent 
hardship has to be caused by the claimed event rather than one of the insured 
events and this may sometimes confuse the customer. 
                                         
677 The 2014 Code, s.7.3. 
678
 ibid, s.7.5. 
679 ibid, ss.7.11-7.15. 
680
 ibid, s.7.19. 
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Accordingly, in order to understand this section properly and avoid unnecessary 
disputes, it would be better if there were guidelines or examples interpreting the 
application of that section, and of course, the insurer’s training and education are 
also important. 
6.2.14 After the discussion about self-regulation in Australia, it may be 
concluded that the Code is well developed and the interests of both parties in 
general insurance are considered and reflected in the 2014 Code. It is predicted 
that the 2014 Code could develop in practice as well and it may become a good 
reference to other self-regulations such as marine insurance and reinsurance, 
and also a good reference for other countries, for example, England. 
6.3 Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) 
6.3.1 It has been introduced at the beginning of this work that the current English 
legal position of indemnity insurance law is, generally speaking, not the same as 
in almost all the other EU countries regulated by the general principles of EU law, 
which is codified in PEICL. After comparing the Australian approach it is 
appropriate to introduce the EU principle. 
The aim of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) is to 
create a Common Frame of Reference (CFR) for European general contract law 
and to facilitate cross-border insurance business. Even though it is voluntary for 
parties to choose PEICL as the governing law of the insurance contract, once 
the PEICL are adopted by the contract they could exclude the national law(s) of 
the contractual parties and more importantly, no exclusion is allowed in applying 
PEICL. However, it needs to be remembered that the PEICL are in fact legal 
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principles and when they are interpreted derogations are allowed, provided that 
the interest of the policyholder is not harmed. Therefore, if PEICL is incorporated 
into an English policy, the assured could claim for the damages for late payment 
even before the Enterprise Act 2016 comes into force.  
It is not necessary to go much further into PEICL but some key points have to be 
identified because PEICL could be regarded as a general understanding about 
some important matters in insurance contracts by the majority of countries of 
Europe. 
6.3.2 There is no express term in PEICL which states the nature of the insurer’s 
obligation, but clearly it is by no means the obligation to prevent the loss: in 
PEICL that obligation belongs to the assured to prevent further loss, which is 
similar to the English “sue and labour” provision in the MIA 1906; and from the 
expression in Art 4:103 (2)681, it is reasonable to infer that the primary obligation 
of the insurer is to provide insurance money, in other words, to make the 
contractual payment stated on the policy. 
6.3.3 It is clearly stated in PEICL that it is the insurer’s obligation to “take all 
reasonable steps to settle a claim promptly” and unless information for the delay 
or denial is given in writing within 1 month, the insurer is presumed as accepting 
the claim. It is also stated in PEICL that once the claim is accepted, payment 
shall be made without undue delay in no more than 1 week after finishing the 
quantification. These principles could support the argument that under PEICL 
the obligation of the insurer is to make contractual indemnity and the cause of 
                                         
681
 “(2) Subject to a clear clause providing for reduction of the insurance money according to the degree of 
fault, the policyholder or insured, as the case may be, shall be entitled to insurance money in respect of 
any loss caused by negligent non-compliance with a precautionary measure.” 
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action will not arise until the reasonable quantification is finished and that is also 
the time when interest in PEICL should begin to run. 
6.3.4 Once the payment is unduly delayed, the assured is allowed both interest 
and damage for late payment. In line with common practice in many countries, 
interest on late payment will run from the date when payment should be made at 
the rate applied by the European Central Bank in refinancing operations plus 
7%.  
However, the assured’s co-operation is also expressly required by PEICL. If the 
lack of co-operation causes prejudice to the insurer, the insurer is allowed to 
reduce the amount of payment equal to the prejudice; once the duty of 
co-operation is breached either with intention or recklessness it may give 
insurers opportunity to discharge the whole liability. 
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Chapter 7 The Impact of Enterprise Act 2016 
7.1 The sections in the new Enterprise Act 2016: Contracting out 
7.1.1 As mentioned at the beginning of this work, the original section on the 
insurer’s obligation to pay has been reintroduced in the new Enterprise Act 
2016;682 in addition, a new section on contracting out of the above-mentioned 
section has been added subsequently: 
“(1) A term of a consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, 
which would put the consumer in a worse position as respects any of 
the matters provided for in section 13A than the consumer would be in 
by virtue of the provisions of that section (so far as relating to 
consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent of no effect. 
(2) A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other 
contract, which would put the insured in a worse position as respects 
deliberate or reckless breaches of the term implied by section 13A 
than the insured would be in by virtue of that section is to that extent 
of no effect. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) a breach is deliberate or 
reckless if the insurer— 
(a) knew that it was in breach, or 
(b) did not care whether or not it was in breach. 
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 See s.29 of the Enterprise Act 2016.  
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(4) A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other 
contract, which would put the insured in a worse position as respects 
any of the other matters provided for section 13A than the insured 
would be in by virtue of the provisions of that section (so far as 
relating to non-consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent of no 
effect, unless the requirements of section 17 have been satisfied in 
relation to the term…”683 
By virtue of this section, it is certain that as to the consumer insurance contract 
the insurer could not contract out of the duty to make timely payment nor could 
the insurer avoid the obligation to pay damages caused by the late payment. 
However, parties to a non-consumer insurance contract could agree on less 
favourable terms and could contract out the implied term, provided that firstly, 
the deviation from the implied term does not avail the insurer of deliberate or 
reckless breach of the obligation to make payment and secondly, the alternative 
provision of the contract has to be clear and unambiguous and sufficient steps 
have to have been taken by the insurer to draw it to the attention of the 
assured.684 
Accordingly, the position of the law is clear: as to the consumer insurance it 
would become the strict obligation of the insurer to make a timely payment, 
otherwise damage shall be paid if it is caused by the late payment; while as to 
non-consumer insurance or business insurance, the starting point of the law 
remains the same as consumer insurance but the law permits the market 
                                         
683 See s.29 of the Enterprise Act 2016. 
684
 See s.17 of Insurance Act 2015. 
304 
 
practice to make an adjustment and it will then become a problem of business 
rather than a problem of law. However, unlike the Australian ICA 1984 the new 
Insurance Act 2015, which will be amended by the new Enterprise Act 2016 with 
the implied obligation on the insurer, applies universally to general indemnity 
insurance contracts, marine insurance contracts and even reinsurance contracts. 
However, its application on reinsurance contracts may cause unpredicted new 
problems. 
7.2 The unexpected problems from the reinsurer 
(1) The problems 
7.2.1 It has been introduced at the beginning of this work that most insurers 
welcome the implied term approach of their obligation to make a timely payment 
because this approach could build up a comfortable environment for modern 
insurance business. However, some unexpected problems happen when 
reinsurance evolves, and the following questions have to be answered: 
1. If the insurer delays the payment and actually pays the insured sum plus 
damage for the late payment, what is the legal position of the reinsurer? 
2. If the insurer settles a claim with the assured, is the reinsurer obliged to pay 
the damage admitted during the settlement in case a “follow settlement” clause 
is incorporated in the reinsurance policy? 
3. If the reinsurer takes over the claim handling process and the payment in the 
insurance policy is ultimately delayed, what will be the legal consequence? 
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(2) The general position of the reinsurer 
7.2.2 Although it is always said that reinsurance shares most principles with 
insurance, 685  under current English law the starting date of the insurer’s 
obligation is different from the date of the reinsurer. 
It has been discussed several times that under current law once the insured risk 
occurs the insurer is automatically in breach, however, that is not true for the 
reinsurer. There has been a heated debate on the exact subject matter of the 
reinsurance contract, which is caused by the vague language in s.9 (1) of the 
MIA 1906,686 and accordingly the subject matter of the reinsurance contract may 
either be understood as the liability of the insurer687 or the same risk in the 
original insurance policy688 (also known as the direct policy).  
The continuous debate shall be discussed later in this part, but it is certain that, 
without an agreement to the contrary, unless and until two preconditions are met, 
the reinsurer’s obligation will not arise: firstly, the insurer owes an established 
and quantified obligation to the assured and secondly, the insurer is able to 
                                         
685 See Arnould (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell) at para.33-01. 
686
 “The insurer under a contract of marine insurance has an insurable interest in his risk, and may 
re-insure in respect of it.” 
687 See Arnould at para 33-07; Ozlem Gurses, Facultative Reinsurance and The Full Reinsurance Clause, 
available on 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/210837/8.hasCoversheetVersion/__soton.ac.uk_ude_PersonalFiles_Users_
slb1_mydocuments_ozlemthesis_with_signed_declaration.pdf>, last accessed on 15
th
 February 2016, 
at para 1.4; see also Lord Hope in Agnew v Lansforsakringsbolagens AB [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 637; 
Feasey v. Sun Life Assurance Corporation of Canada [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 637; for an Australian 
approach see Commonwealth of Australia v Vero Insurance Ltd [2012] FCA 826. 
688 See Marine Insurance Legislation (5th edn, Routledge, 2013), at notes 9, see also Wasa International 
Insurance Co Ltd v. Lexington Insurance Co [2009] UKHL 40, especially per Lord Collins. 
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prove that the reinsurance claim falls within the reinsurance contract. 689 
Accordingly, compared with a direct insurer the liability of the reinsurer would not 
arise unless the preconditions mentioned above are met; while the liability of the 
direct insurer, under current law, arises as soon as the insured peril occurs.  
The nature of the reinsurance contract is not the main aim of this work, but it is 
rather difficult to discuss the influence of the implied obligation on the reinsurer 
without a clear definition of the nature of reinsurance, especially as to the 
reinsurer’s legal position when the insurer is liable for the late payment. 
According to the effect of the implied obligation, it will become contractual 
obligation of the insurer to make payment within a reasonable time and 
accordingly, if a reinsurance contract is to insure against the insurer’s 
contractual obligation the reinsurer could hardly deny its obligation to indemnify 
the insurer’s damages paid to the assured, not even by inserting the Extra 
Contractual Loss (XCL) clause into the reinsurance contract. While if a 
reinsurance contract is to insure against the original risk the reinsurer would not 
be liable because the causation of the further damage is the insurer’s behaviour 
rather than the insured risk. Therefore, the subject matter of the reinsurance 
contract shall be discussed in the first place and the relevant questions at the 
beginning of this part shall be discussed below.  
                                         
689
 See Arnould (18
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell) at para 33-34, Ozlem Gurses and Rob Merkin, ‘Facultative 
reinsurance and the full reinsurance clause’, [2008] L.M.C.L.Q, at p.371, see also Malcolm Clarke, ‘The 
Contractual nature of reinsurance’, The Cambridge Law Journal (2010) 69 (1) 24-25 at p.25. 
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(3) The subject matter of reinsurance contracts 
7.2.3 Notwithstanding the continuous debate on the subject matter of 
reinsurance, the House of Lords provided a straightforward answer in Wasa 
International v. Lexington,690 where Lord Phillips held that 
“…under English law a contract of reinsurance in relation to property 
is a contract under which the reinsurers insure the property that is the 
subject of the primary insurance; it is not simply a contract under 
which the reinsurers agree to indemnify the insurers in relation to any 
liability that they may incur under the primary insurance…”691 
This understanding was also accepted by Lord Mance692 and Lord Collins693 
and accordingly under current English law, without special contractual 
provisions,694 the subject matter of the reinsurance contract is the original risk 
rather than the insurer’s liability and the reinsurance is described by Malcolm 
Clarke as if 
“…the insurer of my house reinsured the risk: my house would then 
be covered against fire by two insurers, insurer and reinsurer. In 
the event of a fire my claim would only be against the insurer with 
                                         
690 [2009] UKHL40. 
691
 Wasa International v. Lexington [2009] UKHL40, at [2]. 
692 ibid, at [32-33]. 
693 ibid, at [114]. 
694
 For example, see Feasey v. Sun Life Assurance [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 640, where the principle of the 
“pervasive insurable interest” changed the subject matter of a reinsurance policy from the original risk to 
the liability of the insurer. 
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whom I had contracted. That insurer would later recover part of what it 
paid me from the reinsurer.”695 
Accordingly, when an insurer reinsures the risk with a reinsurer, what the 
reinsurer insures against is the original risk rather than the insurer’s liability, 
no matter primary or secondary, and therefore, the problems at the 
beginning of this chapter could be answered below. 
(4) The liability of the reinsurer in case of the insurer’s late payment 
7.2.4 A brief answer to the first question is that generally the reinsurer is not 
liable when the insurer is held liable for damage for late payment according to 
the implied obligation. There are two sub questions to be answered in this part:  
1. Could the implied obligation apply between the insurer and the reinsurer in 
case of the insurer’s late payment? 
2. Could the reinsurer be held liable for the reason that the liability of the insurer 
to pay damages due to the late payment is within the scope of the reinsurance 
contract? 
The answer to the first question is straightforward. In Commercial Union 
Assurance Co v. NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd696 it was held that once a 
judgment was entered against the insurer, the liability of the reinsurer was then 
fixed and quantified. Accordingly, during the late claim handling stage the liability 
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 Malcolm Clarke, ‘The Contractual nature of reinsurance’, The Cambridge Law Journal (2010) 69 (1) 
24-25 at p.24. 
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 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.600. 
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of the reinsurer does not arise and there is no reason why the reinsurer shall be 
liable for the period before its obligation arises. 
The answer to the second question, according to the discussion on the nature of 
reinsurance, is that the reinsurer is not liable to indemnify the insurer on the 
damage. Even though there is no binding legal precedent on this point, it is worth 
noting that firstly, according to the discussion of the effect of the implied 
obligation in the Enterprise Act 2016, the primary obligation of the insurer will be 
a contractual one to indemnify the assured, and in a reinsurance context the 
original risk means the risk which could trigger the insurer’s primary obligation; 
secondly, it should be remembered, based on the discussion in chapter 2 and 
chapter 3 of this work, that if a judgment on damage for late payment is entered 
it must be read as two parts: the first one is on the primary obligation of the 
insurer, which holds that the insurer shall be liable for the insured loss and this 
part is the liability caused by the original risk which could be recovered from the 
reinsurer; the second one is the secondary obligation, which holds that due to 
the delay of the performance of the primary obligation the insurer shall be liable 
for damage, and this part is not covered by the reinsurer. Other than the reason 
provided above, this answer could also find some support in s.55 of the MIA 
1906, where it clearly states that the insurer is liable for any loss proximately 
caused by a peril insured against, but he is not liable for any loss which is not 
proximately caused by a peril insured against. Applying this section to the 
reinsurance context, it means that the reinsurer is only liable for the loss caused 
by the original risk, subject to the reinsurance policy limit,697 but that reinsurer is 
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 See Uzielli & Co v Boston Marine Insurance Co (1884) 15 Q.B.D. 11. 
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not liable for damages caused by the insurer’s poor behaviour. However, the 
best way to make sure that the reinsurer could get rid of the payment for 
damages is to express clearly on the reinsurance policy that it excludes 
damages and further interest caused by the insurer’s late payment.   
(5) The liability of the reinsurer in settlement 
7.2.5 It is not uncommon for reinsurers to add a “follow the settlement” clause 
into the reinsurance contract and the typical wording of that clause reads as 
“Being a Reinsurance of and warranted same . . . terms and 
conditions as and to follow the settlements of the Insurer…” 
The leading case of this provision is Insurance Co of Africa v. Scor.698 In that 
case a reinsurance contract was entered into on the “follow the settlement” basis. 
A claim was raised by the assured and after consulting loss adjusters the insurer 
settled the claim and then sought an indemnity from the reinsurer who at that 
time obtained strong evidence that the assured of the direct policy was a fraud. It 
needs to be stressed here again that in order to make a reinsurer liable two 
conditions have to be met together: firstly, the insurer is liable according to the 
direct policy and secondly, the claim made by the insurer was within the scope of 
the reinsurance. While in Scor it was certain that should the assured destroy its 
property intentionally the insurer was not liable it would be redundant to consider 
whether the insurer’s claim was within the scope of the reinsurance contract. 
However, Robert Goff LJ took another view on the effect of the “follow the 
settlement” provision: 
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“In my judgment, the effect of a clause binding reinsurers to follow 
settlements of the insurers, is that the reinsurers agree to indemnify 
insurers in the event that they settle a claim by their assured… 
provided that the claim so recognized by them falls within the 
risks covered by the policy of reinsurance as a matter of law, and 
provided also that in settling the claim the insurers have acted 
honestly and have taken all proper and businesslike steps in making 
the settlement… I do not read the clause as inhibiting reinsurers 
from contesting that the claim settled by insurers does not, as a 
matter of law, fall within the risks covered by the reinsurance 
policy; but… I do consider that the clause presupposes that 
reinsurers are entitled to rely not merely on the honesty, but also on 
the professionalism of insurers, and so is susceptible of an implication 
that the insurers must have acted both honestly and in a proper and 
businesslike manner.”699 
7.2.6 It is rightly suggested by Arnould that the effect of the “follow the settlement” 
clause is to relieve the insurer’s obligation of proving that the loss is within the 
direct policy while it is nevertheless necessary for the insurer to prove that the 
loss is covered by the reinsurance policy.700 It has been discussed above that 
because the subject matter of the reinsurance is the original risk rather than the 
liability of the insurer, the money paid according to the settlement is not covered 
by the reinsurance automatically and whether the insurer is entitled to recover 
from the reinsurer is subject to the following matters: 
                                         
699 Insurance Co of Africa v. Scor [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 312 at p.330, emphasis added. 
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Firstly, the claim which is raised by the assured and triggers the settlement has 
to be covered by the reinsurance policy should it be raised by the insurer, but it is 
not necessarily within the scope of the direct policy,701 and if the direct policy 
and the reinsurance policy are back to back, which means that the terms of both 
policies are identical, while the settlement is not covered by the direct policy, the 
insurer could not recover from the reinsurer at all. 
Secondly, the settlement has to be made not only in good faith but also in a 
commercial way. This aspect has been reviewed by Field J in Tokio Marine v. 
Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd702 and it was held that as long as there was 
nothing additional to be gained by further investigation and negotiation, it would 
be sufficient for the insurer to argue that a businesslike settlement in good faith 
had been made and the reinsurer was liable to indemnify according to the “follow 
the settlement” clause.703 
Thirdly, in Tokio Marine v. Novae Corporate Underwriting Ltd the reinsurance 
policy clearly stated on the “follow the settlement” provision that the liability of 
the reinsurer is subject always to the limits reinsured and in that case it was 
unnecessary to argue that the reinsurer was not liable for the amount over the 
limit of the reinsurance policy. However, it is arguably right that even if there is no 
such limit the “follow the settlement” clause would not make the reinsurer pay 
more than the policy limit. This argument could find some support from Uzielli & 
Co v Boston Marine Insurance Co.704 In that case the ship-owner insured the 
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vessel for 100% and the insurer subsequently reinsured the full value of the 
vessel and the reinsurer retroceded that risk. The vessel became a constructive 
total loss and the insurer settled the claim by paying 88% of the policy to the 
assured and subsequently paid 24% on its own to rescue the vessel which 
turned out to be fruitless. It was common ground that according to the ‘sue and 
labour’ principle the insurer was entitled to the full amount of 112%, but the 
dispute appeared when the reinsurer sued the retrocessionaire for 112%. In the 
first trial Mathew J gave the judgment for the reinsurer, but in the Court of Appeal 
the amount was firmly limited to 100% which was exactly the limit of the 
retrocession. It was held by Brett MR that the ‘sue and labour’ action was taken 
by the insurer rather than the reinsurer and even though the reinsurer was able 
to insure more than 100%, choosing not to do so would make the retrocession 
policy limit conclusive.705 Additionally, in Scor the insurer settled a claim and the 
amount of the final settlement was beyond the policy limit and it was held by the 
Court of Appeal that the obligation of the reinsurer was limited by the 
reinsurance policy, even though a “follow the settlement” clause was inserted in 
the reinsurance contract and it was not clearly stated whether the reinsurer’s 
obligation in the settlement was subject to the reinsurance policy limit. 
7.2.7 After considering the above issues, it is not the end of the story regarding 
settlements: it is common that the final amount of the settlement is a number 
combined with different considerations and among them the damage for late 
payment might be included. In other words, it has been argued by this work that 
the reinsurer is not liable for the damage for late payment paid by the insurer, as 
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understood when applying the implied obligation under the new legislation; but 
what if the damage for late payment is admitted by the insurer in the settlement 
and in this situation, is the reinsurer liable according to the “follow the settlement” 
clause in the reinsurance contract? There is no reported case focusing directly 
on this point, however, it should be remembered that in Scor the court 
nevertheless permitted the reinsurer to refuse the settlement which was outside 
the reinsurance cover;706 accordingly if the reinsurer could prove that a part of 
the settlement amount reflects damage for late payment the reinsurer will not be 
held liable for that amount. However, what if the detail of the settlement amount 
is not known at all? 
This happened in a liability insurance case, Lumberman’s v. Bovis;707 even 
though it was not a reinsurance case, the nature of the settlement was the 
same.708 In that case Bovis entered into a contract with Braehead and due to 
the conflict Bovis claimed its contractual payment of £37m while Braehead 
counterclaimed £103m or £75m based on different grounds. The claim was 
finally settled and Braehead paid £15m settlement to Bovis but the contents of 
the settlement were completely unknown. It was held by Colman J that the 
dispute in that case was in fact issues about the assured’s burden of proof and in 
order to claim against the insurer, the assured had to prove that 
“Firstly, there has to have occurred an eventuality which has rendered 
the insured liable to a third party. Secondly, the eventuality and the 
consequent liability has to be within the scope of the cover provided 
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by the policy. Thirdly, it must be established that such liability has 
caused loss to the insured of an amount within the scope of the 
contractual indemnity. Each of these constituents of the obligation to 
indemnify the insured has to be established before it can be said that 
there is a cause of action.”709 
Applying the above statement in a reinsurance context, it seems that it is the 
insurer’s obligation to prove the detailed information about the settlement, 
otherwise the cause of action against the reinsurer would not arise and therefore, 
if the detail of a settlement is completely unknown, the reinsurer would not be 
liable due to the lack of cause of action, in spite of the “follow the settlement” 
provision. 
However, the outcome of Lumberman’s was not welcomed and in Enterprise Oil 
v. Strand Insurance,710 another liability insurance case, it was not followed by 
Aikens J.  
7.2.8 It is worth pausing here to stress the reinsurer’s obligation again. It has 
been discussed above that, it has been settled in law that in order to trigger the 
obligation of the reinsurer, the insurer has to firstly ascertain its obligation to the 
assured and secondly prove that a claim is within the scope of the reinsurance 
contract; this statement is undoubtedly correct, however, when a “follow the 
settlement” clause is inserted, this statement needs to be explained further: 
ascertaining the obligation to the assured could be named as the precondition 
issue while proving the cover could be named as the causation issue and in an 
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insurance context those two issues are in fact one; when a “follow the settlement” 
provision is inserted it actually means that the precondition issue is waived by 
the reinsurer unless the settlement is made in an unreasonable or 
unbusinesslike manner but the causation issue nevertheless applies. 
In light of this understanding Lumberman’s could be regarded as reaffirming 
what was decided in Scor: even though a settlement has been reached between 
the assured and the insurer, it is always open for the reinsurer to argue that the 
claim of the insurer according to the settlement is beyond the scope of the 
reinsurance contract.711 
(6) Late payment caused by the reinsurer 
7.2.9 It has been discussed above that if a “follow the settlement” clause is 
inserted into the reinsurance policy, the reinsurer is not entitled to deny liability if 
the insurer’s claim falls within the scope of the reinsurance policy. Therefore, for 
the sake of their own interest, reinsurers always wish to make sure that the 
insurance claims or settlements could be handled directly by the reinsurers 
rather than the insurers, or at least they could participate in the process and 
accordingly, claim control clauses and claim co-operation clauses are often 
found in reinsurance policies. 
In Gan Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd (Nos 2 and 3)712 the 
meaning of the claim co-operation clause was considered by the Court of Appeal; 
the wording of that clause was: 
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“…it is a condition precedent to any liability under this policy that 
(a) the reinsured shall, upon knowledge of any circumstances which 
may give rise to a claim against them, advise the reinsurers 
immediately, and in any event not later than 30 days. 
(b) The reinsured shall co-operate with reinsurers and/or their 
appointed representatives subscribing to this policy in the 
investigation and assessment of any loss and/or circumstances giving 
rise to a loss. 
(c) No settlement and/or compromise shall be made and liability 
admitted without the prior approval of reinsurers.” 
It was held both by Longmore J and members of the Court of Appeal that 
according to that provision the duty of the insurer’s co-operation, if properly 
drafted, could be regarded as the condition precedent of the reinsurer’s 
liability.713 Two further questions about the implied obligation were also raised, 
namely, whether there were to be implied into the reinsurance policy that 
reinsurers could not withhold approval of a settlement unless there were 
reasonable grounds for withholding that approval; and that reinsurers would 
respond with reasonable promptness to a request for approval of a settlement. It 
is necessary to pause here to illustrate the importance of such implications in 
light of an important principle: “the privity of contract”. 
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(7) Privity of contract in reinsurance claims 
7.2.10 It is common ground that a contract of insurance is between the assured 
and the insurer, while if the insurer signs a reinsurance contract it is a contract 
between the insurer and the reinsurer. It is settled that the contract of insurance 
and the contract of reinsurance are entirely separate undertakings, which means 
that the assured could not claim directly against the reinsurer, while the reinsurer 
could not avoid the reinsurance policy due to the assured’s failure to comply with 
the duty of good faith. There is but one exception, according to which the 
assured could claim against the reinsurer: the insolvency of the insurer.714 
In Grecoair v. Tilling715 the court was asked if here could be another exception to 
the privity of contract if the reinsurer assumed direct liability to the assured. In 
that case Grecoair was the assured which insured against certain kind of risks 
for aeroplanes with ENSA and the latter reinsured with Tilling; when the loss 
occurred, it was argued by Grecoair that according to special contractual 
arrangements and the settlement meeting it could claim directly against the 
reinsurer instead of the insurer. There were two grounds, according to which 
Grecoair made the claim: firstly, according to the reinsurance contract, the 
insurance claims had to be handled by the reinsurer and secondly at a 
settlement meeting on 11 March 1997 the representatives of the reinsurer made 
several points, which could constitute the assumption of direct liability. 
                                         
714 See The Fanti [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 191. 
715
 [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 151. 
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However, Langley J was not persuaded by those arguments made by Grecoair; 
it was held that the principle of privity of contract had to be maintained in that 
case and, as to the first argument, it was stated by Langley J that 
“In my judgment, there is nothing in either the contractual documents 
or context which justifies the case Grecoair seeks to make on the first 
issue. To the contrary, the documents and context are all consistent 
with the conventional status of assured, insurer and reinsurer. 
Grecoair’s claim on this basis therefore also fails.”716  
As to the second argument, it was unnecessary for Langley J to make further 
comment because a short meeting itself could not prove the assumption of 
liability and accordingly the assured failed on both issues. 
Therefore, it is settled by law that although a claim could be handled by the 
reinsurer, the claim handling arrangement could not usually provide a direct 
cause of action for the assured to claim against the reinsurer directly. If Gan v. 
Tai Ping and Grecoair are read together, it is clear that the insurer is in a very 
awkward position: in order to be indemnified by its reinsurer, the insurer has to 
pass the direct claim under the insurance policy to the reinsurer, but the 
reinsurer is not contractually liable for its claim handling process due to privity of 
contract. Naturally the insurer wishes to add contractual obligations into the 
reinsurance contract about the claim handling manner of the reinsurer, expressly 
or impliedly. 
                                         
716
 ibid, at [105]. 
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(8) Implied terms about the reinsurer’s claim handling manner  
7.2.11 It has to be mentioned in the first place, that it is always open for the 
insurers and reinsurers to add express terms into the reinsurance contract about 
this issue, even though it rarely happens in commercial reality because most 
reinsurance contracts are written on a back-to-back basis and therefore, the 
discussion on the implied obligations is more important. 
Moving back to Gan v. Tai Ping again, this issue was firstly discussed by 
Longmore J (as he then was). The learned judge, after reviewing the leading 
case717 on implication and making cross reference to an authority on land 
law,718 approved those implications and made it clear that 
“… a right arbitrarily to refuse approval of a settlement would defeat 
the purpose of the reinsurance contract, which is to indemnify the 
reinsured in respect of his actual liability to his assured, not to give the 
reinsurer an option to indemnify the reinsured if he feels like it, but not 
if he does not feel like it. The implication that reinsurer’s consent to a 
settlement is not to be unreasonably withheld is, in my opinion, 
necessary to give business efficacy to the contract as a whole. To 
force the reinsured to litigate his liability to the assured to the point of 
judgment is so uncommercial and so unbusinesslike that it cannot 
have been the parties’ intention.”719 
                                         
717
 See The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, this case has been discussed in chapter 2 of this work. 
718 See Price v Bouch (1986) 53 P & CR 257. 
719
 Gan Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd [2001] Lloyd's Rep IR 291, at p.308. 
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7.2.12 However, this judgment was overruled unanimously by the Court of 
Appeal. In the appeal, it was submitted by the reinsurer’s counsel that the 
reinsurer’s approval was not required to establish the liability of the insurer and 
therefore implying an obligation upon the reinsurer was not required to achieve 
the purpose of a reinsurance contract nor business efficiency.720 
This submission was accepted by the court and it was firstly pointed out by 
Mance LJ (as he then was) that as to the purpose of the reinsurance contract, 
because the insurer could always settle a claim with the assured, with or without 
claim provision in the reinsurance contract, even though this settlement could 
deprive the insurer of recovery from the reinsurer and therefore, withholding a 
settlement, no matter rightly or wrongfully, could not defeat the purpose of the 
reinsurance contract.721 
As to the matter of business efficiency, after a detailed analysis, it was held by 
Mance LJ that there was indeed an implied requirement: 
“I would therefore accept as a general qualification, that any 
withholding of approval by reinsurers should take place in good faith 
after consideration of and on the basis of the facts giving rise to the 
particular claim and not with reference to considerations wholly 
extraneous to the subject-matter of the particular reinsurance.”722 
                                         
720
 Gan Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, at [31]. 
721 ibid, at [42]. 
722
 Gan Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 667, at [50]. 
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No wonder the requirement of good faith is lower than the requirement of 
businesslike and reasonable steps even though there is no reported case on the 
exact difference between each other.  
However, it could be assumed that the good faith standard only applies when the 
claim provision is the claim co-operation clause: it was accepted by Mance LJ, in 
light of Scor that if party A’s behaviour could bind party B’s financial obligation it 
was implied that party A had to act in a businesslike and reasonable manner723 
while in Gan v. Tai Ping the settlement and the claim were actually dealt with by 
the insurer even though the reinsurer assisted the insurer’s conduct;724 and, 
therefore, it could be argued that if the claim provision in the reinsurance 
contract is a claim control provision, it means that in case of a claim it is the 
reinsurer’s right to take over, but at the same time it is also the obligation of the 
reinsurer to handle the claim in a businesslike and reasonable manner. However, 
in that situation, if the payment is delayed, it is also the obligation of the insurer 
to pay damage according to the new Enterprise Act 2016 and then recover from 
the reinsurer according to the implied obligation; this arrangement could also 
make the insurance and reinsurance contracts “back to back”: it is the insurer’s 
implied obligation to deal with a claim reasonably and failing to do so will lead to 
damages; when the reinsurer takes over that claim, it is also an implied 
obligation of the reinsurer to handle the claim with reasonable care and failing to 
do so will also lead to damage loss and this loss is to indemnify the damages 
paid by the insurer according to the privity of contract. 
                                         
723 ibid, at [49]. 
724
 ibid, at [77]. 
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According to the discussion above, it seems that once the Enterprise Act 2016 
comes into force, it is more appropriate for the insurer to insert claim control 
provision instead of the claim co-operation clause in order to make those 
contracts back to back. 
7.2.13 In order to decide whether a claim has been handled properly, it is 
required by the new Enterprise Act 2016 that “factors outside the insurer’s 
control”725 have to be considered as an important reference. It has been 
discussed above that in case of a claim co-operation clause or a claim control 
clause the reinsurer’s conduct would not affect the obligation of the insurer and it 
was held by Mance LJ that  
“…insurers’ rights could only ever arise under a reinsurance such as 
the present if and when insurers’ liability to their original insured had 
been ascertained as to its existence and amount, by virtue of a 
judgment, award or settlement/compromise; and that, if this was so, 
inability (under the Claims Co-operation Clause) to settle or 
compromise without approval would mean that reinsurers could oblige 
insurers to allow themselves to be sued to judgment, before 
reinsurers could become liable.”726 
Accordingly, it seems that when the reinsurer’s delay in approving or 
co-operating a settlement threatens the insurer’s obligation to make timely 
payment to the assured, it would be wiser for the insurer to abandon the 
settlement and start a legal proceeding against the assured. However, this 
                                         
725 See s.13A (3) (d) of Insurance Act 2015 (To be amended by s.28 of the Enterprise Act 2016). 
726
 Gan Insurance Co. Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd (Nos 2 and 3) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 667 at [39]. 
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approach seems to be anomalous: if the claim provision is a claim handling 
clause the insurer would never bother to do so, because it has been discussed 
above in this part that once a claim control provision is inserted the obligation of 
the insurer and the reinsurer is completely back to back; secondly, abandoning a 
settlement and starting a legal proceeding in order to claim against the reinsurer, 
this approach seems like a conspiracy between the assured and the insurer and 
the reinsurer would gain a potential defence, according to the claim co-operation 
clause. 
To conclude, the insurer could not deny the liability of late payment simply 
because the claim is co-handled or actually handled by the reinsurer, but in order 
to make sure that the insurer could be indemnified it would be better to insert a 
claim handling clause instead of a claim co-operation clause. 
7.2.14 According to the discussion on the law of reinsurance, it is clear that the 
implied obligation on the insurer could make a huge impact on the reinsurance 
industry and this impact is probably even more serious than that in insurance 
market.  
If the reinsurance contract states nothing about the cover nor the claim handling, 
it is theoretically possible for the reinsurer to deny liability for the damage paid by 
the insurer; while if the reinsurance contract states specifically that it covers the 
liability of the insurer, in order to exclude further liability the damage caused by 
the late payment of the insurer has to be clearly and specifically stated and 
excluded, subject always to the “deliberate or reckless exception” in s.29 of the 
Enterprise Act 2016 
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If a “follow the settlement” clause is inserted into the reinsurance contract the 
reinsurer’s argument could proceed on two levels: firstly whether the settlement 
is made by taking reasonable steps and in a businesslike manner and secondly 
whether a claim according to the settlement is within the cover of the 
reinsurance contract. 
If a reinsurer wishes to insert a claim provision it should be remembered that a 
claim control provision gives more power to the reinsurer but at the same time it 
also requires the reinsurer to handle a claim reasonably and this part is 
problematic: in order to achieve a real back-to-back result when the implied 
obligation is imposed on the insurer, it is very likely that a claim control provision 
will be widely used and it means that more and more reinsurers will be ahead of 
insurers, instead of lagging behind them.   
7.3 The future of insurance law 
7.3.1 Before this work is completed, the draft Enterprise Bill 2015 has become the 
Enterprise Act 2016 and it will come into force on 4th May 2017. Several changes 
have been made to the Bill during these stages but the implied duty of insurers 
remains unchanged. 727  However, it does not mean that this clause is 
uncontroversial and perhaps that is also the reason why the implied obligation 
could not exist in the Law Commission Bill. 
                                         
727
 Although there is an added section on time bar for the damages claim. 
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It is suggested by Hill Dickinson LLP728 that the “reasonable time” is too vague to 
be practical and therefore the insurance community, including insurers, brokers 
and policyholders, should work together to clarify which elements should be 
considered to constitute “a reasonable time”.729 It is also of concern to the law 
firm that the implied obligation of the insurer could bring uncertainty and 
unfairness to the reinsurance and subscription market; even though these 
problems could be solved by inserting policy wordings, the lead-in time is 
insufficient. 
Unlike Hill Dickinson LLP, Lord Patten believed that the insurance industry should 
carry the implied obligation even before the Bill starts having its legislative power 
and the insurance industry has the power to do so; and it is rightly pointed out that 
the long-standing bad behaviour of the insurers could  
“…hinder, or at worst torpedo, the efforts of small businesses to get 
back on their feet after, for example, the catastrophic floods…”730  
This view is shared by Kit Malthouse from the House of Commons, who believes 
that it is necessary to impose such an implied obligation upon the insurers, and 
                                         
728 Written evidence submitted by Hill Dickinson LLP (ENT 69), available on 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/enterprise/memo/ent69.htm>, accessed 
on 14th March 2016. 
729 ibid, at para 19. 
730
 Lords Hansard 12
th
 October 2015, available on 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151012-0001.htm#15101212000385
>, accessed on 14
th
 March 2016. 
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he also gives some examples where the insurer’s failure to make a timely 
payment caused huge further losses to the assured.731 
Sajid Javid, who is also in favour of the implied obligation, addresses the problem 
from another aspect: it is stressed by Mr. Javid that the skill base plays a very 
important role in order to unlock the increasing productivity732 and therefore the 
new implied obligation could “force” the insurance market to improve its skills to 
grow in prosperity. 
7.3.2 Considering the practical difficulty of the implied obligation, an amendment 
was moved by Baroness Neville-Rolfe to insert a time bar for the damages claim 
for late payment, which requires a policy-holder to raise a claim within one year 
after the insurer pays all sums due under the insurance claim733  and this 
suggestion was successfully inserted in section 30 of the Enterprise Act 2016. It 
is believed by Baroness Neville-Rolfe that this amendment 
“…does not prejudice them unduly. It also has the potential to protect 
the vast majority of policyholders, who will never need to bring a late 
payment claim, from any premium increases that may result as a 
consequence of insurers’ increased costs...”734 
                                         
731
 House of Commons Hansard 2
nd
 Feb 2016, available on 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160202/debtext/160202-0004.htm#
16020280000007>, accessed on 14
th
 March 2016.  
732 House of Commons Hansard 2nd Feb 2016, available on 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160202/debtext/160202-0002.htm#
16020263000002>, accessed on 14th March 2016.  
733 Lords Hansard 15th December 2015, available on 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151215-0001.htm#15121538000331
>, accessed on 14th March 2016.  
734
 ibid. 
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According to the new section, any damages claim has to be made within one 
year after the insurer made the payment under the policy. This short limitation 
does not affect the ordinary six years’ time limit for policy claims, and the 
payment under the policy, according to subsection 2, could be widely interpreted 
as a payment according to the policy, a settlement payment or a payment forced 
by a judgment or an arbitration award. This section, prima facie, is a section to 
limit the right of the assured through using a short time limit; however, the true 
aim of that section is to balance the interests of both sides of the policy: it is of 
concern to the insurers that the implied obligation and the new cause of action 
could inevitably force them to keep their claim records and hold reserves in 
respect of possible late payment claims for an uncertain length of time; no 
unsurprisingly it would increase the cost of maintenance for insurers and 
therefore potentially increase premiums, while inserting this new limitation clause 
could reduce that concern and more importantly, it reflects the government’s 
ambition that the late payment provision shall not be substantially changed. 
It seems probable that the implied obligation may bring more cost for the 
insurance industry in the future, however, according to the Impact Assessment735 
of the implied obligation there is a different answer: 
Firstly, it is believed that there would be little training cost for the insurer because 
it has already been required by the FCA rules that all insurers should pay 
                                         
735
 Late payment of insurance claims- Impact Assessment, available on 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA15-009E.pdf>, accessed on 14
th March 
2016. 
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promptly and be trained to do so, implying that an obligation on insurers does 
nothing more than stress that requirement.736 
Secondly, even though it is predicted that a cost about £202,250 is to be spent to 
enable senior insurance managers to become familiar with the new law, that cost 
is for the new Insurance Act 2015 as a whole, not only for the implied obligation. 
Thirdly, it is believed by the Assessment that the vague definition of “reasonable 
time”, which insurers worry about most, could only cause a few disputes in future 
litigation and those disputes are able to be clarified by several High Court’s 
rulings.737 
It is also considered by the Assessment whether there could be speculative 
claims in the future and a negative answer is given, because even though the 
assured is able to prove all the required elements to raise a damages claim738 it 
is nevertheless open to the insurer to use the “reasonable basis” defence;739 
additionally, the insurers are protected by the new limitation section,740 which 
would also increase the difficulty of raising a speculative claim. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the actual main “cost” is not from the monetary 
aspect but the confidence in the law and in the insurance industry itself: if the 
insurance industry could provide a general guideline to define “reasonable time” 
and “reasonable basis”, it could then be predicted that after one or two leading 
cases decided by the court, the new law would be less uncertain.  
                                         
736
 ibid, at para 2.23. 
737 ibid, at para 2.29. 
738 These elements, for example, are a valid claim, causation, and the limbs in Hadley v. Baxendale which is 
fully discussed in chapter 3 of this work. 
739 Insurance Act 2015, s. 13A (4), (to be amended by the Enterprise Act 2016). 
740
 See The Enterprise Act 2016, at s. 30. 
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Alternatively, the implied obligation could bring great benefits not only to assureds, 
but also the insurance industry and even to the economic environment of this 
country: 
Firstly, it is axiomatic to mention that assureds could have direct monetary 
benefits from the new law and according to the Assessment that amount could be 
£1 million a year at the mid-point.741 
Secondly, it has been mentioned in this work that the current legal position of the 
insurer in the UK (except Scotland) is both isolated and anomalous; the new 
legislation could enhance the international reputation of English law and 
therefore attract more international assureds. 
As to the economic environment, it is believed by the Assessment that the 
improved claim handling method could facilitate the recovery of the trading line 
between the supplier and business after the loss, and it could even provide 
safeguards when an assured company becomes insolvent. 
Through all the stages of the Enterprise Act 2016, the implied obligation on the 
insurer has not been substantially changed: as a part of the Government Bill, the 
late payment provision has gone through the full scrutiny by House of Lords and 
House of Commons, and it is indeed a change “overdue”742 in English law.  
7.3.3 The development of indemnity insurance in this country has been 
discussed and it is very good to see that the reform focuses more on the 
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commercial reality and re-balancing the interests between the insurer and the 
assured (and, of course, the insurer and the reinsurer).  
When the Enterprise Act 2016 comes into force, there will be some inevitable 
problems. For example, it has been argued in this work that the implied 
obligation in the new Enterprise Act 2016 may have changed the primary 
obligation of the indemnity insurer: if it has, the indemnity insurance could be 
regarded as an ordinary contract (although the position of liability insurance 
remains due to the “hold harmless” principle), then the interest could be 
calculated on a compound basis and damages would certainly be recoverable; 
while if it has not, the implied obligation does nothing more than introduce a 
brand new cause of action in insurance law only, it does not deal with the 
unsolved problem as to the nature of the indemnity insurance or the common 
law blot in interest. However, although the debate on those problems could last, 
no one can deny the fact that those new rules on insurance law accelerate the 
prosperity of the insurance industry.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 After the discussion of the whole work, it is safe to conclude that: firstly, it 
should have been clarified that the primary obligation of the insurer is to 
indemnify the assured by payment or reinstatement and once such an obligation 
is breached a secondary obligation of paying damage will incur, in that scenario, 
the general rule of damages shall apply. Notably, damage is still payable even if 
the insurer refuses a claim with good faith but the refusal is turned out to be 
wrong objectively. 
Secondly, interest carried by the primary payment of indemnity shall not start to 
run until the insurer finishes a reasonable investigation; even though interest 
does not mean punishment it should be calculated in compound basis to reflect 
the value of the money and the commercial reality. 
Thirdly, it has been noticed that the non-legal ADR, the FOS has worked well in 
this country and it does help non-commercial assureds to a large extent since the 
law used to be silent. When the new Enterprise Act comes into force, it does not 
mean that the effect of the FOS will be diluted, in the contrary, it means that the 
importance and correctness of the FOS has been supported and proven by law. 
Moreover, the insurers, especially those general insurers in the UK shall learn 
from their colleagues in Australia as the Australian General Insurance Codes of 
Practice could be regarded as a good standard for their future performance. 
Most importantly, it should be remembered that the Enterprise Act 2016 will 
come into effect in May 2017 and damages will be available for the assured and 
a brand new era for insurance has come. 
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